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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the shortcomings of the international banking regulation as a cause of the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 and evaluates the effectiveness of the post-crisis regulatory 
architecture for prevention of future crises in the banking sector. It shows that the 
international standards for banking regulation and supervision -Basel I and Basel II- effective 
at the onset of the crisis, were not strong enough to protect the banking sector from the 
financial turmoil because they contained loopholes allowing regulatory arbitrage and 
encouraging perverse practices which eventually led to the breakdown of the global financial 
system and destabilized the world economy. The new international regulatory framework 
Basel III has managed to address most of the lessons of the financial crisis and to close the 
gaps revealed in Basel II. However, some issues remain unsolved and they might undermine 
the regulatory effort to ensure global financial system stability in the future. The analysis of 
the achievements and the outstanding problems of Basel III leads to the conclusion that Basel 
III will not be able to completely eliminate the possibility of future crises in the banking 
sector primarily because it leaves the shadow banking sector out of its scope. Nevertheless, it 
has a strong regulatory base and potential to reduce the likelihood of future crises or at least to 
mitigate the disruptive effects on the banking system associated with such events provided 
that it is timely and consistently implemented across the globe. It is also important that the 
international banking regulation be regularly updated in step with the financial innovation if 
the objective of financial system stability and resilience is to be achieved in the long run. 
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Foreword 
The combination of law and economic studies has always been attractive to me because the 
two disciplines are practically linked and jointly applicable in the contemporary business and 
corporate world. This is especially valid for the strongly regulated banking industry. 
Therefore, I decided to write about the international banking regulation and its fundamental 
review that has been made in the last three years in response to the global financial crisis. My 
topic was particularly inspired by a couple of guest lectures delivered by practitioners at the 
largest Swiss banks UBS and Credit Swiss as a part of the curriculum in the Financial 
Institutions course which I took during my exchange semester in Switzerland in the fall of 
2010. 
The topic is interesting and challenging because (1) the global financial crisis is an actual 
problem that concerns each single economy, (2) the scale and the dimensions of the crisis set 
a very difficult task to policy makers to find a global solution to problems, (3) the presentation 
and the analysis of the international regulatory process from its first steps with Basel I up to 
its recent standard - Basel III - in one paper allows the new and the old frameworks to be 
directly juxtaposed and gives a complete idea about the international regulatory developments 
and perspectives, (4) the success of the new banking regulation is uncertain and has to be 
followed up and proved in the future; therefore, it is intellectually challenging to assess Basel 
III at its initial stage and to see whether the own conclusions and suppositions about its 
effectiveness will turn out to be true in the time, and (5) the last framework is not a final one 
and there is still a lot of space for further regulatory improvements and fresh ideas. 
At this place, I would like to express my special gratitude to my thesis supervisor Professor 
Guttorm Schjelderup who supported me in the choice of my topic and was sincerely engaged 
with my thesis and willing to help me improve my work during the whole process of writing.  
 
 
Jasmina Svilenova 
Sofia, May 2011 
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Introduction 
In 2007 the world was hit by the most severe financial crisis after the Great Depression of 
1929 that the financial history has ever recorded. Countries and regions all over the world 
have experienced banking crises and significant systemic financial problems many times 
before but the recent crush affected every single nation across the globe and every single 
aspect of the real economy. The depth of the crisis and its world-wide systemic implications 
were unprecedented and raised critical questions and international discussions among policy 
makers and bankers about the omissions of the financial regulation and oversight and how it 
should address the problems this time in order to overcome the negative effects on the world 
economy and to ensure the durable safety and stability of the financial system on a global 
level. The most challenging question in such circumstances is whether the measures taken 
will be sufficient and appropriate enough to help prevent from future financial crises. The 
global consequences of the crush made clear that if financial and economic safety and 
stability is to be pursued and achieved in the future, the financial and banking world will need 
an internationally coordinated and harmonized macro-prudential approach to financial 
regulation and supervision because the banking systems and the financial markets are already 
strongly interconnected, and thus interdependent, and problems at a single systemically 
important financial institution may have system-wide repercussions on a global level. 
Apart from the financial regulation, there are several other areas such as corporate governance 
in banking system, global capital imbalances, and monetary policies which have been largely 
discussed as contributing causes to the financial crisis. These fields will also need a thorough 
revision and appropriate policy responses. The new design of the financial regulation and 
supervision, however, is the major challenge for policy makers. Therefore, this thesis will be 
primarily focused on the regulatory response to the global financial crisis of 2007-2008.  
Additionally, even if the crisis started with the breakdown of the mortgage-backed securities 
market and affected all players in the financial system, it was the banking sector that 
transmitted the financial turbulence and shocks throughout the globe. Thus, the thesis will 
deal exclusively with banking regulation and supervision, and particularly with its 
fundamental weaknesses which led to or allowed the outbreak of the crisis and the regulatory 
corrective actions that have been and should be further taken in order to prevent such events 
in the future.                                                                             
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Finally, because the global scale of the financial crisis provokes international concern and 
requires a global approach to solution of the current and future problems in the banking 
sector, the thesis will leave regional or any country-specific regulation and internal bank’s 
policy out of its scope and will put the emphasis of the analysis on the international standards 
for banking regulation and supervision, and specifically the standards of the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) – Basel I, Basel II and Basel III – designed for 
internationally operating banks. 
The purpose of the analysis of the pre- and post-crisis international banking regulation and 
supervision in this thesis is to answer the following research question: 
Will the new regulatory framework Basel III be sufficiently sound and resilient to protect the 
banking sector from financial crises in the future? 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the new regulatory architecture for prevention of 
future crises in the banking sector the analysis will proceed as follows: 
The first section presents the basic aspects of banking regulation and supervision. It aims to 
explain the necessity of banking regulation and supervision and its main objectives at first 
place and to give a general idea about the different approaches to banking regulation, different 
types of risks banks are exposed to, as well as the different levels at which the banking 
regulation and supervision take place. These main banking concepts will help gain a better 
understanding of the purpose, the functions and the contents of the international standards for 
banking regulation and supervision – Basel I, II and III- analyzed and discussed in the rest of 
the paper. 
Sections 2, 3 and 4 are dedicated to the state of the regulation before the crisis and the nature 
of the crisis itself.  
Section 2 gives a brief overview on the international standards of the BCBS- Basel I and 
Basel II - effective in the banking sector at the onset of the crisis. This is necessary in order to 
facilitate the comprehension of their critical analysis and discussion made in Section 4 and to 
provide the basis for the further comparison to the new regulatory framework - Basel III.  
Section 3 aims to explain the evolution of the financial crisis and to provide a summary of its 
highlights. It focuses on those significant developments that were to a large extent a result of a 
flawed banking regulation and supervision and are therefore of particular interest for 
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regulators as regards their future efforts for regulatory improvements and enhanced 
supervisory controls. The concrete shortcomings of the financial regulation which led to these 
developments are then discussed in detail in Section 4. 
Section 4 deals with the causes of the financial crisis from regulatory perspective. It analyzes 
the key failures of banking regulation and supervision, internal management and controls, and 
financial accounting and explains how the deficiencies in the regulatory frameworks 
facilitated and encouraged regulatory arbitrage and created perverse incentives for bankers to 
take excessive risks which led to exorbitant risk concentrations, excessive leverage and 
insufficient capital levels in the banking sector and caused the subsequent financial crush. The 
critical analysis of the problems of Basel II will be further used to evaluate how successful 
Basel III has managed to address these problems and to close the gaps of Basel II. 
Sections 5 and 6 are designed to analyze the effectiveness and the soundness of the 
international regulatory response to the financial crisis.  
Section 5 summarizes the new standard Basel III and the enhanced framework Basel II which 
aim to correct the shortcomings of the pre-crisis Basel II framework, discussed in Section 4, 
and to bring in some new important elements that have not been addressed before in order to 
promote better bank solvency management and financial system protection.  
Section 6 then discusses the achievements of the new regulation in terms of overcoming the 
flaws of the preceding regulatory frameworks addressed in Section 4. It also outlines some 
outstanding problems and analyzes their potential negative impact on the financial stability of 
the system in the long run. Finally, the capacity and the potential of Basel III to prevent future 
crises in the banking sector are evaluated by weighing its strengths and weaknesses in Chapter 
6.3. in order to answer the research question posed in this thesis.  
In conclusion, Section 7 summarizes the main findings and inferences once again and 
elaborates on some additional issues that should be further addressed in order to strengthen 
the new regulatory framework and to ensure its success in preventing the banking sector from 
severe financial crises in the future. 
 The research in this thesis is based entirely on secondary sources of information like the ones 
found in academic journals and banking literature as well as the official documents of the 
BCBS published at Bank for International Settlements (BIS) web site. 
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Section 1: Bases of Bank Regulation and Supervision 
This section will review the basic aspects of the banking regulation in order to gain a better 
understanding of the main problems that will be further discussed. Since banks are the key 
building block of the financial system and the main concern of the post-crisis regulation the 
term financial regulation1 in the context of this thesis will imply bank regulation. 
Furthermore, banking regulation will refer to external regulation rather than banks’ self-
regulation. When the latter is meant, it will be explicitly stated. 
1.1. Purpose of Bank Regulation and Supervision 
1.1.1. Reasons for Regulation  
In historical perspective financial regulation has usually been an immediate reaction to 
financial crises (Nobel and Zimmermann, 2005). In crisis circumstances the problems and the 
fragility of the banking system become extremely tangible and this enhances the necessity of 
regulatory actions to set new rules of further functioning and exercise strong controls on all 
banks in order to terminate the ill practices and mitigate the negative impact on the economy. 
Some economists such as Kaufman (1996) and Dowd (1996) support the free banking and 
reckon that banks should be a subject to discipline of an unregulated market place. Analyzing 
the history of U.S. Federal regulation on banks they find out that efforts of the regulatory 
institutions to provide protection against fragility of banks actually create additional problems 
(e.g., reduced market discipline, increased risk exposure). As Dowd explains, these problems 
require further intervention that on turn creates new problems. This vicious circle eventually 
leads to an even larger fragility of the banking system and a worse economic outcome than 
the unregulated starting point.  Goodhart (1998), on the other hand, argues that the main cause 
of  problems in banking has traditionally been the failure of internal governance and controls- 
poor credit control, connected lending, insufficient liquidity and capital. He argues further that 
the private sector, left to itself, produces market failure because of information asymmetries, 
negative externalities and oligopolistic market power and the results in the case of private 
self-regulation (in free market conditions) are worse than in the case of public regulation, 
even with all the failures that the latter may entail. Moreover, the social cost of failures in 
unregulated financial system creates public pressure and forces the establishment of an 
external regulation from a higher instance. Therefore, he concludes, the banking system 
                                                     
1 Financial regulation includes banks, securities markets, mutual and hedge funds, insurers, and central banks 
10 
 
requires enhanced and improved external regulation and supervision in addition to and partly 
in place of self-regulation in order to reinforce internal controls and to prevent from market 
failure.  
Goodhart (1998), among others, states the three main reasons for banking regulation. First, 
customers luck market power and are vulnerable to exploitation from the monopolistic 
behavior of banks. Secondly, bank clients are less informed and unable to monitor banks 
because of difficulty or cost of obtaining information and, therefore, require protection. 
Finally, regulation is necessary to ensure safety and stability of the financial system. 
1.1.2. Objectives of Regulation  
The reasons for banking regulation determine the main purposes and objectives of the 
regulators. The financial regulation is not so much concerned with the control of monopoly 
behavior. As Matthews and Thompson (2005) explain, although banks are to some extent able 
to use information about clients to exercise some monopolistic pricing (e.g., unduly high 
consumer loan interest rates or unduly low deposit interest rates), the ferocious contestability 
of the banking market has in general contributed to decline in interest margins and diminution 
of monopolistic power. The purpose of the regulation in this direction is, therefore, to ensure 
fair and open competition, and reasonable access to systems and information (Goodhart, 
1998).  
The core objectives of banking regulation are to ensure the customer protection and the safety 
and soundness of the banking system. By so doing the regulation will also achieve the 
financial stability of the economy as a whole. 
The main threat for bank customers, first and foremost for the depositors and creditors of the 
bank, arises from the possibility of bank failure and the consequential losses the customers 
may suffer. Additionally, information asymmetry makes customers vulnerable to fraud and 
misuse on the part of the bank. To achieve clients’ protection the financial regulation and 
supervision should ensure the safety, stability and proper conduct of the bank itself, i.e. that 
the bank will remain solvent and will be able to meet its obligations towards its customers 
when they come due. By focusing on the safety and soundness of the individual institutions 
the financial regulation will ensure not only customer protection but also the financial stability 
of the whole banking system. 
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 System protection is important for two reasons. First, it is a common notion among 
economists, regulators and investors that the financial system, and particularly the banking 
system, is much more vulnerable to systematic risks and contagion than any other economic 
sector. This is so because of banks’ special function as asset- and maturity-transformers. The 
difference in the degree of liquidity of their assets and liabilities makes them highly 
vulnerable to depositor withdrawals and bank runs in extreme cases. Additionally, banks are 
more susceptible to systemic crises because of the largely developed interbank market where 
banks deal with each other on a massive scale and imbalances and shocks are quickly spread 
throughout the whole sector (Moosa, 2008) 2. Hence, while the failure of one firm in another 
business is typically in favor of the competition, in banking, the failure of one bank affects 
negatively the other institutions and may cause a crisis in the whole financial system.  
Secondly, bank failures and crises in the financial system have adverse consequences for the 
economic stability. Banks as intermediaries allocate financial resources among various 
economic sectors and are the central provider of payment and liquidity services for the real 
economy (Saunders and Cornett, 2008). Disruption in banking sector, however, leads to 
reduction in credit flows to the rest of the economy, and hence to disturbance of the normal 
economic activity and subsequent economic stagnation.  Therefore, regulatory protection of 
the financial system is of great significance in the contemporary world of international 
banking since systemic failures pose a threat for the economy as a whole and have social costs 
that exceed the private costs of the failing institutions as it is evident from the current crisis. 
A very important function of the regulation is that it strengthens the reputation of the banks 
and increases the confidence of the clients. This determines the behavior of the customers and 
is crucial for both the single bank and the systemic dimension because the functioning of the 
financial markets largely depends on the trust of market participants (Hoffmann, 2004). The 
crisis of 2007-8 was to a large extent a crisis of confidence. Therefore, another objective of 
the regulation should be to ensure sufficient information transparency so that market 
participants can assess banks’ real risk positions and make informed decisions. Additionally, 
the regulators should maintain the credibility of the banks in the eyes of their clients by 
ensuring banks integrity, i.e. that the banks are not committing fraudulent actions such as 
money laundering, exchange rate manipulations and insider transactions on securities market 
(EF, 2000).  
                                                     
2 See 1.4. Systematic risk 
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1.2. Approaches to Bank Regulation  
Regulators have developed several approaches to customer and individual bank as well as 
bank system protection. Saunders and Cornett (2008) indicate four protective mechanisms of 
the U.S. Safety and Soundness Regulation which broadly reflect what occurs elsewhere. 
These are the basic elements of the prudential regulations and financial safety net applied in 
many countries to prevent from or minimize banking sector problems and particularly the risk 
of failure by institutions and systems. Various other laws in different jurisdictions 
complement the country-specific regulatory systems. 
The first layer of protection is directed to diversification of assets in order to reduce credit 
risk. To encourage diversification regulators establish limits on bank lending to an individual 
borrower. Banks are required, for example, not to make loans exceeding more than 10 percent 
of their own equity capital to any one public or private party, i.e. if a bank has 8 percent of its 
assets funded by its own capital, the bank is not allowed to lend more than 0.8 percent of its 
assets to any one borrower (Saunders and Cornett, 2008). 
The second layer of protection includes minimum own equity capital requirements to 
minimize the insolvency risk. This requirement protects depositors and other liability holders 
because equity holders legally bear the losses on assets first. Only when and if the equity is 
turned down to zero bank creditors can suffer losses.  
The third layer of regulation is monitoring and supervision. Moosa (2008) points out three 
functions of financial supervision: macro-prudential supervision, micro-prudential 
supervision, and conduct-of-business regulation. Macro-prudential supervision intends to 
limit financial system distress which has damaging effects on the whole economy. Micro-
prudential supervision is concerned with the solvency of the individual institution rather than 
the whole system. The objective is to protect consumers from loss by ensuring that banks are 
operating in compliance with laws and regulations and to take corrective actions when 
prudential requirements fall short. Conduct-of- business regulation seeks to protect investors 
and customers by imposing business conduct rules requiring transparency and information 
disclosure in order to ensure fair treatment and to increase the confidence in the banking 
system. It may also include competition and money laundering issues. 
13 
 
The fourth layer of protection is the financial safety net which includes deposit insurance and 
lender of last resort3. Deposit insurance is a guarantee (explicit or implicit) provided privately 
or by the government to protect depositors against losses in case of bank failure and thus 
reduces the risk of systemic bank runs4. A lender of last resort is typically the central bank, 
which funds banks when borrowing from the market is restricted. The purpose is to prevent 
systemic problems due to liquidity shortage in individual institutions5.  
Additionally, regulators in most countries require that banks maintain certain levels of 
liquidity at any time. These requirements include minimum level of cash reserves against 
demand deposits and minimum ratios of liquid assets banks must hold in order to meet their 
immediate needs of cash. 
1.3. Structure of Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Banking regulation and supervision takes place at four levels. The first level are the 
international organizations and committees initiating the establishment of international 
standards for regulation and supervision of financial markets. The second level is the regional 
regulation which concerns first and foremost the EU countries which national legislation is 
pre-empted by the EU regulations. The third level are the national legislative authorities in 
each country which enact the laws with immediate effect in the banking sector. The fourth 
level is banks’ self-regulation in the form of internal controls and risk management practices 
or in the form of voluntary industrial norms. 
1.3.1. Global Regulators 
The globalization and the increasingly complex nature of international financial markets in 
the recent decades have created new levels of financial risk and new dimensions of financial 
crises. Instability in the financial sector in one particular country affects nowadays not only 
the local market or geographical region but has world-wide repercussions in all economic 
areas. Therefore, a growing number of international organizations have engaged in the 
development of new supervisory and regulatory international standards aiming to reduce the 
danger of financial system collapses. These organizations seek the promotion and 
implementation of the standards through effective co-operation and co-ordination of all 
                                                     
3 An expanded definition of financial safety net includes also the prudential regulatory and supervisory 
framework (Schich, 2008) 
4 OECD definition, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6200 
5 OECD definition, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1518  
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separate national financial authorities in order to achieve harmonization of international 
policies as a way of avoiding the inefficiencies and uncertainties that result from differences 
in national laws.  
International standards as defined by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) are “widely 
accepted good principles, practices, or guidelines in a given area”6. They act as 
recommendations which have no compulsory form and are not directly applied.  The 
standards have to be transformed into national laws in order to become legally binding for the 
financial institutions of a particular country. Additionally, they offer flexibility in 
implementation which gives countries the possibility to choose between options which best 
suit their national systems (Zulauf, 2006). 
 Standards are often compared to the “soft law” that is voluntarily endorsed by the national 
legislative authorities because of its persuasiveness and proven effects. In the banking sector, 
however, international banks who seek to be internationally competitive, to avoid enhanced 
supervision in the host countries and to improve their position on the capital markets, more 
often exercise strong pressure on their home country legislators to align the standards with the 
national law (Zulauf, 2006). Additional stimulus for the enactment of the standards is created 
through the annual inspections carried out by international organizations such as IMF or 
OECD which set the standards as a benchmark when assessing the financial stability and the 
overall economic situation in a particular country (Hoffmann, 2004).  
Financial Stability Forum has designated twelve internationally recognized key standards for 
sound financial systems which represent minimum requirements for good practice7. For the 
banking industry the most important standards are the standards of Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the standards of The International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Both organizations as well as the other international 
financial standard setting bodies are coordinated at the global level by the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB)8. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is the international regulatory and 
supervisory institution for the banking sector. Its Secretariat is provided by the Bank for 
                                                     
6 FSF definition, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/standards.htm  
7 See Appendix 1 
8 Financial Stability Board (FSB) is the successor to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) since April 2009 
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International Settlements (BIS) - the world’s oldest financial organization which encompasses 
the largest central banks in the world. The Committee was established at the end of 1974 with 
the purpose of cross-border co-ordination of the individual national supervisory authorities 
with regard to the activities of their internationally operating banks. Its main objectives are to 
promote and facilitate the adoption and implementation of basic principles on key supervisory 
issues and improve the quality and efficiency of the banking supervision worldwide. The 
foundation of the Committee as a reaction to the collapse of the Breton Woods system and the 
subsequent closures of Bankhaus Herstatt in Germany and Franklin National Bank in the 
United States is the first serious attempt to develop formal supervisory co-operative 
procedures on international level. All forms of co-operation before that have been of a purely 
ad hoc and bilateral nature (Walker, 2001). 
The Committee has issued a large number of papers so far. To the most popular publications 
belong: the Committee’s recommendations on cross-border banking supervision which 
became known as the Basel Concordat published first in 1975, revised later in 1983 and 
reformulated as a set of Minimum Standards9 in1992; the Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision issued 1997 and revised in 2006; and the basic standards setting 
minimum capital requirements for banks -the Capital Accords of 1988 and 2001 known 
respectively as Basel I and Basel II- as well as the latest standard of the Committee in 
response to the financial crisis of 2007- Basel III- issued in December 201010. The 
international standards Basel I, Basel II and Basel III will be the main focus of the analysis in 
the following sections. 
The other set of standards relevant to the banking sector are the standards of The International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). IOSCO, created in 1983, is recognized as 
the international standard setting body for securities markets and the global coordinator of 
securities market regulators. Its main objectives are: facilitating cross-border co-operation, 
investor protection, ensuring fair, efficient and transparent markets, and reduction of systemic 
risk11. These standards are particularly important for the banking industry because banks are 
in continuous interaction with securities markets as part of their trading, hedging, funding, 
and diversification activities.  
                                                     
9 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision:  Minimum Standards for the Supervision of International 
Banking Groups and Their Cross‐Border Establishments, July 1992. Basel 
10 All papers could be found at www.bis.org , <<Basel Committee on Banking Supervision>> 
11 See www.iosco.org  
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1.3.2. Regional Regulators 
In response to the world financial crisis the European Parliament established in November 
2010 the European Banking Authority (EBA) as the successor of the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS). The main purpose of EBA is to ensure the stability of the 
financial system in the EU, the protection of depositors and investors, the transparency of the 
financial markets and the strengthening of the international supervisory coordination12. 
1.3.3. National Regulation  
Bank regulation differs significantly across countries in terms of bank legislation, government 
and central bank policy, structure of the banking sector and performance of individual banks. 
Country-specific bank policies determine permissible banking activities such as engagement 
in securities, insurance, and real estate activities or integration of banking and commercial 
activities. Other policy differences include the size of the banks, the degree of government 
ownership, government protection through deposit insurance and/or lender of last resort, entry 
barriers, foreign ownership of banks, etc. Nevertheless, national regulatory regimes across 
countries have the same main goal- the safety and the soundness of their financial systems. 
1.3.4. Self- Regulation 
Self-regulation is not unambiguously understood. What is meant here is not the self-regulation 
of the market left to itself (i.e. in the absence of external regulation). It is rather the 
supplementary regulation in the form of self-imposed and self-binding rules such as codes of 
conduct or codes of practice, customer charters and voluntary agreements, developed and 
enforced autonomously by the interested parties themselves whenever such rules make sense. 
These rules can be set up by the single entity for internal checks and controls and risk 
management in order to ensure its sound procedures and processes or by the industry and 
professional organizations as generally valid standards and practices for all participants. In 
principle, self-regulation is a voluntary independent regulatory approach. However, in the 
case of the industry-wide norms peer pressure can enforce compliance by the existing 
participants or even hamper potential new entrants if they do not abide by the established 
professional standards. Additionally, self-regulation can be formally required and endorsed by 
the legislation in some countries. An example for successful self-regulation in the banking 
                                                     
12 See www.eba.europa.eu  
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sector is Switzerland which has long traditions in this field. Self-regulation in Switzerland 
exists in three forms13. The first one is the free and autonomous self-regulation without any 
state intervention. The second is compulsory self-regulation as regards some issues which 
should be regulated by the banks themselves and then endorsed by the regulator. The third 
form is a hybrid between voluntary and compulsory self-regulation. Self-regulation, e.g. codes 
of conduct, is initiated and voluntarily drawn up by a group of banks in collaboration with the 
regulator. Once approved by the regulator the codes of conduct become legally binding and 
act as minimum standards not only for the members of the group but for the whole banking 
sector. Banks are monitored for compliance with the codes and are liable to sanctions in case 
of infringement just like in the case of any other laws.  
The advantage of the self-regulation in comparison to institutional regulation is that it is based 
on the inside know-how of bank practitioners and, therefore, is more flexible and can be 
adapted faster and more accurately to changing market conditions and consumer demands 
(EF, 2000, EBK, 2007, Carmichael and Pomerleano, 2002). Other advantages include lower 
implementation and compliance costs because of the larger discretionary power of the self-
regulators, higher acceptance and greater willingness to comply by the regulated because it is 
self-designed, and positive effect on banks reputation (EBK, 2007, Carmichael and 
Pomerleano, 2002). 
Self-regulation is also a subject to some criticism. The main drawback is that it can cause 
conflicts of interest among the involved parties as well as towards third parties, particularly 
the depositors and investors as well as the financial market because the self-regulators are 
much more concentrated on their personal rather than public interest. Another weakness is the 
risk that the more powerful players in the industry will set rules in their own self-interest and 
will disadvantage the smaller participants (EBK, 2007, Carmichael and Pomerleano, 2002). 
1.4. Types of Bank Risks and Risk Management 
The starting point for developing institutional bank regulation as well as internal bank 
controls are the various types of risks the banks are exposed to. The regulator should ensure 
that the banks have the necessary mechanisms and processes to assess and manage three 
generic risk types (under Basel II): credit risk, market risk and operational risk. 
                                                     
13 See http://www.finma.ch/d/regulierung/Seiten/selbstregulierung.aspx  
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Credit risk or default risk is the possibility that a contractual counterparty will not fulfill its 
obligations because it is unable or unwilling to honor the contract (Ammann, 2001). Credit 
risk is often referred to also as counterparty risk. The difference is that counterparty risk is 
more transient financial risk than standard creditor default risk and is generally associated 
with trading of over-the counter (OTC) derivatives where each counterparty is exposed to the 
default risk of the other party. Therefore, it is the risk of non-performance of a trading partner 
(Santomero, 1997).  
Financial institutions, in this case the banks, are compensated for assuming credit risk by the 
interest paid by the borrowers on their debt obligation. Credit risk is an idiosyncratic risk that 
can be eliminated through careful risk management that involves screening and monitoring of 
the most creditworthy loan applicants, correct loan pricing based on the probability of default 
of the borrower and the degree of collateral, and diversification of the loan portfolio. 
Nevertheless, one portion of the risk remains undiversified because diversification reduces 
primarily the individual firm-specific credit risk whereas the banks are still exposed to 
systematic credit risk, outlined below, that affects the economy as a whole and may cause 
simultaneous default of all or a lot of borrowers (e.g., economic recession). Therefore, it is 
difficult and impossible for the banks to make in advance accurate estimates of the total loss; 
they can easily calculate the expected loss and cover it with loan loss reserves but they cannot 
predict the unexpected loss. Thus, bank’s capital is a necessary tool for risk mitigation 
required not only by the regulator (regulatory capital) but also by the banks themselves 
(economic capital) in order to provide a cushion against unexpected losses. 
Market risk arises because of the bank’s trading activity. It is the risk that the value of the 
traded assets and liabilities and as a result the earnings on the trading portfolio can fluctuate 
due to extreme changes in interest rates, exchange rates, asset prices and other market 
conditions such as market volatility and market liquidity (Saunders & Cornett, 2008). Bank’s 
trading portfolio (trading book) contains financial instruments such as equities, fixed-income 
securities, commodities, derivatives, bonds and foreign exchange which are characterized 
with short trading horizons and secondary market liquidity whereas the investment portfolio 
(banking book) contains assets and liabilities that are relatively illiquid and held for longer-
term investment, funding or hedging purposes, e.g., loans and deposits. However, some long-
term loans become more liquid and tradable through securitization (e.g. mortgages). Market 
risk affects primarily the trading book but also the banking book whenever banks take open or 
19 
 
unhedged positions in their traded assets and liabilities (Saunders and Cornett, 2008). To 
reduce the market risk banks measure and manage the closely related interest rate, foreign 
exchange, and equity return risks, establish control systems to limit the risk taken by traders 
and use various internal models to measure the market risk exposure of the bank such as the 
RiskMetrics model estimating the potential loss or value at risk-VAR- of the traded positions 
for different periods as well as on a daily basis calculating daily earnings at risk-DEAR. Since 
1996 with the Amendment to the Capital Accord Basel Committee on Bank Supervision 
requires that banks apply regulatory capital add-on to counteract market risk14. 
Operational risk is a collective risk category that includes several risk sub-categories such as 
technology risk (malfunction or break down of existing technology or support systems), 
employee risk (e.g., internal fraud, human error), capital asset risk (e.g., fire, flood), customer 
risk (e.g., client dissatisfaction with a product) and external risks such as taxation risk (tax 
avoidance), legal risk (e.g., fraud, violation of regulation or law) and strategic and 
reputational risk (e.g., failed merger) (Saunders & Cornett, 2008). Operational risk is defined 
by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate 
or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events”15. The losses may be 
direct financial losses (e.g. loss of income) or indirect financial losses in the form of revenue 
forgone as a result of business suspension or damage to bank’s reputation leading to, e.g., 
client withdrawals.  BIS definition includes explicitly legal risk and excludes strategic and 
reputational risk. Most financial institutions, however, accept the broader view that adds 
strategic and reputational risk to the operational risks as well.  
Unlike credit and market risk the operational risks arise inside the bank. Operational risks are 
the reason for not the consequence of the losses incurred. Therefore, the bank is in a position 
to better manage operational than market and credit risks because it can directly influence 
internal processes, people and systems, e.g., information or internal control systems (Nobel & 
Zimmermann, 2005). Bank’s efforts to control and reduce operational risk include: loss 
prevention (training and development of employees), loss control (planning, organization, 
backup systems), loss financing (catastrophe insurance) (Saunders & Cornett, 2008). 
Nevertheless, operational risk just like the credit and market risks cannot be completely 
eliminated through risk management and it has also been incorporated into capital 
                                                     
14 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision:  Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risk, 
January 1996. Basel 
15 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: The New Basel Capital Accord, January 2001, p. 94, Basel  
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requirements with The New Basel Capital Accord, 2001. By definition, the minimum 
regulatory operational risk capital charge includes legal risk but not strategic and reputational 
risks. The latter are subject of further regulatory decisions (Basel II).  
Other risk types that the banks should manage in order to avoid distress and ensure stability 
and fulfillment of their obligations are interest rate risk and liquidity risk. Interest rate risk 
and liquidity risk are inherent to banks because of their fundamental function as maturity- and 
asset-transformers of short-term deposits into long-term loans. 
Interest rate risk is the risk that arises because of the mismatched maturities of banks assets 
and liabilities (Saunders and Cornett, 2008).  Saunders and Cornett (2008) subdivide interest 
rate risk into (1) refinancing risk and (2) reinvestment risk, depending on the type of maturity 
mismatch. Refinancing risk exists when banks hold longer-term assets relative to their 
liabilities. It is the risk that the cost (the interest rate) of rolling over or re-borrowing funds 
could rise above the return (the interest rate) on asset investments. Reinvestment risk exists 
when the maturity of the assets held is shorter than the maturity of the liabilities. In this case 
the bank faces the risk that the interest rate at which it could reinvest funds could fall below 
the cost of funds (the borrowing rate). In both case banks will take losses as a result of 
changes in the interest rates.  
Interest rate risk is tightly linked to market risk since the interest rate is the rate at which 
future cash flows from assets and liabilities are discounted in order to calculate the present 
(market) value of these assets or liabilities. Therefore, increase in the interest rate leads to 
decline in market values, and conversely, falling interest rates increase the market values of 
assets and liabilities (Saunders and Cornett, 2008).   
Banks can directly control interest rate risk by matching the maturities of their assets and 
liabilities. Managing interest rate risk in such way, however, is not consistent with the banks 
special function as asset-transformers and reduces bank’s profitability because the returns 
from acting as a specialized asset-transformer are also reduced. Therefore, banks use other 
techniques to hedge against interest rate risk such as futures and forward contracts as well as 
options and swaps (Saunders and Cornett, 2008).   
Liquidity risk consists of two components: the risk of a funding crisis (funding liquidity risk) 
and market liquidity risk. Funding liquidity risk is the risk that the bank will not be 
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able to fund increases in assets and meet cash flow or collateral obligations as they come due, 
without incurring unacceptable losses or affecting the daily operations of the bank. Market 
liquidity risk is the risk that a bank cannot sell off  an asset position at the market price 
because of inadequate market depth or market disruption (BIS interpretation16).  
 
The reasons for the liquidity risk in a bank, as explained by Saunders and Cornett (2008), can 
be found on both the liability- and the asset-side. The liability-side liquidity risk is present 
when liability-holders (e.g., depositors) seek to withdraw their deposits immediately; the 
asset-side liquidity risk arises when the bank has to fund the exercise of off-balance-sheet 
loan commitments or credit lines. In a normal situation the banks are able to asses and manage 
effectively their liquidity needs without incurring losses that could threaten their solvency.  
There are several ways to do so. The most direct source of liquidity is cash. Banks, however, 
limit their cash holdings because cash reserves pay no interest. They would rather invest it in 
less liquid and longer-maturity assets in order to increase profit. Alternative ways to meet 
liquidity demand are borrowing additional funds in the money market or/and selling off assets 
starting from the most liquid ones such as T-bills.  Sometimes, however, because of a sudden 
surge in liability withdrawals due to, e.g., damage of bank’s reputation and lack of confidence 
by liability holders, the bank can face a liquidity crisis. Kaufman (1996) explains that a shock, 
in this case a liquidity shortfall, at a single bank can be quickly transmitted to other banks 
because banks are tightly financially interconnected: they lend continuously to and borrow 
from each other and rely on funding from capital markets. As a result, the initial shock at a 
single bank can lead to funding liquidity crisis and functional disturbance, affecting the whole 
financial system. There could also be some unexpected need for cash from all depositors 
simultaneously (bank runs) due to systematic factors such as worsened economic conjuncture.  
In such conditions, when all, or many, banks face abnormally high withdrawal  demands, 
borrowed funds can become extremely expensive or even restricted (Saunders and Cornett, 
2008). This will result in a more serious funding liquidity risk. Banks will then be compelled 
to sell some of the less liquid assets to meet their obligations towards liability holders. Selling 
these assets immediately will be possible at a lower (fire-sale) price than the fair market value 
that the bank would otherwise receive if it had enough time to negotiate the sale of the asset 
(market liquidity risk). The liquidity risk problem can eventually cause insolvency risk, where 
                                                     
16 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and 
Supervision, p.1, September 2008, Basel 
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the bank’s capital resources are depleted and the bank cannot pay its creditors as promised, 
and end up with the bank’s failure. 
Liquidity regulations are predominately country-specific (Gualandri et al., 2009). National 
liquidity regimes impose different liquidity buffers such as minimum cash reserves on 
demand deposits banks must hold in order to meet increased liquidity needs in the short run17. 
In general, banks would choose to hold cash reserves even in excess to minimum 
requirements in order to meet immediate liquidity needs. Other specific rules include limits on 
maturity mismatches or reliance on a particular funding source, liquidity ratios as well as 
qualitative measures such as supervisory requirements to develop internal systems for the 
management, control, monitoring, and reporting of liquidity positions, identifying specific 
measurements of liquidity risks (Gualandri et al., 2009). 
Because liquidity risk turned out to be of crucial importance in the recent crisis it received an 
extensive regulatory attention in the latest international framework-Basel III. In December 
2010 Basel Committee has introduced for the first time global liquidity standards which aim 
to improve the ability of banks to absorb financial and economic shocks and thus reduce the 
risk of contagion and systemic break down18.  
Particular attention with regard to the financial crisis deserves also the systematic risk. 
Systematic or systemic risk includes all risks that threaten the functioning and the stability of 
the whole system.  Functional disturbances that affect the whole banking system are as a rule 
a result of the realization of the combination of all risks- credit, market, operational, and 
liquidity risk (EF, 2000).  
There are several reasons for systematic risks in banking sector. A “classical” reason are the 
bank runs (EF, 2000). As already explained, the strong interconnectedness between banks 
makes them more susceptible to systematic risk than firms in any other industry (Kaufman, 
1996). Therefore, actual or perceived shocks at one institution cause a crisis of confidence 
towards the other intermediaries (bank panics); in the absence of deposit insurance protection 
this results in bank runs and liquidity problems. The latter are quickly spread among banks 
                                                     
17 e.g., U.S. Federal Reserve requires reserves of 0‐10% depending on the amount of liabilities (data as of 
January 2011 at  http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm); Swiss National Bank: 2.5 % 
(Nationalbankverordnung, NBV,2004, Art.15, Abs.1); European Central Bank (ECB): 2% (Regulation No 
1745/2003 of the ECB on the application of minimum reserves, Art.4, 2003) 
18 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk 
Measurement, Standards and Monitoring, December 2010, Basel 
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and can threaten the stability of the whole financial system. Since systematic risk is a 
combination and consequence of credit, market, liquidity and operational risks, holding 
sufficient capital and managing adequately liquidity helps avoid default from adverse shocks 
originating at other banks but is not sufficient (Kaufman, 1996, EF, 2000). Additionally, 
governments protect depositors against losses and banks against runs through deposit 
insurance.   
Nobel and Zimmermann (2005) argue additionally that systematic risks are not based solely 
on the transmission of insolvency and liquidity problems from one bank to another but can 
arise simultaneously in many intermediaries due to a single common factor such as macro 
shock. 
Another reason for systemic risk is the globalization of the markets and their actors and the 
concomitant development of global information, trade, and payment systems. The 
globalization of these systems as well as the global organization of the financial 
conglomerates and institutional investors facilitates the spreading of disturbances (EF, 2000). 
Externalities can also provide an explanation for the systematic risks. They arise in many 
ways through incomplete information of market players about the creditworthiness of the 
counterparties, bank’s reliability, and behavior of the other market participants. Тhe 
consequences of these externalities can be reduced through higher transparency. The 
regulatory instruments to achieve it are the requirements for information disclosure and 
information accessibility (EF, 2000).  
Systematic risk is basically an un-diversifiable risk and as such is very difficult to measure 
and manage by banks. Regulatory efforts of governments to address systematic risk, 
especially during the current crisis, have been focused on reinforcement of financial safety net 
for banks by providing guarantees such as explicit deposit insurances in order to restore 
confidence and prevent bank failures. Kaufman (1996), among others, argues that safety net 
in the form of deposit insurance or any other anti-systemic risk regulations, may have an 
unintentional negative impact on bank’s risk taking behavior and market discipline if poorly 
designed or implemented.  It may foster moral hazard and actually increase fragility of banks 
and the likelihood of bank crises instead of reducing them. McCoy (2006) concludes that 
countries considering adoption of explicit deposit insurance need to have proper safeguards 
against moral hazard by banks. These safeguards include: strong banking regulation, a strict 
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failed bank resolution regime, carefully designed deposit insurance with safeguards against 
risk, healthy private monitoring, and strong institutions. If all these safeguards are present the 
deposit insurance will serve the intended purpose, i.e. protect both banks and depositors while 
eliminating the possibility of moral hazard. 
On a global level, Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board are in an ongoing 
process of developing integrated approach to systemically important financial institutions and 
elaborating further measures to mitigate systematic risk that include liquidity surcharges, 
tighter large exposure restrictions and enhanced supervision19. 
1.5. Costs of Bank Regulation and Supervision  
Bank regulation aims to increase social benefits and reduce social costs through minimizing 
the risk of market failure. This public good, however, is created by generating private costs 
for the regulated banks. The costs of regulation borne by banks include, for example: 
• Cost of capital adequacy requirements. Holding high level of equity capital constraints 
banks ability to use more debt (deposits and other liabilities) as a cheaper source to finance 
their assets and to leverage like other firms. 
• Cost of regulatory compliance. Administrative costs for monitoring and supervision as well 
as costs for information production in adherence to reporting standards can become even 
more redundant for banks if there are multiple regulators. 
• Costs incurred as a result of reduced profitability or opportunity cost. For example, the 
asset diversification requirements prohibit the loan extension to a single borrower above a 
certain limit even though the additional loans to the same counterparty may have positive 
net present value for the bank (Saunders and Cornett, 2008). Another example is holding 
cash reserves which bear no interest. Well-managed banks find it quite burdensome 
especially if they need lower than required cash levels for their own liquidity purposes. 
Restrictions on permissible activities also reduce bank’s potential for profit realization. The 
opportunity or indirect costs constitute the “lion’s share” of the total costs of bank 
regulation, however they are very difficult to measure (Hoffmann, 2004). 
In order to achieve efficient regulation the regulators should take into consideration the net 
regulatory burden imposed on the regulated institutions. They should ensure that the benefits 
                                                     
19 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient 
Banks and Banking Systems, p.7. December 2010. Basel  
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of regulation outweigh substantially the costs involved if the regulation is to make sense.  
Otherwise, high regulatory burden may have detrimental effect on the financial institutions in 
terms of profitability, efficiency, and competitiveness and, therefore, deteriorate the quality of 
the financial services and products offered and hamper the functioning of the financial market 
as a whole. A thorough cost-benefit analysis by the regulators before any new rules are 
introduced will help avoid bringing in excessive and counter-productive regulation.  
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Section 2: International Bank Regulation Effective at the Onset of the 
Crisis 
This section will present the main regulatory instruments set in the international regulatory 
and supervisory standards of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) - the 
Basel Capital Accords known as Basel I and Basel II. Basel I is the initial framework 
establishing minimum capital standards for international banks. The extended framework 
Basel II keeps and develops further Basel I standards adding some new dimensions of 
regulation and supervision. 
By introducing regulatory instruments such as minimum international standards for capital 
adequacy, the objective of Basel I and II, in line with the main regulatory and supervisory 
concepts discussed in the previous section, is to minimize the possibility of bank failures and 
to strengthen the soundness and the stability of the global banking system. The other goal of 
these international frameworks is to provide uniform rules and a level playing field for 
internationally active banks in order to ensure consistency in application and fair competition. 
2.1. The Initial Framework Basel I 
In 1988 BCBS drew up a document20 which became known as Basel Capital Accord or Basel 
I. Basel I is an agreement between the major industrialized countries (G10)21 to apply 
minimum levels of capital requirements to their internationally operating banks. The capital 
adequacy standards address entirely the credit risks of assets (both on- and off-balance sheet). 
Capital standards for other risks at this stage are not explicitly stipulated and additional 
provisions against risky assets are left to the discretion of the individual supervisory 
authorities.  
Basel I sets a minimum risk-based capital ratio which the banks should maintain at any time 
in order to absorb losses incurred from counterparty failure and ensure solvency and 
soundness. To be adequately capitalized, the bank must hold target standard capital in the 
                                                     
20 The original name of the document is “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards”, July 1988 
21 Initially the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision comprised representatives of the Central banks and the 
supervisory authorities of the Group of Ten (G 10) countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and Luxemburg as an associate member). 
Today, the Committee includes 28 member countries. The new members are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
China, Hong Kong, SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, 
and Turkey. 
27 
 
amount of minimum 8% of its weighted-risk assets. Additionally, the share of the core capital 
should be at least 4%.  
The ratios are calculated as follows: 
Capital ratio ൌ  
ܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ ሺܶ݅݁ݎ 1 ൅ ܶ݅݁ݎ 2ሻ
ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ ݎ݅ݏ݇ െ ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ
 ൒ 8 % 
Core capital ratio ൌ  
ܥ݋ݎ݁ ܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ ሺܶ݅݁ݎ 1ሻ
ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ ݎ݅ݏ݇ െ ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ
 ൒ 4%,  
where: 
Capital is defined as the sum of two tiers: the core capital (Tier 1) which should be at least 50 
% of the total bank’s capital base and the supplementary capital (Tier 2) limited to 100 % of 
Tier 1 capital. 
Tier 1 (core) capital includes22 (a) permanent shareholder’s equity in the form of common 
stock, perpetual non-cumulative preferred stock, and minority interests in equity accounts of 
consolidated subsidiaries; (b) disclosed reserves such as retained earnings, share premiums or 
other surplus, and (c) qualifying innovative capital instruments up to a maximum of 15 % of 
Tier 1 capital.  Goodwill should be deducted from Tier 1 capital. 
Tier 2 (supplementary) capital includes (a) undisclosed reserves that have been accepted by 
the bank’s supervisory authority; (b) general loan-loss reserves limited to 1,25 percent of risk-
weighted assets; (c) hybrid (debt, equity) capital instruments; (d) subordinated debt limited to 
50 percent of Tier 1 capital; (e) asset revaluation reserves 
From total capital (Tier 1 +Tier 2) banks should deduct 
• investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries  
• holdings of other banks’ capital (at national discretion) 
Credit risk-weighted assets are calculated as the sum of credit risk-adjusted on-and off-
balance sheet asset positions. On-balance-sheet assets are classified in several categories 
according to their riskiness and are then multiplied by the risk weight assigned to the 
respective category. Off-balance-sheet assets are first converted into credit risk equivalents by 
                                                     
22 According to 1988 Accord (Basel I)and “Instruments eligible for inclusion in Tier 1 capital”, 1998 published at 
http://www.bis.org/press/p981027.htm  
28 
 
multiplying the nominal amounts of the positions by a credit conversion factor (set by the 
regulator) and then the credit equivalent amounts are multiplied by the assigned risk weights 
to them. The risk weight or the risk exposure of a position is determined by the probability of 
the counterparty failure. In Basel I the risk weights are set by the regulators. 
Basel I was followed by several amendments of which the most important is the fifth revision 
which includes additional capital charge for market risk. This revision was published in 1996 
as "Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks". 
The amendment introduced Tier 3 capital as an additional capital to meet market risks along 
with Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. Tier 3 capital consists of short-term subordinated debt with an 
original maturity of at least two years and can be used as a cushion solely against market risk, 
i.e. credit and counterparty risks should be covered by Tier1 and Tier 2 capital. Tier 3 capital 
cannot exceed 250% of bank’s Tier 1 capital required to support market risk which means that 
at least 28% of market risks should be covered by Tier 1 capital. Additionally, Tier 2 capital 
can be substituted for tier 3 capital up to the same limit of 250%. 
 The amendment offers two approaches for measuring market risk exposures. The first one is 
the standardized method proposed by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Secondly, 
with regulatory approval and under certain conditions banks are allowed to use their own 
internal risk management models to measure market risk23.  
The BIS standardized method to calculating the minimum capital requirement for market risk 
is different than the risk-weighting approach applied for calculation of the capital charge for 
credit risk described above. The capital charge for market risk is directly and separately 
calculated for each single position or risk category (fixed-income securities and equities in the 
trading book and foreign exchange and commodities throughout the bank). The sum of the 
capital charges across all positions yields the total capital charge for market risk. The total 
capital charge for market risk is then multiplied by 12.5 (the reciprocal of the capital ratio of 8 
%) in order to create notional market risk- weighted assets. The capital ratio is calculated by 
dividing the total eligible Tier 1,2, and 3 capital in the numerator by the sum of the market 
and credit risk-weighted assets in the denominator.  
                                                     
23 Details about the two approaches can be found in “Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market 
Risks”, 1996 at www.bis.org  
29 
 
The second option for market risk measurement is to use internal models such as Risk Metrics 
and Historic (back simulation) model where market risk is measured as VAR at a certain 
confidence level and time period. If banks decide to use their own internal models they should 
satisfy certain criteria in order to receive approval by their supervisory authority and /or 
validation of model’s accuracy by external auditors. Banks should prove that they have 
appropriate and sound market risk management systems as well as rigorous and 
comprehensive stress testing programs. Additionally, when calculating their capital charge 
they should apply some minimum quantitative standards, particularly for VAR calculations, 
set in the amendment.  
2.2. The Second Framework Basel II 
In 2001, BCBS issued “The New Basel Capital Accord”24 which became known as Basel II. 
Basel II is more sophisticated and complete framework in comparison to Basel I because it 
has revised and improved the credit risk measurement in Basel I and introduced capital 
requirements for operational risks. Additionally, Basel II is structured in three mutually 
connected pillars which provide an integral concept for adequate capital support of the risks, 
better risk management, and overall stability of the financial system.  
Basel II was created by BCBS in order to address the changes in the banking sector related to 
market innovation and increased complexity in banking industry that Basel I could not deal 
with effectively any more. Basel II was necessary also to correct some essential shortcomings 
of Basel I which resulted in unintended effects in the banking sector such as circumventing 
capital requirement and increasing credit risk exposures through innovative financial 
instruments. The criticism of Basel I and the necessity of Basel II will be discussed in detail in 
Section 4. 
The New Basel Capital Accord has been updated and supplemented by several later 
publications all referred to as Basel II. The contents here are based primarily on the initial 
document of 2001. Where necessary, specific other documents will be additionally 
mentioned. 
 
                                                     
24 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: The New Basel Capital Accord. January 2001, Basel  
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2.2.1. The First Pillar- Minimum Capital Requirements 
Capital ratio 
The first pillar treats the methods of calculation of minimum capital requirements for credit, 
market and operational risk. Basel II keeps entirely the definitions and the limitations of Tier 
1, 2, and 3 capital set in Basel I and its fifth amendment. The required capital ratio continues 
to be minimum 8% for total capital. However, the total capital now includes new capital 
charge for the operational risk in addition to the minimum levels of capital required as a 
buffer against credit and market risks.  
The ratio is calculated as follows: 
Capital ratio ൌ
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݎ݅ݏ݇ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ
൒ 8%, 
where: 
Total risk assets ൌ ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ ݎ݅ݏ݇ െ ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ ܽݏݏ݁ݏݐݏ 
                                                    ൅12.5ሾܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ ݄ܿܽݎ݃݁ ݂݋ݎ ݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ ݎ݅ݏ݇ሿ 
                                                             ൅12.5ሾܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ ݄ܿܽݎ݃݁ ݂݋ݎ ݋݌݁ݎܽݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ ݎ݅ݏ݇ሿ 
 
As in the case of market risk, the measure of operational risk is multiplied by 12.5, the 
reciprocal of 8 %, in order to retain the principle of capital ratio calculation. The approaches 
to calculation of the capital charge for operational risks are presented below. 
Capital requirements for credit risk  
For the calculation of credit risk capital charge Basel II brings in some essential 
improvements which aim at achieving more sophisticated measurement of the credit risk-
adjusted assets. The regulators provide two options for the treatment of credit risk. The first 
one is the Standardized Approach which has the same methodology of calculation of the 
capital ratio and the same definition of risk-weighted assets as the one developed in Basel I 
and outlined in the previous chapter. The essential improvement in the new framework is that 
it offers a wider differentiation of credit risk weights25. Basel I sets arbitrary risk categories, 
for example, all loans to private sector counterparties, including corporates, have a risk weight 
of 100 percent regardless of the differences in individual credit risk. Under Basel II, different 
corporations fall in different risk categories according to their credit rating.  Additionally, the 
                                                     
25 The credit risk categories in Basel II are shown in Appendix 2  
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risk weights for sovereign, bank, and corporate loans are refined by applying ratings provided 
by external credit rating agencies recognized as eligible by national supervisors (e.g., 
Moody’s and Standard &Poor’s). As a result, the Standardized Approach in Basel II is more 
risk sensitive and produces more precise capital ratios based on the actual credit risks the 
banks are exposed to, compared to Basel I (Saunders and Cornett, 2008).  
The second option is to use Internal Ratings Based Approach (IRB)26 where banks are 
allowed to employ their internal rating systems and internal estimates of the creditworthiness 
of the borrowers and the respective credit risk exposures in determining the capital 
requirement. Because of that IRB Approach produces even more risk-sensitive capital charge 
than the Standardized Approach. Banks using IRB, however, should abide by rigorous 
methodological and disclosure rules set by the regulators and, as in the case of internal based 
models for market risk, are subject to explicit permission by bank’s supervisory authority. The 
IRB Approach to credit risk includes two versions: the Foundations Approach and the 
Advanced Approach. 
Under the IRB approach, banks must categorise credit risk exposures into broad classes of 
assets with different underlying risk characteristics defined by the Committee. The classes of 
assets are corporate, sovereign, bank,  retail, and equity. The capital requirement and risk-
weighted assets (RWA) must be individually derived for each asset exposure using formulas, 
or risk-weight functions, specified by the Committee for each asset class. Total risk-weighted 
assets are the sum of individual RWA. 
In general, for an asset A: 
RWA (or capital requirements) A = ƒ (PDA, LGDA, EADA, MA), 
where: 
PD is the probability of default of the borrower over a given time horizon 
LGD is loss given default which measures the portion of the exposure that will be lost in the 
event of default 
EAD is the exposure (amount) at default  
M is maturity which measures the remaining economic maturity of the exposure 
                                                     
26 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards, June 2006, Basel   
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The functions include different risk components for the different asset classes. The risk 
components are either determined by the bank itself or set by the regulators depending on the 
variant of IRB Approach being employed. Under the Foundations Approach, in general, banks 
use their own estimates of PD and supervisory estimates for LGD, EAD and M. Under the 
Advanced Approach banks provide their own estimates for all risk components, subject to 
certain minimum standards. 
The IRB Approach is based on measures of unexpected losses (UL) and expected losses (EL) 
for credit risk. Capital requirements are intended to protect banks against unexpected losses 
(UL). IRB framework provides a separate treatment of the expected losses (EL) which are 
covered by eligible provisions. Where the total expected loss amount exceeds total eligible 
provisions, banks must deduct the difference from the capital. Where the total expected loss 
amount is less than total eligible provisions banks may recognise the difference in Tier 2 
capital up to a maximum of 0.6% of credit risk-weighted assets. 
 
Credit risk mitigation 
Pillar 1 under Basel II offers also credit risk mitigation (CRM) techniques which are 
recognized by the Committee for regulatory capital purposes. Under certain minimum 
conditions and operational and disclosure requirements banks using CRM techniques can 
obtain capital relief. 
The credit risk mitigation techniques include risk mitigating instruments such as collateral, 
credit derivatives and guarantees, or on-balance sheet netting agreements. The framework 
provides very similar approaches for the treatment of the mitigators in Standardized and IRB 
methods. 
Asset securitization27 
Asset securitization involves the legal or economic transfer of assets or obligations by an 
originating institution to a third party, typically referred to as a special purpose vehicle (SPV), 
which then issues asset-backed securities that are claims against specific asset pools. An SPV 
is a corporation, trust, or other entity organised in a way that isolates the SPE from the credit 
                                                     
27 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision:  International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards,  June 2006 and The New Basel Capital Accord, January 2001 
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risk of an originator or seller of exposures. SPVs are commonly used as financing or 
investment  vehicles in which exposures are sold in exchange for cash or debt. 
Under Basel II banks must apply the securitisation framework for determining regulatory 
capital requirements to cover the risks arising from securitisation exposures. Securitization 
exposures include asset-backed securities, mortgage-backed securities, credit enhancements, 
liquidity facilities, interest rate and currency swaps, credit derivatives, etc. Banks are required 
to hold regulatory capital against all of their securitization exposures. Upon certain 
operational requirements originating banks may remove securitized exposures from their 
balance sheet and thus from the calculation of their risk-based capital ratio, e.g., in the case of 
legal transfer of securitized assets to a third party via a true sale whereby the bank ceases its 
effective or indirect control over the transferred assets. It is said that the bank has achieved a 
clean break. The treatment of the risks associated with securitizations is similar in 
Standardized and IRB Approaches. The IRB framework, however, is more risk-sensitive.  
Capital requirements for market risk 
The New Capital Accord retains the approaches to measurement of market risk capital charge 
adopted with the Amendment of1996.  
Capital requirements for operational risk 
With the increase of technological developments the proper management and mitigation of 
operational risks gained in importance for the safety and stability of banks. The regulators 
acknowledged the significance of the threat and proposed the incorporation of the operational 
risks into capital requirements with Basel II in 2001. 
The first pillar in Basel II introduces three methodologies for the calculation of operational 
risk capital charge: the Basic Indicator Approach, the Standardized Approach, and the 
Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA)28. Banks are encouraged to choose an approach to 
calculate operational risk capital that they believe is consistent with their mix of activities and 
their risk profile. Internationally active banks and banks with significant operational risk 
exposure, however, are expected to use the more risk-sensitive Advanced Measurement 
Approach whereas the Basic Indicator and the Standardized Approach are more appropriate 
                                                     
28 For details about the approaches see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision:  International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards. June 2006, Basel  
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for banks with less significant operational risk exposures. Banks are also permitted to use the 
Standardized or Basic Indicator Approach for some business lines and AMA for others. Once 
the banks have received the regulatory approval for more advanced approach, however, they 
are not allowed to scale back to simpler approaches unless their supervisors advise to do so. 
In Basic Indicator Approach banks must hold capital for operational risk equal to the average 
over the previous three years of a fixed percentage (denoted alpha) of bank’s annual gross 
income.  
This can be expressed as follows: 
Operational capital charge = α x Average annual gross income, 
where:  
α is set to 15 % by the BCBS and  
Gross income is defines as net interest income plus net non-interest income 
The drawback of the Basic Indicator Approach is that it is too aggregative and does not 
differentiate among business areas with different operational risk profile (Saunders and 
Cornett, 2008). 
As in the Basic Indicator Approach, the Standardized Approach requires that banks hold 
capital for operational risk equal to a fixed percentage of the three-year average of the gross 
income. The difference here, however, is that rather than calculate capital based on the gross 
income at firm level, the bank must calculate a capital requirement based on the gross income 
of a single business line. The bank’s activities are divided into eight business lines shown in 
Appendix 3. The capital charge for each business line is calculated by multiplying gross 
income (as a broad indicator that reflects the size or the volume of bank activities and thus the 
likely operational risk exposure in that business line) by a factor (denoted beta) assigned by 
BCBS to that business line. Adding capital charges across all business lines together yields 
the total capital charge for operational risk. The capital charge can be expressed as follows: 
Operational capital charge = β1 x AGIBL1 + β2 x AGIBL2 +…….+ β8 x AGIBL8 
where: 
β1-8 is a fixed percentage set by the Committee for each business line (shown in Appendix 3) 
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AGI BL1-8 is the average annual gross income for each business line (shown in Appendix 3) 
In order to use Standardized Approach banks should have adequate operational risk systems 
that comply with the minimum criteria outlined by the Committee. 
With supervisory approval banks are allowed to use also Advanced Measurement Approach 
which enables them to calculate their regulatory capital requirements for operational risk 
based on internally generated risk estimates, subject to qualitative and quantitative standards 
set by the Committee. The quantitative requirements for a sound internal risk measurement 
system include the availability of internal data, relevant external data, scenario analysis and 
factors reflecting the business environment as well as internal control systems. The regulatory 
capital charge should be calculated as the sum of expected loss (EL) and unexpected loss 
(UL) for specified business lines and event types set by the Committee29. In order to make 
proper operational risk estimates banks should have a minimum five-year observation period 
of internal loss data as well as reliable external data. 
2.2.2. The Second Pillar- Supervisory Review Process 
The regulatory supervision is an integral part of the whole procedure of compliance with the 
minimum capital requirements for banks. The supervisory review intends to ensure that banks 
have sound internal systems and rigorous processes in order to assess adequate capital levels 
that support all risks in their business as well as to encourage banks to strengthen their risk 
management and improve internal controls.  
Pillar 2 emphasizes the primary role of bank’s board and senior management for ensuring 
internal control, sound risk and capital measurement systems, and thorough monitoring and 
reporting. Banks should have methodologies for measuring and management of credit risk 
both at individual and portfolio level. Those ones using IRB method should prove that they 
have sufficient capital to meet any deficiencies indicated by the credit risk stress test. In case 
of a shortfall, supervisors may require banks to reduce their risk or/and hold additional 
capital. Banks should also supplement their VAR model with stress testing to identify adverse 
events or changes in market conditions when evaluating the capital adequacy for support of 
market risk. As for risk factors that are not captured under Pillar 1 (e.g., liquidity risk, interest 
rate risk, particular stage of the business cycle effects, etc.) the supervisors will typically 
                                                     
29 Operational risk loss events types are shown in Appendix 4 
36 
 
require that banks hold adequate (economic) capital beyond the core minimum requirements 
and commensurate with the bank’s risk profile.  
Additionally, banks are subject to supervisory scrutiny under Pillar 2 as regards their 
compliance with the minimum criteria and disclosure requirements for the more advanced 
internal methods for risk assessment, particularly IRB method for credit risk, as well as for 
their credit risk mitigation techniques and asset securitizations.  
In order to ensure compliance with the regulatory requirements, supervisors are expected to 
regularly review and evaluate banks’ capital adequacy relative to their risks, the quality of 
capital held, the adequacy of bank’s risk management and internal controls as well as the 
information reporting and systems.  The periodic review can include on-site examinations and 
inspections, off-site reviews, discussions with bank management, and review of work done by 
external audits.  Whenever the supervisory review shows unsatisfactory results of the bank’s 
own risk assessment and capital allocation, and /or banks do not comply with the 
requirements set by the regulator, or fall outside the well-capitalized zone, the supervisors are 
empowered to take discretionary prompt corrective actions to reduce risk or restore capital. 
There are several means for supervisors to ensure that individual banks are adequately 
capitalized. Normally, the supervisors will require that banks hold capital above the minimum 
Pillar 1 standard as a buffer against uncertainties and unexpected losses. The supervisor may 
also set target capital ratios or define categories (e.g. adequately capitalized, well capitalized, 
undercapitalized)30 above the minimum requirement in order to identify decline in capital 
levels at an early stage and intervene with appropriate remedial actions. These actions may 
include intensifying the monitoring of the bank, restricting the payment of dividends, 
requiring bank to prepare and implement a satisfactory capital adequacy restoration plan, and 
requiring the bank to raise additional capital immediately. Any corrective actions taken by the 
supervisors, however, should be carried out in a highly transparent and accountable manner. 
2.2.3. The Third Pillar- Market Discipline 
In order to promote market discipline the third pillar of Basel II introduces requirements for 
formal disclosure of the scope of application of the New Accord, capital structure, risk 
exposures and assessment, and capital adequacy of banks. The purpose of disclosure is to 
                                                     
30 See Appendix 5 for exemplary capital categories  
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increase banks transparency and provide market participants with access to critical 
information about the risk profile and the capital adequacy of banks in order to reduce the 
information asymmetry and help investors take informed decisions. The framework defines a 
set of core disclosures valid for all institutions. An additional set of requirements includes 
supplementary disclosures for some banks depending on the nature of their risk exposure, 
capital adequacy, and methods adopted to calculate the capital charge. Both core and 
supplementary disclosures are particularly important for internationally operating banks. 
Standardized approaches used for credit risk and market risk measurements, internal methods 
for risk assessment as well as credit risk mitigation techniques and asset securitizations are all 
subject to disclosure requirements. 
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Section 3: The Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 
The financial crisis of 2007 started as a subprime crisis in the US mortgage market, turned 
into a crisis in the banking sector and evolved eventually into a global financial crisis. The 
period preceding the crisis is characterized by increased credit extension, particularly to the 
real estate sector, and excessive leverage in the financial system favored by historically low 
interest rates, abundant liquidity, low financial market volatility, increased risk taking 
behavior and loose credit standards (FSF, 2008, Lechner, 2009). In such conditions the 
demand for housing and housing investment escalated to a boom and caused a continuous rise 
of the prices of the real estate (Lechner, 2009). The housing bubble eventually burst in 2007 
and unleashed a crisis which spread very fast in the interconnected banking world and 
throughout the real economy. 
A key factor fostering the housing boom was the remarkable growth in innovative financial 
instruments such as asset-backed securities (e.g. mortgage- backed securities -MBSs) and the 
related securitization process which enabled the development of the so called “originate and 
distribute” model illustrated in Scheme 1.  
 
 
                                                  Loan                            Cash  
                                                  Portfolio                      Payment 
 
                                          Rating                                        Enhancement 
  
                                               Fee                                                  Fee 
 
                                           Securitized                              Cash 
                                           Instruments                             Proceeds 
 
 
 
Scheme 1: Originate-to-distribute model: adapted from Matthews and Thompson (2005) 
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In this model, as explained by Matthews and Thompson (2005), banks bundled a large 
number of their credit assets in a pool, securitized them and sold them to special entities 
called special purpose vehicles (SPV) or structured investment vehicles (SIV) which were 
separate legal entities set up specifically for the transaction. The accounting standards for de-
recognition allowed banks to remove these assets from their balance sheet.  The SPVs, on 
turn, repacked this pool into different tranches of asset-backed securities (ABS) which 
received different and usually highly optimistic ratings by the credit rating agencies (CRAs) 
based on the inherent risk of their composition, and sold them profitably throughout the world 
to other banks and institutional investors outside the regulated banking sector such as hedge 
funds, insurance companies and private equity firms. The asset-backed securities usually 
received credit enhancement in the form of a guarantee from the originating or other bank 
which was recorded by the bank according to the accounting rules off-balance sheet as 
contingent liability to the SPV, i.e. it allowed recourse to the bank in case of mortgage 
defaults. This enhancement or guarantee by the bank actually made the rating and the sale of 
ABSs in the market possible. Without it the financial claims issued by the SPV will not be 
marketable and the whole process will fail since the banks would not be allowed to remove 
the assets from their balance sheet. 
Banks benefited from this scheme because by removing assets from their balance sheet they 
eased the pressure from capital requirement. Indeed, banks often created SPVs specifically to 
evade regulatory requirements since these SPVs were not a subject to the same regulation as 
banks and operated without capital buffers (FSF, 2008). By so doing banks did not violate the 
rules for calculation of the capital requirement; they just took advantage of the loopholes and 
regulatory arbitrage opportunities embedded in the regulatory and accounting frameworks in 
order to reduce their capital and set resources free for other profitable activities. The 
securitization process, however, allowed banks to take increasingly high risks and at the same 
time to maintain low levels of capital which did not correspond to their true risk exposures 
and did not provide sufficient buffer against losses during the crisis31. It also facilitated banks 
in raising additional funds through securitized short-term debt which was relatively cheap, 
and thus more attractive, compared to long-term financing (Diamond and Rajan, 2009). This, 
combined with the low levels of capital, contributed to the build-up of excessive leverage 
before the crisis. 
                                                     
31 The capital circumvention practice and other regulatory arbitrage issues as well as their consequences for the 
banks will be discussed in more details in Section 4. 
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The “originate and distribute” model has been developed by the investment banking of the 
large globally operating banks enabling them to actively trade credit risks as opposed to the 
older model where banks originate and hold credits on their balance sheet until maturity 
(Zuberbüchler, 2008)32.  The reasoning behind as explained by Diamond and Rajan (2009) is 
that securitization is a convenient tool to sell residential mortgage loans to international 
investors who would otherwise not be willing to hold them directly because of credit 
servicing and uncertain credit quality. Secondly, packing different types of mortgages 
together diversifies risk. Furthermore, the riskier portions could be offered to more risk 
appetite investors whereas the safest AAA-rated could be sold to international investors. The 
demand for AAA papers was so high that banks invented a further mechanism to squeeze 
more such securities out of the underlying package of mortgages by second securitization of 
ABS. Banks packed together the lower quality securities form the initial package with 
securities from other packages including a large portion of AAA papers and securitized them 
once again by issuing Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). Through the securitization 
mechanism banks were able to distribute, trade, and hedge their credit risks which increased 
the perception of high liquidity of credit instruments (FSF, 2008, Lechner, 2009).  
The success of the innovative financial instruments, the law default rates as well as the rising 
asset prices induced banks to take full advantage of the overall macroeconomic upsurge and 
to optimize their revenues by extending more loans and producing more securitized assets that 
were sold or used to obtain short-term debt. The problem, however, was that banks started 
lending to subprime (highly risky) borrowers strongly loosening their credit extension criteria. 
Banks felt encouraged to do so because as long as the prices went up the borrowers who were 
not able to pay back their credit would sell their house with a gain and refund their loans 
(Lechner, 2009, Diamond and Rajan, 2009). Additionally, under the “originate and distribute” 
model the primary goal of the banks originating the loans was to sell them to another banks or 
market players. Therefore, the originating banks had no direct interest to ensure the 
creditworthiness of the borrower because if the borrower defaulted on the repayment another 
bank will bear the losses (McIlroy, 2008). The loose credit standards and the vague risk 
redistribution in the originate- to- distribute model led to excessive risk taking and high risk 
concentrations in banking sector which were difficult to identify, and therefore difficult to 
                                                     
32 See also EBK, Jahresbericht 2007, p.98 
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protect form. As long as the market went up, however, everybody along the chain felt safe and 
did not bother about the true risks behind the MBSs. 
Furthermore, the perception of obvious stability and the expectation of low future volatility 
incited banks to increase their cheap short-term borrowing neglecting the possibility of 
becoming illiquid and incapable to roll over financing in worse times, and to take excessive 
risks in order to generate higher returns (Diamond and Rajan, 2009). Moreover, there were a 
lot of risk appetite investors willing to share these risks and thus high market liquidity which 
facilitated the functioning of the scheme. 
From June 2004 until June 2006 the FED gradually increased interest rate levels. The prices 
in the real estate sector reached their peak in the middle of 2006 and began to fall sharply 
from early 2007 onwards. As a result, subprime borrowers defaulted on their mortgage 
obligations and the value of the highly rated securities backed with subprime mortgages felt 
dramatically. Banks holding large amounts of already illiquid and devalued MBS on their 
balance sheet had to write-down millions of assets suffering huge losses and depleting their 
capital cushions. The largest risk concentrations and thus write-offs occurred in the global 
investment banks. They had large amounts of best rated (AAA) tranches of CDOs on their 
balance sheet which were thought exclusively safe before the crises but lost a lot of value 
afterwards (Zuberbüchler, 2008). The reason to hold large amounts of these securities on their 
books rather than sell them was that banks believed that these securities were worthwhile 
investments (Diamond and Rajan, 2009). 
In these quickly deteriorating market conditions banks started to realize their vulnerability in 
terms of credit risk, and particularly the risk of securitization exposures. Banks misjudged and 
underestimated the potential for illiquidity and the concentrations of risks dormant in their 
off-balance sheet explicit or implicit commitments (credit enhancements) to their SPVs that 
evolved once the market risk- taking reversed (FSB, 2008). As the asset-backed securities 
market deteriorated and ABSs could not be sold anymore, SPVs run into financing difficulties 
and turned to banks for liquidity. As a result, banks had to bring the contingent liabilities to 
these SPVs back onto their balance-sheet, running on turn into liquidity problems as well. 
Where explicit commitments were missing banks still had to provide liquidity to their SPVs 
because of reputational concerns (Zuberbüchler, 2008, ICB, 2010).  
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Financing from the interbank money market became very heavy because of this shadow 
banking scheme in which short-term borrowing has to be supported by longer-term assets like 
mortgage-backed securities as collateral. The devaluation of MBSs, however, meant that the 
same amount of collateral would now support less borrowing which forced banks being 
highly levered to deleverage and sell off assets at fire-sale prices triggering further falls in 
asset prices (Mishkin, 2010). Borrowing dried up also due to increased risk aversion, 
tightened lending conditions, mutual mistrust among banks in terms of their soundness, 
quality of structured products, and repayment capabilities, and fears about own liquidity 
resources. This caused a severe contraction and dysfunction in the interbank and related 
financial markets (FSF, 2008).  
Having suffered large unexpected losses because of massive write-downs and off-balance 
sheet commitments while at the same time being inadequately capitalized to meet these losses 
and experiencing additional liquidity problems, the first banks started to fail in the second half 
of 2007. The failure of the fourth largest U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers in 2008, 
however, raised market uncertainty about the safety and soundness of major financial 
institutions and unleashed a crisis of confidence which in the autumn of 2008 practically 
locked up inter-bank money markets and created a large-scale liquidity crisis (The de 
Larosière Group, 2009). 
To sum up, losses and liquidity problems at the relatively small financial segment of the 
subprime residential mortgages in the US market caused a chain reaction in the whole 
strongly interconnected banking sector and given the systemic risk inherent to the financial 
system resulted in a global financial crisis throwing economies around the world into 
recession. Strategically large international financial institutions had to be bailed-out by their 
governments in order to save the financial system from complete collapse. 
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Section 4: Causes of the Financial Crisis 
The causes of the financial crisis were and still are largely discussed by financial regulators, 
investors and policy makers. The attention is focused on four broad areas: corporate 
governance, global capital imbalances, loose monetary policies and underlying weaknesses in 
financial regulation. This section will explain the causes of the crisis primarily from 
regulatory perspective outlining the deficiencies and loopholes in the regulatory framework 
which gave incentives for regulatory arbitrage and perverse behavior by bankers leading to 
exorbitant concentrations of risk in the banking sector and the subsequent crunch. Since the 
main force behind these developments is the human factor, the first chapter will shortly 
explain the incentives of the bankers to act in a way inconsistent with the financial stability. 
The following chapters will then explain the reasons for the failures of the risk management 
and the regulatory systems as well as the key role of the credit rating agencies. 
4.1. Remuneration Systems 
Flawed executive compensation schemes provide a reasonable explanation for the short-term 
oriented behavior of bank managers reflected in excessive risk taking and weakened risk 
management and underwriting standards. The remuneration package of top management of 
large international financial institutions includes bonuses usually in the form of stock options 
or warrants which give holders the right to purchase company stock at pre-specified price 
within certain timeframe. Given that their tenure is constrained in time managers have a 
strong incentive to increase the market value of the shares and thus the amount of their 
compensation as much as possible in the short run by undertaking riskier but more income 
generating activities. This behavior was encouraged by the favorable market environment 
before the crisis providing high risk opportunities, particularly in the abnormally profitable 
securitization business, and the regulatory deficiencies providing incentives for regulatory and 
accounting arbitrage and moral hazard. As Stiglitz (2010) explains, the existing accounting 
regulations allowed managers to manipulate accounting information in a way that they were 
able to overstate profits today by recording potential liabilities off-balance sheet. The use of 
stock options encouraged managers to concentrate on increasing reported income and thus 
rising stock prices in the short-run rather than increasing true profits in the long-run. In 
addition, if the compensation was structured so that executives participate in gains but not in 
losses they will have strong incentive for excessive risk taking. 
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The compensation schemes of subordinate staff in the financial sector also induced short-term 
risk-taking behavior because traders were paid based on their short-term risk-adjusted 
performance (Diamond and Rajan, 2009).   
Besides the reward systems, however, a lot of other incentives encouraged financial 
institutions to act in a short-term perspective and to make as much profits as possible to the 
detriment of the long-term interests of their stakeholders (The de Larosière Group, 2009). 
Even if the managers understood that this type of strategy was not truly value-creating and 
that securitization exposed the system to bad risks they could have hardly avoided the herd 
behavior given the strong pressure by the competition (Diamond and Rajan, 2009, The de 
Larosière Group, 2009). With such incentive structures determining a prevailing mindset in 
the financial institutions it would be naive to think that regulation alone can solve all the 
problems that became evident in the crisis. Well-targeted regulation, however, could have 
helped mitigate or eliminate some of the misleading incentives and thus prevent from or 
constrain the dimensions of the crisis (The de Larosière Group, 2009). 
4.2. Deficiencies of Risk Management and Internal Controls 
The safety and stability of the financial institutions depend first of all on their own internal 
management and controls which did not prove sound during the crisis. The main failure of the 
risk management in banks was the inadequate assessment and thus inaccurate pricing of risks- 
something that has been overlooked also by their regulators and supervisors. Banks, 
regulators, and supervisors severely underestimated credit risks, concentration risks, market 
risks and liquidity risks, particularly for AAA-rated tranches of structured products. Some 
banks held large exposures to super-senior tranches of CDOs without entirely understanding 
the risks inherent in such instruments, and failed to take appropriate actions to control or 
mitigate those risks (FSF, 2008). The risk measurement models such as VAR-models for 
measuring of market risks were not suited to estimate the exposure to systemic shocks and tail 
risks for complex structured products, and therefore underestimated the overall risk exposure 
(FSF, 2008, The de Larosière Group, 2009).  
Risk management system failures were aggravated also by failures of corporate governance 
procedures and weak internal controls as well as inadequate communication across business 
lines and functions. (Yeoh, 2010, FSF, 2008, The de Larosière Group, 2009). Many boards 
and senior managers seriously underestimated the risks they were running and did not provide 
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the necessary oversight or control of banks activities. Top management compensation 
schemes contributed to excessive risk-taking and short-term oriented behavior. The originate-
to-distribute model created additional distorted incentives for bank managers to overlook 
risks. Knowing beforehand that the default risks of borrowers would be transferred or sold 
through MBSs or CDOs to other market players, bankers had no incentive to ensure high 
lending standards (The de Larosière Group, 2009). The application of the model that looked 
attractive in the context of liquid money market, however, led to bad highly risky practices 
such as increased leverage, short-term borrowing and sub-prime lending. Many banks did not 
fully capture their risk exposures within the capital adequacy calculation and ended up 
insolvent in the crisis. 
The overall effect of the failures of risk management and internal controls was an 
overestimation of the ability of financial firms to manage their risks, and the respective 
underestimation of the capital they should hold in order to meet potential losses (The de 
Larosière Group, 2009). 
4.3. Shortcomings of Financial Reporting and Accounting  
One of the problems with financial accounting, as already noted in chapter 4.1., was that it 
gave bankers incentive for short-term performance and encouraged the reporting of 
misleading information which did not reflect the true risk exposures . The accounting rules 
allowed immediate recognition of profits but made no provision for a discount for future 
potential losses (The de Larosière Group, 2009). US-GAAP allowed securities and the 
implicit risks to remain off-balance sheet (ICB, 2010). This contributed to a large extent to the 
massive use of complex structured products. Banks set up conduits and SIVs to securitize 
assets assuming implicit or explicit commitments to these SIVs. In the case of explicit 
commitments banks insured the debt issued against the securitized assets using credit 
guarantees (e.g., in the case of commercial paper). These credit guarantees mostly structured 
as “credit enhancements” were recorded off-balance-sheet as contingent liabilities with 
recourse to bank balance sheets for outside investors (Acharya et al, 2010, Yeoh, 2010). The 
use of such structure created a belief that the  risks did not lie with the arrangers and led 
market participants to underestimate bank’s risk exposures. Additionally, the off-balance 
sheet entities intended to allocate less capital against risks connected with these conduits than 
if they were booked on-balance sheet. This led to relatively low levels of capital compared to 
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the size of the balance sheet, excessive leverage, and increased sub-prime risks hidden in off-
balance sheet vehicles which hit back the bank when they had to be recorded on-balance sheet 
once market liquidity dried up. 
Another problem with the accounting was the “fair-value” or “mark-to market” accounting 
rule imposed by the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB). According to this 
principle banks are required to record their assets in their books at current market values. The 
main deficiency of the principle is that it has strong procyclical, meaning here negative, 
detrimental effect on the financial institutions in a downturn (Nobel, 2009). This became 
evident in the current crisis when the market for asset-backed securities shrank substantially 
and the prices deteriorated.  The rules forced banks to incur huge losses having to write-down 
large amounts of financial assets, and particularly securities held on banks’ balance sheets. 
Due to strong pressure by banks, however, FASB eased the mark-to-market rule in April 
2009, allowing banks to value their assets when the market is not active for an asset, at prices 
that would be received in an orderly market rather than forced liquidation33. 
4.4. Insufficient Information and Transparency  
Lax disclosure requirements and unregulated shadow banking system before and during the 
crisis allowed banks to operate with complex structured products without providing 
information about the quality and performance of the underlying assets and the risks involved 
in the securitization process. Even when publicly available, the information disclosed was not 
timely and useful enough to help investors and market participants assess the type and 
magnitude of risks associated and the capital adequacy and solvency of banks (FSF, 2008). 
Banks actually benefited from this information asymmetry and lack of transparency as long as 
there were risk- appetite investors who were more concerned with the exclusively high yields 
of the new financial products rather than with the explanation of their true nature. The other 
reason for providing insufficient information was that the senior bank managers “gambled” on 
“ludicrously complex” products which they themselves did not understand as well (McIlroy, 
2008). Securitized instruments were meant to increase the efficiency in the banking sector by 
spreading risks more evenly across the financial system.  The nature of the securitization 
model, however, made it difficult to ascertain whether risks have been actually spread or re-
concentrated in less visible parts of the system (McIlroy, 2008, The de Larosière Group, 
                                                     
33 http://www.fasb.org/sbd040209.shtml  
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2009). As a result, there was increased opacity in the financial system and ambiguity about 
which market participants bear what degree of risk which eventually caused a crisis of 
confidence in the financial market and led to investors’ withdrawal and liquidity crunch 
during the turmoil (FSF, 2008, The de Larosière Group, 2009). 
Indisputably, supervisory and regulatory authorities also failed to strengthen the reliability of 
valuations and risk disclosures. Basel Committee addressed these flaws by introducing 
disclosure rules under Pillar 3 of its Basel II Capital Accord. It did, however, nothing for the 
timely implementation and enforcement of the framework. 
4.5. Performance of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) 
A large contribution to the financial crisis and particularly to the expansion of the structured 
products market and its subsequent failure play the CRAs which provided over-optimistic 
ratings of the innovative financial instruments. CRAs assigned AAA- ratings to the senior 
tranches of subprime-related MBSs and CDOs-the same rating they gave to standard 
government and corporate bonds- triggering unprecedented growth of subprime lending and 
creating misleading perception of financial stability. As the risks became so large and obvious 
that they could not be ignored any more, CRAs announced sudden downgrades of these 
instruments which raised serious concerns about the quality of credit ratings with regard to 
structured products and loss of confidence among investors.  
The main criticism of CRA focuses on its flawed rating models, conflict of interest in the 
rating process, and insufficient transparency and information about the key assumptions and 
criteria, risk characteristics, and methodologies used in the rating of structured products (FSF, 
2008). 
The poor rating models for assessment of the default probability of complex structured 
products were based on insufficient historical data on the US sub-prime market. The data 
available spanned a period of benign economic environment with rising house prices. There 
was not sufficient historical data about how particular asset pools would respond to potential 
economic downturn. CRAs, however, could have taken into account the correlations in the 
defaults that would occur in a market downturn (FSF 2008, The de Larosière Group, 2009). 
As Goodhart (2010) explains, because MBSs are constructed on basis of mortgage pools that 
consist of static portfolios of fixed-income investments that become seasoned over time, their 
ratings, which are predictable, move either towards default or AAA together. This “all-or-
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nothing” nature of the risk results in high yields in good times and concentrated defaults in 
bad times.  Once the conditions start to deteriorate the volatility of MBSs ratings is much 
more extreme than for corporate debt. Therefore, Goodhart concludes, the problem with rating 
MBSs arises not because the future cannot be predicted but because CRAs apply to structured 
products the same traditional rating model they use for corporate and government debt. 
Instead of giving one particular rating, for example A or BBB, CRAs should publish 
additional detailed information on the potential volatility of ratings migration in each case. 
In addition, CRAs underestimated the severe loosening of underwriting standards by certain 
originators and thus neglected their due diligence of the quality of the collateral pools 
underlying rated securities. This led to inadequate assessment of the credit risks of 
instruments collateralized by subprime mortgages (The de Larosière Group, 2009, FSF 2008). 
The other issue that received attention was the conflicts of interest involved in the rating of 
structured products. CRAs apply issuer-pays model which implies that they may have 
incentive to give good ratings to the ones who pay for the rating. The standard conflict of 
interest, however, is very unlikely in traditional corporate business because of reputational 
concerns. As Goodhart (2010) explains, the existence of CRAs is strongly dependent on their 
reputation and normally they would not damage it just to retain a single client and gain 
another fee. The incentive to over-rate, however, is much higher with structured products for 
two reasons. Firstly, structured products earned abnormally high profits for the investment 
bankers issuing the securities and generated higher fees for the CRAs in comparison to 
corporate rating. Secondly, structured products were often rated by only one or two agencies 
compared to corporations which sought ratings by all or several major agencies. The 
investment banks sought for the agency that will give the highest rating for their products (the 
so called “rating shopping”). This fostered increased competition between CRAs and induced 
them to become lax and biased in their estimates. 
 
The conflict of interest arises also because CRAs sell consulting services to entities that 
purchased ratings. To the extent that CRAs discuss with issuers the structuring and rating of 
different tranches, the potential for conflicts of interest becomes greater (FSF 2008). If the 
CRAs, however, advise their clients how to structure their tranches in order to achieve 
particular rating it is absolutely normal that if the clients follow the instructions they will get 
the ratings they strive at. Moreover, referring to IOSCO’s code of conduct for CRAs 
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Goodhart (2010) argues that CRAs are actually obliged to support issuers with details of the 
techniques used to assign ratings and to answer methodology related questions. He assumes 
that conflict of interest is possible only if CRAs and issuers jointly apply a rating that CRA 
reckons as too high. 
Finally, because of the complexity of the structured products and the difficulty of the analysis 
of the underlying assets which require experience and special knowledge many investors did 
not fully understand the risk characteristics of these products. CRAs, however, also did not 
provide sufficient and clear information about the assumptions and the criteria used in their 
rating. As result, when the reliability on CRAs ratings became questioned, many investors 
could not asses the risks on their own, which added to market illiquidity (FSF 2008). 
4.6. Underlying Weaknesses of Basel Capital Accords 
If the prudential regulation has to be blamed for the current crisis, it is important to emphasize 
that the causes lie primarily in Basel I since Basel II framework was not fully implemented 
before the crisis and entered into force in January 2008 in the EU and is only applicable in the 
US since April 2010 (The de Larosière Group, 2009). Furthermore, it could be argued that if 
Basel II had already been fully implemented, especially in the USA where the crisis started, it 
would have helped avoid or at least mitigate the crisis (The de Larosière Group, 2009, 
Gualandri et al., 2009). For example, had the capital requirements for liquidity lines provided 
to SPVs already been in place, then they might have eliminated some of the difficulties (The 
de Larosière Group, 2009).  
Basel II, however, also has several severe flaws which have been revealed by the financial 
crisis yet before it has been definitely implemented. These deficiencies will be discussed here 
in order to understand the necessity of its fundamental review that has been made recently 
with Basel III. 
4.6.1. Capital Adequacy 
The typical criticism of Basel I is its limited risk sensitivity which results in unrealistic capital 
ratios. As already discussed in Chapter 2.2., assets with different credit risk are allocated 
under the same broad asset class and thus assigned the same risk weight regardless of their 
particular quality (e.g., all corporate loans have 100% risk weight). By adding up the credit 
risks of individual assets together, Basel I also ignores the diversification of risk in the asset 
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portfolio. This produces higher capital charge than if correlation is taken into account. As 
Moosa (2008) explains, these deficiencies have created an incentive for circumventing the 
capital requirement and increasing the credit risk in the loan portfolio. In order to boost their 
income banks shifted the composition of their portfolio towards high-yield, low-quality assets. 
Since high-quality and low-quality loans had the same risk weight, banks were able to keep 
the same capital ratio while increasing their overall risk. The other form of regulatory 
arbitrage was the use of securitization. Under Basel I securities unlike loans are not subject to 
capital requirement. Thus, through the securitization of mortgage loans banks reduced their 
capital charge without reducing their risk exposure if the assets were held on bank’s books or 
shifted with explicit or implicit commitments to their SPVs off-balance sheet.  
Basel I created incentives to circumvent capital requirement through securitization and 
contributed this way to the development of the “originate and distribute” model characterized 
with excessive risk taking, subprime lending, and short-term borrowing before the crisis. The 
model developed with the idea to distribute risks more evenly throughout the financial system 
actually contributed to large risk concentrations hidden in ABSs which were perceived as safe 
both by banks and investors until the subprime borrowers started to default. Basel I did not 
capture the risks form the securitization exposures within the capital adequacy calculation and 
allowed banks to remove assets from their balance sheet and to maintain lower capital levels 
relative to their true risk exposures. As a result, many banks ended up insolvent due to 
inadequate capitalization during the crisis. 
By circumventing the capital requirement, as already mentioned in Section 3, banks took 
advantage of the loopholes in Basel I in order to increase their profitability while at the same 
time sticking to the capital calculation rules, i.e. what banks did was not illegal. The problem 
was that the omission of the regulatory framework to include securitizations in the capital 
adequacy allowed such behavior. Moreover, banks’ supervisors have the discretionary power 
to impose restrictions on banks activities or require prompt corrective actions if they establish 
that banks are undercapitalized.34 Supervisors, however, like bankers and investors were also 
not aware of the true risks of the securitizations and even if they were, according to the capital 
coverage scope of Basel I, they would neither be expected to require that banks hold 
additional capital specifically against securitizations because banks will immediately say that 
                                                     
34 See 2.2.2. Supervisory Review Process 
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they are not obliged to, nor to punish banks because they have not included securitization risk 
in their capital calculation. They were only allowed to require that banks hold capital above 
the minimum but provided the magnitude of the risks hidden in ABSs that measure would 
have hardly been sufficient to prevent the failures. What supervisors could have done was to 
incite revision of Basel I framework in order to correct the omissions, which they actually did 
with Basel II. However, they did not trigger the timely implementation of Basel II. This and 
other problems of banks’ supervision will be discusses in detail in Chapter 4.6.6. 
In order to overcome the shortcomings of Basel I the regulators developed the improved and 
extended Basel II framework. Basel II corrects the problem with the arbitrary risk weights of 
Basel I by suggesting wider credit risk weights differentiating between obligors and their risk 
profiles. Therefore, it aligns minimum capital requirements more closely to the actual risks 
banks face and strengthens the risk management practices. In contrast to Basel I, Basel II 
framework takes into account also the risk mitigation techniques such as collateral and thus 
produces more realistic and more risk-sensitive capital ratios. Some critics argue, however, 
that the categories of new risk weights are still limited and it is unclear how closely they 
reflect true credit risk (Moosa, 2008, Saunders and Cornet, 2008). Others like Goodhart 
(2005) reckon that risk-based capital measure is basically wrong. Particularly in a fast 
changing market the financial innovation will soon make risk assessments outdated and 
erroneous, however accurate and sophisticated they might be at the moment when they are 
determined (Goodhart, 2005). Another problem is that unrated firms are weighted 100% 
whereas firms rated BB- or below receive 150% risk weight. This creates incentives for risky 
firms to avoid ratings in order to obtain cheaper finance (LSE, 2001). Because of such 
loopholes the potential for regulatory arbitrage under Basel II remains as well.  
Basel II, however, managed to address adequately the problem with the innovative financial 
instruments and thus to eliminate regulatory arbitrage incentives for moving risk exposures 
off-balance sheet or distributing them through the securitization process. Under Basel II banks 
are required to hold regulatory capital against all of their securitization exposures, including 
MBSs, ABSs, credit enhancements, liquidity facilities, etc. unless a clean break has been 
achieved through legal transfer (sale)35. Additionally, the regulation and supervision of the 
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securitization process has been strengthened through compulsory disclosure requirements in 
Pillar 3. This framework, however, was not implemented before and during the crisis. 
Basel II framework is undoubtedly superior to Basel I. Nevertheless, it also has some 
deficiencies. One of the main critiques, as already discussed, is that it keeps the risk-based 
capital calculation which, even if more sophisticated, still allows regulatory arbitrage. 
Furthermore, the heavy reliance on the ratings of CRAs in the Standardized Approach for 
assessment of credit risk in the aftermath of the sub-prime crisis also turns out to be 
problematic. The use of ratings of CRAs, as it has been shown in Chapter 4.5, is inappropriate 
and misleading because they provide inconsistent and conflicting forecasts of the 
creditworthiness of individual clients.  CRAs are unregulated and the quality of their risk 
estimates is unreliable because of lack of transparency and information about the rating 
models used. The regulators allowed the use of CRAs but did nothing to ensure a consistent 
application of ratings in order to dampen incentives for “rating shopping” (LSE, 2001).  
Basel II, like Basel I, also fails to address credit risk portfolio diversification opportunities. 
The Standardized model is a linear measurement of risk that ignores correlations among assets 
and asset group credit risks, i.e. risk weights are calculated for each asset separately and then 
summed up to get the total measure of credit risk (Saunders and Cornet, 2008). Thus, Basel II 
has been criticized to produce inadequate capital ratios as well. As Moosa (2008) further 
explains the failure of the regulation to consider asset correlations creates perverse incentives 
for banks to reduce their capital requirement by investing in highly correlated, relatively low-
risk individual assets, i.e. banks create more risky portfolios consisting of less risky individual 
assets. These portfolio concentrations of similar type of assets such as MBSs expose banks to 
higher risks since the assets move towards default together and thus threaten the insolvency of 
the bank. This was demonstrated during the crisis with the large amounts of strongly 
correlated in terms of credit risk MBSs such as AAA-rated CDOs and other derivatives in 
banks’ portfolios which caused severe losses once their value started to jointly move down. 
The correlations arise naturally because of common dependence on macroeconomic factors 
such as real-estate prices, market interest rates or the business cycle (Hellwig, 2010). 
4.6.2. Risk Models Set in Basel II- Pillar 1 
LSE Group (2001) warns about the destabilizing effects of the key deficiencies in Basel II and 
thus the danger of global financial crisis already before the crisis occurred. The Group 
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criticizes the risk models proposed by Basel II pointing out that the models, particularly 
Value-at-Risk models advocated in the advanced approaches to calculating capital charges for 
credit, market, and operational risk, give inaccurate risk forecasts and underestimate the joint 
downside risk of different assets, i.e. the systemic dimension of risk. VaR models are based 
on the assumption that the stochastic process is stationary and banks’ own actions, based on a 
volatility forecast, do not affect future volatility itself, i.e. they treat risk as exogenous and fail 
to consider the fact that market volatility depends also on the behavior and interaction of all 
market participants and is thus endogenous.  In times of “calm” market participants are 
heterogeneous in terms of their risk-aversion and their actions offset of each other. Thus, the 
failure to account for risk endogeneity is not that harmful. In a downturn, however, the failure 
to appreciate the endogenous nature of risk and liquidity at systemic level may lead to 
perverse behavior. In times of crisis banks become homogenous and pursue similar strategies 
to mitigate adverse effects. The homogeneity and strategy convergence are enhanced even 
more when banks are encouraged by regulators to employ similar risk models. As a result, 
individual actions reinforce each other and aggravate the negative effects. This is a typical 
externality which regulators do not take into account. Externalities, however, boost systemic 
risk and threaten the stability of the financial system. In such situations, the use of VaR or 
similar techniques may not be appropriate anymore. At the onset of a crisis, the behavior of 
market participants which govern the process generating the underlying data used in the 
model, has changed from heterogeneous to homogeneous. This violates the main assumption 
of VaR models that the underlying stochastic process is stationary and thus VaR models do 
not produce correct risk estimates anymore. 
Another deficiency of VaR models is that, when the returns are not normally distributed, and 
this is the case with credit, market and especially operational risk, the existing models 
produce misleading and insufficient risk measures. They provide only an estimate of a 
particular point in the distribution but do not measure the scale of potential losses in the 
adverse tail of risk distributions which is important given that low probability, high loss 
events can pose severe threat to the banking system in a crisis. Furthermore, regulators 
propose 99% risk level which does not reflect adequately systemic risk. Additionally, the 
framework suggests minimum estimation horizon of one year which is in practice used as an 
upper bound. This means that banks ignore the data about the long-run volatilities and make 
imprecise forecasts. 
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These deficiencies of VaR-models became crucial in the current crisis, particularly for the risk 
assessment of complex structured products, because neither the models nor the stress tests 
were able to project the risks and the potential losses in the tail, i.e. in the case of a severe 
price fall and contraction of the market of asset-backed securities. Additionally, the 
calculations in VaR-models based on volatility data derived from observation of a too short 
time period of benign conditions before the crisis produced unrealistic prognoses. Therefore, 
while the models may pass the test for normal conditions, they are inappropriate for 
exceptional circumstances (The de Larosière Group, 2009). 
Furthermore, by ignoring tail risks VaR models open a loophole for regulatory arbitrage 
giving banks the opportunity to shift risks away from the distribution of risks that matters for 
the calculation of capital requirement to the tail through the use of,e.g., options (LSE, 2001). 
4.6.3. Basel II Procyclicality  
Banking is a risk-sensitive business and as such is inherently procyclical (Moosa, 2008, LSE, 
2001). Basel II, as a form of capital-based regulation, has been severely criticized because it is 
believed to exacerbate the procyclicality of the banking system. This is so because of the 
cyclical up- and downgrades in the CRA- and internal ratings allowed to use under Basel II 
(McIlroy, 2008). LSE Group (2001) and Moosa (2008) explain that since riskiness of assets 
varies over the business cycle, so do the risk-sensitive capital requirements. Thus, the capital 
charges decrease and banks overland in booms- exactly when the danger of a systemic crisis 
is largest. Conversely, banks hold more capital when the estimates of default risk are higher 
and contract their lending activity in downturns when macroeconomic stability actually 
requires an expansion of lending. In order to maintain required capital levels when prices fall 
and quality of assets deteriorates in a crisis a bank will either have to take on more capital, 
which in the short run may be impossible or costly, or to dispose of risky assets. Banks that 
want to sell risky assets in the absence of regulation will find less risk-averse banks willing 
and able to buy these assets and thus provide liquidity. Under regulatory constraints, however, 
these banks will not be able to do so because they also have to maintain their capital levels. 
As a result, disposing of risky assets will be possible only at fire sales prices which will 
further deteriorate the market for such assets and deepen the crisis by accelerating the 
downturn. Therefore, bank capital requirements exacerbate the procyclical tendencies making 
recessions more severe and booms more inflationary and increase the likelihood of systemic 
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crises in banking sector instead of reducing it. This contradicts to the central purpose of 
prudential regulation which is to ensure the safety and stability of the financial system  
Additionally, ratings of CRAs under Standardized approach are accused of lagging behind 
rather than leading the business cycle. This may produce capital requirement that peaks 
during recession, when banks are least able to meet these requirements and vice-versa 
(Saunders and Cornett, 2008, Moosa, 2008). 
There is also inherent procyclicality in VaR-models because they are based on too short 
statistical horizons to capture fully market prices movements (The de Larosière Group, 2009). 
If volatility goes down in a year the models tend to understate the risks involved and thus 
capital levels and vice-versa. 
By contrast, the regulatory capital requirements under Basel I are neutral as regards the 
economic cycle because assets are rated at a fixed risk weight regardless of the stage in the 
cycle, e.g. loans on corporations and on residential property are rated respectively at 100% 
and 50% in the good times as well as in the bad ones (McIlroy, 2008). Under Basel II where 
CRA- and internal ratings are used, if a company loses its AAA rating, the banks that have 
extended loans to it will have to adjust their capital accordingly (McIlroy, 2008). The 
procyclical impact on the capital levels will be much more expressed in the case of IRB than 
in the case of Standardized approach using CRA-ratings, i.e. in a downturn IRB produces 
higher capital requirement than the Standardized approach and vice-versa (Goodhart, 2005). 
4.6.4. Liquidity 
The capital accords fail to address liquidity risk which was at the heart of the financial crisis 
from the very beginning. Prior to the crisis low interest rates encouraged low-cost short-term 
borrowing which was more attractive to banks than long-term funding in good times but 
increased the risk of becoming illiquid in bad times. Banks build up excessive on- and off-
balance sheet short-term leverage while maintaining very low levels of capital relative to their 
risk exposures. As a result, when ABS- market broke down banks came under severe liquidity 
stress because they were not able to roll over short-term financing anymore and did not have 
sufficient liquidity buffers. Since liquidity risk is strongly linked to solvency and systemic 
risk the lack of prudent liquidity management at individual institutions before the crisis turned 
out crucial for the stability of the whole system. Moreover, financial innovation and the 
related asset securitization have increased banks interconnectedness with the financial 
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markets and with it the correlations between liquidity, market and credit risks. This 
transformation of the financial system from the old “originate and hold” to the “originate and 
distribute” model requires a system-wide consideration of liquidity. Basel II, however, has no 
provisions for liquidity and does not take sufficiently into account the risk transformation 
which creates a gap in the framework and diminishes the effect of the regulation of the other 
risks since here is also valid that a system is as strong as its weakest element(s). This is a very 
serious omission of the Basel Committee providing that the main purpose of Basel Accords is 
to preserve the soundness of the financial system and to limit bail-out actions and liquidity 
interventions by Central banks. 
Basel II treats liquidity indirectly through the capital base required for the credit, market, and 
operational risks and provides only partial solutions to liquidity problems (Gualandri et al., 
2009).  Liquidity is addressed in Pillar 2 where banks are required to have sound internal 
systems and rigorous processes in order to assess adequate capital levels that support all risks 
in their business including risks that are not captured under Pillar 1 such as liquidity risk. 
Supervisors will typically require that banks hold capital in excess to the minimum 
requirements in order to ensure the coverage of such risks36. This treatment of liquidity risk, 
however, is absolutely insufficient provided the severe consequences for the solvency of the 
bank it may have. Moreover, the evaluation of the adequate capital levels depends to a large 
extent on the discretionary actions of the supervisory authorities (Gualandri et al., 2009).  
Basel II provides also partial solutions to the liquidity problems linked to the complex 
structured products. Pillar 1 requires that banks hold capital against liquidity commitments to 
off-balance sheet exposures, even if their duration is less than one year. The commitments 
with shorter maturities, however, are treated as senior exposures with lower capital charges. 
Therefore, the incentives for regulatory arbitrage by creating off-balance sheet exposures in 
the form of short-term liquidity lines extended to securitization vehicles are still not 
eliminated under Basel II (Gualandri et al., 2009). 
Gualandri et al. (2009) explain the omission of Basel II to incorporate liquidity risk into 
capital requirements with the difficulty to align the international scope of regulatory 
framework for capital adequacy with the national character of liquidity regimes. Different 
liquidity regimes are characterized with different quantitative and qualitative approaches and 
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levels of disclosure which are affected by the national regulatory context- national deposit 
insurance schemes, monetary policy of central bank, and insolvency regulation. The 
fragmentation of national liquidity regimes has additionally contributed to the financial 
system fragility in the current crisis. Therefore, the regulators will face a serious challenge to 
create a common framework of liquidity rules and to coordinate supervisory practices.  
4.6.5. Systemic Risk 
The fundamental purpose of Basel Capital Accords is to ensure and protect the safety and 
stability of the financial system through capital-based requirements on an international basis. 
Nevertheless, the system did not pass the test of the financial crisis of 2007-8. Therefore, the 
main critique of Basel II framework is its failure to understand systemic risk and its strong 
interconnection with liquidity risk. A key risk to the stability of the system is that a firm will 
fail and that this may have system repercussions. The failure of an individual firm in most 
other industries gives a healthy, competitive impetus to efficiency (ICB, 2010). In financial 
sector, however, liquidity linkages between banks can cause shocks at one institution to 
propagate in a very short time throughout the system and result in a chain reaction of bank 
runs and system break down37.  
In general, Basel II fails to understand the degree of interdependency of the risks affecting the 
financial institutions and treats credit and market risks separately without correlating them in 
terms of their system relevancy (Nobel, 2008). It focuses more on the individual bank’s risk 
rather than systemic risk. In the end, the aggregate risk facing the system is higher than the 
simple sum of the individual risks. The regulation is primarily concerned with calculating the 
capital levels in accordance with the existing risks but does not provide any guidelines for 
reducing risk exposures and concentrations and controlling bank insolvency risk (Moosa, 
2008). VaR models produce estimates of capital ratio which completely disregard systemic 
risk. Furthermore, the use of similar risk management models may lead to larger than normal 
price movements and thus provoke systemic risk. Additionally, protecting the system is 
severely hampered by the underlying procyclicality of the regulation which exacerbates the 
inherent susceptibility of the financial system to systemic crises. 
Failure of the Basel framework to address systemic and liquidity risk resulted in the use of the 
“traditional” means for saving the financial system in a crisis through bail-outs and deposit 
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insurance. Public safety net aims to reduce the social cost of the crisis but has a proven 
negative impact over the market and management discipline and creates incentives for moral 
hazard38. State support implies acceptance of risks (and hence costs) by the state and 
utilization of the related benefits by the private sector (ICB, 2010, Stiglitz, 2010). This 
separation of costs and benefits produces inefficiencies and distorts risk management. Too big 
to fail banks (meaning systemically important financial institutions-SIFIs) knowing that they 
have the explicit or implicit guarantees to be bailed out through liquidity injected from their 
lender of last resort in times of trouble will have strong incentives for excessive risk taking 
and poor decision-making in order to generate higher profits and will always take advantage 
of their implicit protection at the expense of the taxpayers and the other market players. 
Conversely, facing the real prospect of failure in the absence of state support bank managers 
will be more risk averse and responsible for the consequences of their decisions because they 
know that their own bank will have to bear the costs of poor performance. Therefore, banks 
should be allowed to fail in order to ensure market efficiency and fair competition, to promote 
management discipline and punish hazardous behavior, to build a stronger and safer banking 
sector, and thus reduce the cost of bail-outs for the rest of the economy. The main concern 
during the crisis, however, was that allowing too big to fail banks to actually fail would have 
more damaging impact on the financial system and the economy than the cost of bail-out. 
This raised the issue about the necessity of a regulatory framework for the safely resolution of 
SIFIs, meaning resolution that could be carried out at a maximum low cost for the society. 
Allowing SIFIs to safely fail then will reduce the reliance on public support and limit the 
moral hazard in the future.  Because of their increasing importance in the financial system 
SIFIs and the related systemic risk are the main items in the post-crisis regulatory agenda. 
4.6.6. Supervisory Framework- Pillar 2  
Supervisors under Pillar 2 are obliged to assess the quality of banks risk management and 
capital measurement systems. The supervisory framework allows regulators to be more 
flexible with respect to bank’s specific circumstances when they establish the required capital 
charge. LSE Group (2001) argues, however, that this flexibility may have unintended 
consequences. A high degree of flexibility implies high discretionary power which 
supervisors may use to set lower capital levels for some banks in order to afford them a 
competitive advantage. Alternatively, supervisors may choose minimum ratios when higher 
                                                     
38 See also (1)1.4. Systematic Risk and (2)Kaufmann, 1996 
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capital levels are more prudent. High discretionary power may eventually result in the failure 
of the accord to achieve level playing field and uniform and consistent implementation across 
countries. Additionally, it may lead to regulatory capture, and thus to distorted incentives to 
defend bank’s individual rather than the public interest. 
The Group identifies a further ground for potential competitive disadvantage across countries 
as regards the capacity- financial and human- of banks and regulators to employ internal risk 
models. IRB approach for credit risk assessment, for example, requires substantial investment 
and well trained talent to design and use the system which may not be possible for poorer 
countries. Moosa (2008) complements this argument by adding that Pillar 2 focuses primarily 
on general principles and does not take into account the differences in supervisory 
competence across countries. Therefore, Basel II is likely to achieve its objectives only 
partially. 
This criticism, even if well-grounded, is more valid for the years ahead, now when Basel II 
has already been fully implemented. The main problem of bank regulation and supervision 
with respect to the current crisis, however, turned out to be the lack of macro-prudential scope 
and, therefore, the failure to timely and effectively counteract to the crisis and, if not able to 
prevent, at least to mitigate it. Supervisory authorities recognized the underlying weaknesses 
of the financial sector yet before the turmoil but did not undertake more serious actions most 
probably because they believed that the financial system is strong and resilient enough (FSF, 
2008). Moreover, bank supervisors actually welcomed the “marketization” of financial risk 
because they saw it as a way to reduce risk concentrations on banking sector by spreading risk 
across market players worldwide which was supposed to have stabilizing effect on the global 
system (Persaud, 2010, McIlroy, 2008). Another suggestion is that the financial supervisors 
did not have or received subsequently all the relevant information on the global magnitude of 
the risks and that they did not fully understand and thus adequately evaluated the risks (The 
de Larosière Group, 2009). Meanwhile, deficiencies in the pre-Basel II framework facilitated 
the development and the growth of largely unregulated derivatives market and shadow 
banking structures such as SPVs and SIVs carrying along excessive risks covered with 
relatively low capital levels and potential liquidity problems. BCBS analyzed the weaknesses 
of the OTD-model shortly before the crisis but it was already too late to react to the ongoing 
events (Zuberbüchler, 2008). Additionally, supervisory authorities did not manage to co-
operate effectively and to share information properly on a cross-border basis which is one of 
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the fundamental objectives of BCBS supervisory framework. Fierce international competition 
among financial centers gave incentives to national regulators and supervisors to avoid 
unilateral action, thus, focusing more on the micro-prudential supervision of individual 
institutions rather than on the macro-systemic dimension of risks (The de Larosière Group, 
2009). All this suggests serious flaws in the existing global supervisory framework. 
Therefore, supervision needs to be revised both on micro-and macro-prudential level. 
4.6.7. Disclosure Requirements- Pillar 3 
The purpose of Pillar 3 is to compliment and strengthen Pillar 1 capital requirements and 
Pillar 2 supervisory review with a set of disclosure rules that will allow market participants to 
assess risk exposures and the relevant capital adequacy of banks. Pillar 3 was developed with 
the intention to provide sufficient information and increase transparency, particularly in terms 
of the securitization process. Admittedly, these improvements would have helped reduce 
information asymmetry, had they been in place before and during the crisis. 
Moosa (2008) summarizes some criticism on Pillar 3 which basic points are that the 
requirements for effective market discipline do not show in detail what information about 
bank’s financial and risk positions needs to be disclosed which results in a lack of consistency 
in the way banks report risk information. Furthermore, Pillar 3 is about creating disclosure 
and transparency which are necessary but not sufficient condition for effective market 
discipline. Therefore, the effectiveness of Pillar 3 as regards market discipline is questioned. 
4.6.8. Other Criticism of Basel II 
Additional criticism of Basel II is directed towards its omission to treat the interest rate risk39 
in the trading book, although this risk is accounted for in the banking book under Pillar 2. It 
also fails to address business, reputational and concentration risk (Moosa, 2008, Saunders and 
Cornet, 2008). Saunders and Cornett (2008) draw an interesting comparison between Basel II 
and risk-based capital schemes for property-casualty and life insurers, pointing out that the 
latter have more complete coverage of risk than does the bank scheme. 
Further criticism relates to competition concerns. The intention of the designers of Basel II 
has been to create an international standard that can be implemented across jurisdictions in 
                                                     
39 See 1.4. Interest rate risk 
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such a way that banks can “play on a level field” (Moosa, 2008). Some national and bank-
specific discretion, however, is inevitable. Due to tax and accounting differences across 
banking systems and in safety net coverage, the 8 % risk-based capital requirement does not 
create a level playing field for banks in different countries (Saunders and Cornet, 2008).  
4.7. Summary 
The analysis made in this section clearly shows that the regulations imposed in the past have 
not worked properly and failed to protect the system from the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
Deficiencies in the regulatory and accounting frameworks have allowed regulatory arbitrage 
and manipulation by banks and have contributed to bank’s vulnerability and inability to 
survive prolonged stressed conditions. The main problem with Basel I and II was that they did 
not fully capture all risks into the capital adequacy calculation. Therefore, many banks ended 
up insolvent due to low capital levels before the crisis. Additionally, both frameworks did not 
take into account liquidity and systemic risks which play a key role for the financial and 
economic stability on a global level in the strongly interconnected banking sector and the 
related financial markets. 
Therefore, there is an international call for a regulatory response to the crisis in order to 
overcome the deficiencies of the regulatory frameworks and to address the problems revealed 
by the crisis. When designing the new regulatory architecture the regulators should consider 
the following main principles: 
First of all, international banking regulation and supervision will need a macro-prudential 
approach in order to address the problems on a global level and to ensure the stability of the 
financial system in the long run and avoid future crises. To protect the whole financial system 
is the fundamental philosophy of Basel frameworks. In the aftermath of the crisis, however, it 
turns out that the international bank regulation and supervision has been much more focused 
on the position of individual banks in isolation rather than the system protection. Therefore, 
the regulators should put emphasis on systemic issues such as increasing bank’s resilience to 
cyclical developments and strengthening the requirements for the SIFIs, in order to promote 
macro-stability.  
Secondly, it was to a large extent the failure of bank supervisors to take coordinated and 
timely action to stop or at least mitigate the crisis. Thus, the system survival in the future will 
require consistent standard implementation and stronger international collaboration and 
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coordination among bank supervisors. Supervisory authorities should operate effectively and 
share information properly on a cross-border basis in order to identify potential risks in the 
system and take common corrective actions at an early stage. 
Third, the role of the regulation is to achieve appropriate behavior of regulated institutions by 
establishing а set of common rules which create incentives. The regulation of banks should 
create incentives for banks to act in a way consistent with the fundamental objectives of 
system stability and consumer protection. Basel frameworks, however, have been improperly 
constructed and have created weak and even perverse incentives for bankers in the financial 
institutions and within the financial system in the past. Hence, when optimizing the regulatory 
regime, the regulators should very well consider the incentive structure they will create with 
the new rules. The incentive structures should be at the center of the regulatory process 
because, as Llewellyn (2001) explains, if they are wrong or inappropriate it is unlikely that the 
other mechanisms in the regime will achieve their regulatory objective. Therefore, if 
regulators want to ensure a sound financial system on a global level the incentives for bankers 
should be consistent with system stability.  
Further regulation is necessary in the following areas:  
- The capital framework will need a thorough revision in order to address all risks 
properly, including the risk from complex securitizations and re-securitizations and 
counterparty risk, and to enhance bank’s resistance in times of financial stress;  
- Bank’s resilience in adverse conditions should be further strengthened through 
liquidity requirements; 
- The enhancement of Pillar 2 supervisory review process of Basel II should focus on 
stronger bank controls and international convergence; 
- Pillar 3 of Basel II promoting market discipline should be enhanced in order to 
achieve increased transparency and consistent disclosure rules among banks and 
towards all market players; 
- Compensation structures, deposit insurance and bank resolution, risk management and 
internal controls, CRAs and accounting rules for financial institutions are all urgent 
issues that should be addressed if the possibility of future crises is to be reduced.  
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Section 5: Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis 
The deficiencies of financial regulation and particularly of Basel I and II Capital Accords 
gave perverse incentives to banks for regulatory arbitrage and caused partially the current 
crisis. The international regulatory framework proved to be insufficient, flawed and unsound 
to help prevent or mitigate the turmoil. Therefore, the Basel Committee had to take prompt 
measures to address the lessons of the financial crisis and reform bank regulation and 
supervision. In July 2009 the Committee introduced a package of measures to enhance the 
three pillars of Basel II followed by a new regulatory and supervisory framework in 
December 2010 which became known as Basel III. Basel III builds on and complements the 
enhanced Basel II framework. The reform aims to overcome the main deficiencies of Basel II 
discussed in the previous section and to strengthen the global capital and liquidity rules in 
order to ensure a more resilient banking sector. It also aims to strengthen risk management 
and internal controls as well as banks’ transparency and disclosures. The new rules take into 
account the systemic dimension, and particularly the importance of the SIFIs. By addressing 
the risks on a macro level Basel III intends to improve banking sector’s ability to absorb 
shocks arising from financial and economic stress and thus ensure the stability of the financial 
system as a whole. 
This section will present the main aspects of the international regulatory response to the 
financial crisis by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.  It will shortly outline the 
most important changes in Basel II framework introduced with the “Enhancements to the 
Basel II Framework” of July 2009 as well as the new rules introduced with the two 
documents: “Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking 
systems” and “Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards 
and monitoring” which will be hereinafter referred to as Basel III. The consequences of the 
new rules on the banking sector and their effectiveness for protecting the financial system 
from future crises will be then discussed in the next section. 
5.1. Enhancements to the Basel II Framework40 
The enhancements to Basel II aim to strengthen the1996 capital requirements for the trading 
book as well as the three pillars of the Basel II framework. The reforms of Pillar 1 include: 
                                                     
40 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Enhancements to the Basel II Framework, July 2009, Basel  
64 
 
- Higher capital requirements for the trading book , complex securitizations and 
exposures to off-balance sheet vehicles which were the main source of losses in the 
current crisis. The capital requirement must be determined based on VaR stress test 
covering 12-month period of significant financial stress; 
- Higher risk weights and thus higher capital requirements for resecuritization exposures 
in both banking and trading book;  
- Operational criteria for credit analysis of externally rated securitization exposures 
intended to ensure that banks perform due diligence and do not rely simply on rating 
agencies’ credit ratings; 
- Uniform capital requirement for all securitization liquidity facilities regardless their 
maturity. The old rule required less capital for the liquidity facilities under one year; 
- Banks are not permitted to recognize external ratings for risk-weighting purposes if 
those ratings are based on support (guarantee) provided by the bank itself. If a bank 
provides a guarantee to an exposure and that guarantee plays a role in determining the 
credit rating the bank must treat this exposure as if it were not rated.  
The reforms of Pillar 2 are focused on risk management and internal controls. A key element 
of the risk management is a thorough and comprehensive internal capital adequacy 
assessment process (ICAAP) which should produce capital levels sufficient to support all 
material risks banks face.  
The enhancements address under Pillar 2 certain areas that have been identified in bank’s risk 
management process during the crisis as weaknesses. These areas include: 
- Firm-wide governance and risk management and controls. Supervisors should ensure 
that banks have in place sound firm-wide risk management system that enables them 
to define the institution’s risk appetite and recognize all material risks, including 
reputational and strategic risks. A sound risk management system requires: active 
board and senior management oversight, comprehensive and timely identification, 
measurement, mitigation, controlling, monitoring and reporting of all risks, 
comprehensive internal controls, appropriate management information system (MIS), 
and appropriate policies, procedures and limits. Risk management processes should be 
monitored frequently by independent internal as well as external auditors; 
- Risk concentrations. Through its risk management processes and MIS banks should 
identify, measure, control and mitigate risk concentrations across firm, business lines, 
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asset types, risk areas, and geographic regions in a timely manner. Banks should 
employ stress-testing techniques in order to assess the impact of such concentrations 
in adverse market conditions. An appropriate level of capital for risk concentrations 
should be determined together with bank supervisors; 
- Off-balance sheet exposures and securitization risk. The enhancement requires that all 
securitization risk not fully captured under Pillar 1 be addresses in bank’s ICAAP (e.g. 
liquidity and reputational risk of each exposure) 
- Valuation practices. According to “Supervisory guidance for assessing banks’ 
financial instrument fair value practices” published in April 2009 by the BCBS banks 
should have adequate governance structures and control processes for fair valuing of 
exposures for risk management and financial reporting purposes. The established 
practices should be appropriate for initial pricing, mark-to- market pricing, valuation 
adjustments and independent periodic revaluation. Banks must have the capacity to 
produce valuations using alternative methods also during periods of stress; 
- Reputational risk and implicit support. Banks should have appropriate policies in place 
to identify sources of reputational risk and consider the potential provision of implicit 
support they might have to provide or losses they might experience in adverse market 
conditions. Once identified potential exposures should be incorporated in banks 
ICAAP. Reputational risk scenarios should be included in regular stress tests where 
the effect of reputational risk should be measured in terms of credit, liquidity, market, 
and other risk types; 
- Stress testing practices. The regulators put a special emphasis on the stress testing as 
an important tool of banks internal risk management that provides forward looking 
assessments of risk and alerts bank management for potential shocks related to various 
types of risk. Banks should examine future capital requirements under stress scenarios 
and plan their capital position in the long-run. A comprehensive set of principles for 
the sound governance, design and implementation of stress testing programs at banks 
is outlined in the Principles for Sound Stress Testing Practices and Supervision 
published by the Committee in May 2009.  
- Sound compensation practices. In April 2009 the FSB published Principles for Sound 
Compensation Practices which should be implemented by banks and reinforced by 
supervisors. In line with the principles the compensations of the staff engaged in 
financial and risk control areas should be independent of these business areas. 
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Compensation must be adjusted for all types of risk so that it is balanced between the 
profit and the risk assumed in generating the profit. Employees’ incentive payments 
should be linked to both the individual contribution and the overall performance of the 
firm. Compensation payout schedules should be structured in accordance with the time 
horizon of risks. Bank’s board should monitor the compensation system to ensure that 
it operates as intended. In addition, the enhancements require supervisory review and 
disclosure of bank’s compensation policies to stakeholders.  
 It is the role of the supervisors to evaluate whether a bank has in place sufficient and sound 
firm-wide risk management process that enables it to define its risk appetite and recognise all 
material risks, including the risks posed by concentrations, securitisation, off-balance sheet 
exposures, valuation practices and other risk exposures. These elements should be adequately 
incorporated into the bank’s risk management system and ICAAP. Differences between the 
capital assessment under a bank’s ICAAP and the supervisory assessment of capital adequacy 
made under Pillar 2 would normally trigger a dialogue between the supervisor and the bank’s 
management about how to improve internal governance and controls, processes and systems 
in order to produce adequate levels of capital. An appropriate target capital ratio set by the 
supervisor under Pillar 2 would be one that exceeds the minimum Pillar 1 standard so that all 
risks of the bank – both on- and off-balance sheet – are adequately addressed, particularly 
those related to complex capital market activities. This way supervisors will ensure that a 
bank maintains sufficient capital  for risks not adequately covered under Pillar 1 and that it 
will be able to withstand a prolonged period of financial market stress by drawing down on 
the capital buffer built-up during good times. When banks are not able to achieve sufficient 
capital levels, supervisors are expected to intervene with rapid corrective actions as already 
described in detail in Chapter 2.2.2. 
 
The Committee strengthens also the disclosure requirements under Pillar 3 particularly the 
disclosures related to securitisation activities, re-securitization exposures, liquidity facilities, 
sponsorship of off-balance sheet vehicles, valuation practices, and liquidity positions. Banks 
are responsible for making disclosures that reflect their real risk profile and convey them to 
market participants. The requirements show in detail what information about bank’s financial 
and risk positions needs to be disclosed, achieving this way consistency and uniformity in the 
way banks report information to the outside world. 
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Pillar 1 and Pillar 3 enhancements must be implemented by the end of 2011. Pillar 2 
enhancements became immediately effective in July 2009. 
5.2. Basel III41 
5.2.1. Capital Framework 
Basel III raises the quality and quantity of the regulatory capital base and improves the risk 
coverage. Additionally, the framework supplements the risk-based capital requirement with a 
leverage ratio that intends to constrain the excess borrowing in the banking system. Basel III 
introduces also several macroprudential elements into the capital framework in order to 
counteract systemic risk arising from procyclicality and from the interconnectedness of banks.  
Capital Base 
Basel III makes some changes to the definitions of capital since the crisis has revealed some 
inconsistency in the elements of the capital base across jurisdictions and insufficient 
transparency and disclosure which did not allow the full assessment and comparison of the 
quality of capital between jurisdictions. The key element of the new definition is the common 
equity as the highest quality component of bank’s capital. 
The new regulatory capital consists only of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. Tier 3 capital available 
under Basel II to cover solely market risks is completely eliminated under Basel III. The total 
capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2) is kept at 8% of risk-weighted assets. 
Tier 1 Capital (going-concern capital) includes Common Equity Tier 1 restricted to at least 
4.5% of risk-weighted assets and Additional Tier 1 Capital. Total Tier 1 Capital must be at 
least 6.0% of risk-weighted assets. 
Common Equity Tier 1 Capital consists of: (a) common shares that meet the classification 
criteria; (b) stock surplus resulting from the issue of instruments included in Common Equity 
Tier 1capital; (c) retained earnings; (d) accumulated other comprehensive income and other 
disclosed reserves; (e) minority interests that meet the criteria for inclusion in Common 
Equity Tier 1 capital; (f) regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of Common Equity 
Tier 1capital. 
                                                     
41 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient 
Banks and Banking Systems. December 2010, Basel 
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Additional Tier 1 Capital includes: (a) instruments issued by the bank that meet the criteria for 
inclusion in Additional Tier 1 Capital (and are not included in Common Equity Tier 1capital);          
(b) stock surplus resulting from the issue of instruments included in Additional Tier 1capital; 
(c) instruments issued by consolidated subsidiaries of the bank and held by third parties that 
meet the criteria for inclusion in Additional Tier1 capital and are not included in Common 
Equity Tier 1capital; (d) regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of Additional Tier 
1capital. 
Dividends are removed from Common Equity Tier 1. Regulatory adjustments or deductions 
from capital (goodwill, deferred tax assets, investment in own shares, reciprocal cross 
holdings, etc.) are generally applied at the level of common equity. Innovative capital 
instruments which are currently limited to 15 % of Tier 1 will be phased out. 
Tier 2 Capital (gone-concern capital) consists of: (a) instruments issued by the bank that meet 
the criteria for inclusion in Tier 2 Capital (and are not included in Tier 1capital); (b) stock 
surplus resulting from the issue of instruments included in Tier 2capital; (c) instruments 
issued by consolidated subsidiaries of the bank and held by third parties that meet the criteria 
for inclusion in Tier 2 capital and are not included in Tier 1capital; (d) certain loan loss 
provisions; (e) regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of Tier 2capital 
For an instrument to be included in Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital it must meet all the criteria set in 
Basel III framework42. For Additional Tier 1 Capital and Tier 2 Capital the Committee is in 
process of harmonization and development of additional entry criteria. 
Finally, the capital base has been strengthened through requirements for disclosure of all 
elements of regulatory capital base and deductions applied and a full recognition to the 
financial accounts. This improves the transparency and achieves consistency of disclosure 
among banks. 
Risk Coverage 
The crisis has revealed the failure of the capital framework to capture major on- and off-
balance sheet risks as well as derivative related exposures which led to low capital levels 
insufficient to cover the high risk concentrations in banking sector. In addition to the 
                                                     
42 See Appendix 6 for classification criteria 
69 
 
enhancements of the Basel II framework outlined in Chapter 5.1 Basel III introduces 
measures to strengthen the capital requirements for counterparty credit exposures arising from 
banks’ OTC derivatives, repo and securities financing activities. The framework allocates 
higher capital charge against these exposures.  
Banks should apply a multiplier of 1.25 to the asset value correlations (AVC) of all exposures 
to regulated financial institutions whose assets are at least 100 bn. This means that exposures 
to financial institutions will require higher capital charge in comparison to non-financial 
corporate sector because the AVCs of the inter-financial sector exposures are higher relative 
to non-financial ones. 
The new rules require that banks calculate their capital requirement for counterparty credit 
risk using data that include a period of stress to the credit default spreads of bank’s 
counterparties. This way the capital charges will not follow the economic cycle and will not 
decrease substantially in times of low market volatility. 
In addition to the capital requirements for counterparty default risk determined with the 
Standardized or IRB-Approach, banks must add a capital charge to cover the risk of potential 
mark-to-market losses (called credit value adjustment-CVA- risk) associated with 
deterioration in the creditworthiness of counterparty. The counterparty credit risk 
management standards take into account also the so called wrong-way risk which is the risk 
that exposures will increase when the credit quality of the counterparty deteriorates as result 
of risk factors highly correlated to the counterparty’s probability of default. Banks should use 
stress tests to identify future shocks arising from changed relationships between risk factors 
and thus deteriorated creditworthiness of a counterparty, and implement Pillar 1 capital charge 
for wrong-way risk. 
The Committee has also adopted additional standards to strengthen collateral risk 
management and initial margining. For large and illiquid derivative exposures to a 
counterparty the Committee requires longer margining periods to be used for the purpose of 
calculating regulatory capital requirement.  
In order to further reduce counterparty risk the Committee is supporting the ongoing work of 
IOSCO and the Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems (CPSS) to establish strong 
standards for central counterparty clearing houses (CCPs). Bank’s collateral and mark-to 
market exposures to a qualifying CCP will receive a low risk weight of 2 %. In addition, 
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default fund exposures to a CCP will be subject to risk-sensitive capital requirements. The 
low capitalization of bank exposures to CCP will create incentives to move OTC derivative 
contracts to central counterparties.  
The Committee has also addressed the overreliance on external credit ratings by introducing a 
number of measures to mitigate the negative effects of the use of such ratings. The Committee 
requires that banks perform their own internal assessment of credit risk exposures regardless 
of whether the exposures are externally rated or not. In order to avoid certain “cliff effects” 
arising from credit risk mitigation practices (guarantees and credit derivatives) the framework 
sets criteria for eligibility of guarantors and protection providers. Basel III also requires that 
national supervisors incorporate IOSCO’s Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating 
Agencies in their eligibility criteria for the use of the ratings of ECRIs. Finally, to eliminate 
the arbitrary “rating shopping” the Committee requires that banks use the chosen ECRIs and 
their ratings consistently for each type of claim and for both risk weighting and risk 
management purposes. 
Leverage Ratio 
One of the main reasons for the severity of the crisis of 2007-8 was the excessive on- and off-
balance sheet leverage in the banking system. As the liquidity in the market dried up banks 
were not able to fulfill their obligations anymore and were forced to deleverage by selling off 
assets at fire sales prices which further amplified the downward pressure on asset prices, 
depleted bank’s capital, and exacerbated banks losses and the credit crunch. 
In order to address the problem, the Committee has introduced a leverage ratio intended to 
constrain the leverage in banking sector and thus mitigate the damaging effects of a forced 
deleveraging process on the financial system and the economy. The ratio as a simple, 
transparent, independent, and non-risk based measure of risk provides additional safeguard 
against model risk and measurement error of the risk-based measure. 
Simply put the leverage ratio is capital divided by total assets. The capital measure for the 
leverage ratio is based on the new Tier 1 capital. Basel III proposes for a start a minimum Tier 
1 leverage ratio of 3% which will be subject to further calibration. The exposure measure 
includes on- and off-balance sheet items measured for the leverage ratio according to certain 
requirements stipulated in the framework.  
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Capital Conservation Buffer 
In the deteriorating conditions in the banking sector right before and during the crisis many 
banks continued to distribute dividends and pay generous compensations. Banks did so even 
if they saw their financial instability because reductions in distributions would have been 
perceived as a signal of weakness. This collective banks activity, however, contributed to the 
depletion of capital in individual institutions and to the system fragility as a whole. Many 
banks returned to profitability after the period of distress but did not rebuild their capital 
buffers. Such dynamics exacerbates the procyclicality of the system. Therefore, the 
Committee has introduced requirements for conservation of capital in order to build-up 
adequate capital buffers above the regulatory minimum that can be drawn down in periods of 
stress. When buffers are drawn down banks should reduce discretionary distribution of 
earnings (in the form of dividend payments, share-backs, bonus payments) in order to rebuild 
them. Banks could also, as an alternative, raise new capital from the private sector instead of 
conserving internally generated capital. It is not acceptable that banks with depleted capital 
buffers distribute capital in order to signal their financial strength. Such behavior may 
encourage other banks to do so and eventually increase distributions exactly at the time when 
banks should actually be conserving earnings. 
Basel III establishes a capital conservation buffer of 2.5%, comprised of Common Equity Tier 
1, above the regulatory minimum capital requirement. Common Equity Tier 1 must first meet 
the minimum capital requirements of 4.5% (as well as the 6% Tier 1 and 8% Total capital 
requirements if necessary). The remainder then is used for the capital conservation buffer. If 
the banks’ capital levels fall within the buffer range the supervisors should impose capital 
distribution constraints. These distribution constraints increase as the bank’s capital levels 
approach the minimum requirement. 
Countercyclical Buffer 
The countercyclical buffer is a macroprudential tool which aims to protect the banking sector 
from periods of excess aggregate credit growth by building capital buffer in good times which 
can be drawn down in bad times. The buffer will be required by national supervisory 
authorities on an infrequent basis as an additional capital defense against potential losses only 
when excess aggregate credit growth is resulting in a system-wide build-up of risk. The 
countercyclical buffer requirement will be decreased or removed when system-wide risk 
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dissipates. The countercyclical capital buffer requirement for internationally active banks will 
be calculated as the weighted average of the buffers deployed across all the jurisdictions to 
which they have credit exposures. 
The countercyclical buffer is set to zero in normal times and increases between 0% and 2.5% 
of total risk-weighted assets depending on the judgment of national authorities as to the extent 
of the build-up of system-wide risk during periods of excessive credit availability. Basel III 
regime treats the maximum countercyclical buffer as 2.5%. The buffer, however, may exceed 
2.5% if national authorities recon this appropriate in their national context. The requirement is 
imposed as an extension of the capital conservation buffer and is also comprised of Common 
Equity Tier 1. To meet the requirement banks may be subject to restrictions on distributions 
like in the case of the conservation buffer. 
The Committee requires additionally that banks disclose publicly their countercyclical buffer 
requirements with the same frequency as their minimum capital requirements. Banks must 
also disclose the geographical position of their private sector credit exposures used in the 
calculation of the buffer. 
5.2.2. Global Liquidity Standards43 
Basel III has introduced global liquidity standards which aim to achieve bank’s resilience in 
the short and in the long run. For this purpose the supervisors have to make sure that banks 
hold sufficient unencumbered high-quality liquid assets to cover the total net cash outflows 
under a prescribed stress scenario over a 30-day period- a time frame in which the 
management and/or supervisors can take appropriate corrective actions and /or the bank can 
be resolved in an orderly way. In the longer run, the objective is to create incentives for banks 
to fund their activities with more stable sources of funding on an ongoing basis.The 
Committee has developed two ratios to achieve these objectives: The Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio (LCR) calculated over 30 calendar days and The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) with 
a time horizon of one year.  
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) is defined as follows: 
Stock of high െ quality liquid assets
Total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days
 ൒ 100% 
                                                     
43 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk 
Measurement, Standards and Monitoring. December 2010, Basel 
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For “high-quality liquid assets”44 qualify these assets that can be easily and immediately 
converted into cash in the markets at little or no loss of value even in periods of severe 
idiosyncratic or market stress. High-quality liquid assets should be additionally eligible at 
central banks for intraday liquidity needs and overnight liquidity facilities. 
Total net cash outflows are calculated as the total expected cash outflows minus total 
expected cash inflows. The cash outflows and inflows are determined according to stress 
scenario parameters which entail both institution-specific and systemic shocks. The 
parameters are internationally harmonized with prescribed values45. Certain parameters, 
however, allow some national discretion in order to better account for country-specific 
conditions.    
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is expressed as follows: 
Available amount of stable funding
Required amount of stable funding
 ൒ 100% 
Stable funding is defined as those portions of equity and liability financing considered as 
reliable sources of funds over a one year time horizon under stress conditions. The required 
amounts of stable funding depend on the liquidity profiles of the assets. All illiquid assets and 
securities as well as some portions of OBS contingent exposures should be backed by stable 
funding46. 
The standards establish minimum levels of liquidity for internationally active banks. To 
strengthen the cross-border consistent application of the framework and to ensure better 
assessment and control of liquidity risk of a bank the Committee has also developed a set of 
monitoring tools that should be considered as the minimum types of information the 
supervisors should use. Consistent with the Committee’s supervisory framework, however, 
national authorities may set higher liquidity levels for their banks and /or use additional 
monitoring metrics in order to capture specific risks in their jurisdictions.  
 
 
                                                     
44 See Basel Liquidity framework for qualifying assets 
45 See Basel Liquidity framework for prescribed values 
46 See Basel Liquidity framework for stable funding 
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5.2.3. Implementation Program 
Basel III will be gradually implemented in order to ensure that the banking sector can meet 
the higher capital requirements through reasonable earnings retention and capital rising 
without contracting the lending to the economy. The framework should be fully effective by 
January 1, 2019. The implementation schedule for the single requirements is as follows: 
The new minimum capital requirements should be implemented at three stages starting with 
3.5% Common Equity Tier 1 and 4.5% Tier 1 capital on 1 January 2013 and applying the full 
levels of 4.5 % Common Equity Tier 1 and 6% Tier 1 as of 1 January 2015. 
The reforms to the counterparty credit risk framework will be effective on 1 January 2013. 
Capital conservation buffer and the countercyclical buffer will be phased-in between 1 
January 2016 and 1 January 2019.  
The transition period for the leverage ratio has commenced on 1 January 2011. A minimum 
Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% will be tested during a parallel run period between 1 January 2013 
and 1 January 2017. Based on the results of the test period the ratio will be eventually 
incorporated under Pillar 1 on 1 January 2018. 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) standards will be 
introduced respectively on 1 January 2015 and on 1 January 2018 after an observation period 
commencing in 2011 during which any unintended consequences will be addressed. 
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Section 6: Evaluation of the Post-crisis Regulation 
This section aims to assess the efforts of Basel Committee to address the lessons from the 
financial crisis and to analyze how the changes brought with Basel III will affect the banking 
sector. It will also discuss the outstanding potential problems and weaknesses of the Basel III 
framework. The last chapter will then answer the research question- purpose of this thesis: 
Will Basel III help prevent future crises in the banking sector? 
6.1. Achievements of the Post-crisis Regulation 
To address the regulatory failures revealed by the crisis, the Committee has revised the 
international regulatory and supervisory framework. The reforms aim to strengthen both the 
micro-prudential, i.e. individual bank level, as well as the macro-prudential, i.e. system level, 
regulation and supervision. The micro-prudential measures should ensure higher resilience of 
the single institutions and better resistance to periods of stress. At macro-prudential level the 
goal is to provide system-wide protection from risks across the banking sector and to mitigate 
procyclical reinforcements of these risks. Admittedly, reducing risk at bank level will 
positively affect the integrity and stability of the whole financial system over time.  
Capital adequacy 
Banks turned out to be extremely fragile and vulnerable to the adverse conditions right before 
and during the crisis due to their very low capital levels which did not correspond to their true 
risk exposures. In the absence of sufficient capital buffers to absorb unexpected losses 
banking sector run into insolvency problems ending up with some spectacular failures of 
systemically important institutions and financial and economic slump. 
In response to the shortcomings that became evident with the crisis the Committee 
strengthened the quality, quantity and international consistency of bank capital and enhanced 
the risk coverage thus increasing the resilience of the global banking system and ensuring 
stronger capital buffers and controls against losses in the future. 
The enhancements of Basel II set higher capital requirements for all securitization exposures 
on- and off- balance sheet. Additionally, re-securitizations which were not separately treated 
under Basel II as more risky than securitizations have now received higher risk weights. Pillar 
2 includes into capital consideration also concentration, reputational and all other risks not 
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covered under Pillar 1 which should be treated in terms of credit, market and operational 
risks. 
Basel III improves the quality and quantity of the capital requirement by increasing the Tier 1 
capital ratio to at least 6 % (compared to the old one - 4 %) which should be comprised of 
minimum 4.5 % high- quality common equity capital. Additionally, the capital conservation 
buffer of 2.5 % raises the total common equity capital to 7 %. The framework requires better 
risk coverage of counterparty credit risk with particular attention to derivatives, repos and 
securities financing activities. It requires capital coverage also for CVA risk. CVA risk was 
not addressed in the previous framework but it turned out to cause more losses than those 
arising from counterparty defaults. Bank’s capital requirement is additionally strengthened 
through a straightforward and transparent non-risk based leverage ratio which supplements 
the risk-based capital measures and overcomes the potential arbitrage opportunities of the 
capital ratio inherent in its risk-weighted assets. It also can ensure that banks have relatively 
equal levels of capital across all jurisdictions. Basel III is trying to capture all relevant risks in 
the capital adequacy framework and reduce insolvency risk as a result of undercapitalization 
or excess leverage. By assigning higher capital charge to riskier products it also reduces 
incentives for excessive risk taking and better prepares the financial system to withstand 
adverse shocks. Under Basel III the incentives for off-balance sheet activities and regulatory 
arbitrage through securitizations provoked by the shortcomings of the previous Basel 
frameworks have been removed. 
Basel III as well as the enhanced Basel II framework address the problem with the 
overreliance on CRAs’ ratings. Both require that banks have internal control and information 
collection systems to assess risk exposures on their own and not solely rely on ratings 
provided by CRAs. Banks should have the necessary capacity to conduct credit risk analysis 
of externally rated securitization exposures as well as perform stress tests and use reliable 
valuations models and quantitative tools to assess all relevant risks. This way, banks will 
assign more realistic risk weights to their assets and produce capital requirement 
commensurate with the actual risks banks are facing. Basel III offsets also the incentives for 
“rating shopping” by requiring consistent use of CRAs chosen by national supervisors. This 
will eliminate the conflict of interest problem and thus provide reliable information to 
investors and market participants. 
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CRAs have contributed to a large extent to the current crisis and this formed the view among 
regulators and investors that they should be regulated in some way in order to reduce the 
conflicts of interest and to increase their transparency and competition. They should be also a 
subject to supervision that can verify the credibility and reliability of the information they 
provide and ensure that their ratings are independent, objective and of high quality. Post- 
crisis, a common suggestion for CRAs regulation is to involve governments either as 
supervisors or as promoting a public sector CRA to compete with the private CRAs 
(Goodhart, 2010). Goodhart (2010), however, recommends that CRAs be better supervised by 
an independent assessment body - a Credit Rating Agency Assessment Centre (CRAAC) - set 
up by the private sector or the government in every country where CRAs exist. He reckons 
that no government intervention is further desirable except to ensure that CRAAC are 
independent of the CRAs themselves. 
CRAs, however, are out of the regulatory and supervisory scope of BCBS. Therefore, their 
regulation will not be touched upon in details in this paper. 
Risk management, internal controls and governance 
Banks’ lax internal governance and risk management lie at the root of the financial crisis since 
they are the first level of protection for individual institutions and thus the system as a whole. 
Therefore, they were items of primary concern in the post-crisis agenda. Pillar 2 revision in 
the enhanced Basel II framework intends to strengthen risk management practices and 
overcome the loopholes in internal controls and risk models in order to better capture risks in 
internal assessments of capital adequacy. Under Pillar 2 banks must apply stress testing that 
will play a leading role in strengthening bank’s governance and the resilience of individual 
banks and financial system. Stress tests should keep banks management alert for potential 
shocks as a result of market reversal. This way banks have an indication how much capital 
they would need in order to absorb losses in times of adverse market conditions, i.e. they can 
plan their capital levels in the long-run so as to be prepared for such conditions and thus 
control their solvency risk. Stress tests are intended to supplement the other risk management 
tools and help overcome the limitations of historical data used in measurement methods and 
particularly the shortcomings of VaR models. Stress tests will be able to overcome the 
procyclicality of VaR estimations through capital charges based on stressed credit valuations 
and provide the information about the tail risks which VaR models cannot measure and 
therefore take into account exceptional circumstances and related systemic risk. Stress tests 
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will allow a broader view over bank’s total risk profile by including a wider range of risk 
scenarios. They should help banks identify risk concentrations in different business areas as 
well as various sources of reputational risk and take appropriate measures to control, avoid or 
mitigate these risks in a timely manner. These provisions together with the enhanced 
securitization requirements should keep risk concentrations in the banking sector under the 
critical levels threatening the stability of the system. 
Furthermore, the enhancements outline an active and critical role of boards and senior 
management in ensuring effective firm-wide governance and oversight and establishing 
adequate risk management practices. Basel II enhancements require that board and 
management have an understanding of risk exposures on a firm-wide basis and are duly 
informed about the capital market activities and products in which their bank is involved. 
With respect to new products and activities- such as securitization and off-balance sheet 
activities and complex products- senior management should understand the underlying 
assumptions in the business models and establish sound and effective valuation and risk 
management practices in order to assess the fair value of the financial instruments and control 
the associated risks. This will help avoid in the future management ignorance about the 
underlying risks and inadequate pricing of the products offered. A sound and resilient 
valuation system will allow banks to produce a fair value of their assets at any time even 
when markets disrupt and there is not a reliable price benchmark anymore. 
Top management and boards should be also actively involved in compensation system’s 
design and operations and bear direct responsibility for mitigating the risks arising from 
remuneration policies. This will reduce the incentives for short term hazardous behavior and 
excessive risk taking which jeopardize the long-term survival of financial institutions. 
In addition to the strengthened internal controls by the enhancements, in October 2010 BCBS 
issued Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance which aim to address main 
deficiencies in bank corporate governance revealed by the crisis. The Principles recommend 
that supervisors establish guidance or rules requiring banks to have sound corporate 
governance strategies, policies and procedures47. 
 
                                                     
47  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: The Basel Committee’s Response to the Financial Crisis: Report 
to G20, p. 7, October 2010, Basel 
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Procyclicality 
One factor that contributed to the deepening of the financial crisis was the procyclical 
reinforcement of the shocks throughout the banking system. Market participants tend to 
behave in a cyclical manner, thus amplifying the negative effects in a downturn. In addition, 
regulatory standards such as the accounting procyclical fair value principle accelerated the 
market break down. Basel II framework does not provide regulatory means to mitigate 
procyclicality. On the contrary, it exacerbates the procyclicality of the banking system even 
more because of the risk sensitiveness of bank’s capital requirement. Basel III attempts to 
correct this deficiency of Basel II and to address procyclicality by introducing series of 
measures which aim to ensure that banking sector serves as a shock absorber instead of a 
shock transmitter throughout the financial system and real economy.  
One of the measures taken is the introduction of the countercyclical buffer which aims to 
achieve system stability by protecting the banking sector from severe lending contraction and 
losses following periods of excess credit growth. Such credit crunches can destabilize the 
banking sector and the economy. Thus, Basel III requires that banks build up additional 
capital defenses in periods of growing system-wide risks. This will provide banks with capital 
absorption capacity in a downturn as well as help moderate excess credit growth and thus 
mitigate or eliminate the possibility of system-wide shocks.  
Similarly, through the capital conservation buffer Basel III aims to strengthen banks ability to 
withstand adverse conditions and to increase the sector resilience into a downturn and help 
rebuild capital during economic recovery. The additional capital held as a buffer will ensure 
that banks have available capital to support their operations in a period of stress. Thus, the 
conservation buffer has a countercyclical effect.  
The leverage ratio meant to constraint excess leverage levels during periods of credit 
expansion will also act countercyclically and thus ensure individual and system robustness 
and survival in stressed conditions. 
In order to dampen excess cyclicality of the minimum capital charge BCBS requires that 
banks use long term data horizons to estimate probabilities of default and include downturn 
loss-given-default (LGD) estimates in their risk functions. Additionally, when determining the 
capital charge, particularly for counterparty credit risk, banks should use stressed inputs and 
thus calculate a capital charge that is more level through time and does not follow the cycle. 
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Basel Committee is aware of the cyclicality of the minimum capital requirements but does not 
consider dampening it through removing the risk weights. Instead, the supervisors will 
observe the impact of Basel II framework on the member countries over the credit cycle. If 
the cyclicality tunes out to be greater than the supervisors deem appropriate, the Committee 
will take additional measure to reduce it48. 
Liquidity 
Perhaps the most welcomed part of Basel III is its liquidity framework which complements 
the Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision of the Committee 
published in September 2008 as immediate response to the crisis.  
The securitization process before the crisis allowed the build-up of excessive leverage in 
banking sector through collateralized short term debt from interbank markets which exposed 
banks to severe illiquidity risk once mark-to-market values declined and banks were not able 
roll over financing anymore.  In the absence of high-quality liquid assets and stable long term 
funding to support bank’s operations in times of stress the banking sector experienced a 
severe liquidity shock and destabilization of the financial markets.  Basel III is addressing the 
liquidity problems by introducing for the first time two global liquidity standards which 
should ensure that banks maintain sufficient liquidity to withstand a range of stress events. 
The LCR standard aims to ensure bank’s resilience to stress and survival in the short run 
whereas the NSFR standard aims to eliminate structural liquidity mismatches in bank’s assets 
and liabilities and to achieve a reliable funding base in the long run. The aim of NSFR is to 
limit the over-reliance on short-term wholesale funding during times of abundant market 
liquidity as it was in the current crisis and to enforce more stable, longer-term funding of 
assets and business activities, thus avoid liquidity shortfalls and maintain financial stability. 
NSFR should also offset incentives to fund the stock of liquid assets with short-term funds 
that mature just outside the 30-day horizon of the LCR. 
The enhancements of Basel II also address some liquidity problems linked to liquidity 
facilities provided to securitization vehicles. The framework requires that all liquidity 
facilities be covered with the same capital charge regardless of their maturity, thus eliminating 
arbitrage opportunities of the old treatment where short-term liquidity commitments had 
                                                     
48 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient 
Banks and Banking Systems, p.5, December 2010, Basel 
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lower capital requirement. The enhancements and the “Sound Principles” require also that 
banks perform scenario analyses in order to identify and assess their liquidity positions and 
cash flow needs in stressed conditions. This should help bank management take timely actions 
to limit bank’s exposures and build up liquidity cushion against potential risks in emergency 
situations. Stress tests should help perform contingency funding planning and set appropriate 
strategies to control liquidity shortfalls at any time. 
Basel III liquidity framework supplemented by the Sound Principles intends to ensure sound 
liquidity risk management and supervision which can reduce potential liquidity shocks to a 
large extent and protect the financial system from instability. This is possible, however, only 
if they are fully implemented by banks and supervisory authorities around the world because 
banks are strongly interconnected through liquidity channels and inconsistent liquidity 
treatment even at a very small number of institutions may destroy the balance in the system. 
Systemic risk 
Addressing systemic risk is of crucial importance if future crises are to be avoided. Systemic 
risk has a global dimension and cannot be efficiently regulated at national level. Therefore, 
BCBS emphasizes the macroprudential dimension in Basel III- something it failed to do with 
Basel II. Systemic risk is indirectly addressed through all the components of the framework.  
Effective risk management and higher capital requirements for complex securitizations and 
off-balance sheet exposures, as well as trading and derivative activities can ensure long-term 
success of individual banks and thus protect better the whole system. Adding a capital charge 
for CVA-risk and correlations, or wrong-way risk, which were not addressed in Basel II, 
creates incentives for banks to carefully and actively manage counterparty risk and has a clear 
systemic concern. Allocating more capital against bilateral OTC derivative contracts while at 
the same time requiring lower capital charges for cleared transactions intends to create strong 
capital incentives to move exposures to CCPs and thus reduce procyclicality and systemic risk 
in the financial sector arising from the interconnectedness of banks and other financial 
institutions through the derivatives markets.  
The Committee is addressing the systemic risk in the financial sector also by raising the risk 
weights and capital charges on exposures to financial institutions in comparison to those to 
the non-financial corporate sector because of the higher correlations of the financial exposures 
relative to non-financial ones. 
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Countercyclical buffer and liquidity standards are directly linked to systemic risk and system 
stability. In addition, capital conservation buffer increases loss absorbing capacity of 
systemically important banks beyond the minimum standards and together with the 
countercyclical buffer protects the system from periods of excess credit growth. Furthermore, 
stress tests aim to assess bad outcome scenarios and help banks take preliminary measures to 
cover potential losses and operate effectively in a downturn, thus maintaining normal 
functioning of the system. Last but not least, leverage ratio aims to constrain the procyclical 
build-up of leverage in the system and thus prevent the system from forced deleverage and 
market break downs in bad times. 
A serious flaw of the prudential regulation before the crisis was its failure to take into account 
SIFIs and their significance for the stability of the financial system. Governments had to 
interfere in order to save the “too big to fail banks” whose disorderly failure would have had 
significant disruption effect on the financial system and wider economy at a high social cost 
because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness. To address this problem, 
BCBS includes in its reform package measures to strengthen the cross-border crisis 
management and orderly resolution of systemically important banks49. The Committee 
recommends that national authorities have “appropriate tools to deal with all types of financial 
institutions in difficulties so that an orderly resolution can be achieved that helps maintain 
financial stability, minimise systemic risk, protect consumers, and promote market 
efficiency”. Examples of such tools are creating bridge financial institutions, transfer assets, 
liabilities, and business operations to another sound financial institution, and resolve claims. 
National authorities should incorporate clear exit options and principles in order to promote 
market discipline and limit moral hazard. Supervisors should plan in advance for orderly 
resolution of SIFIs taking into account the size and complexity of the institution’s group 
structure and business. If they believe that financial institution’s structures are too complex to 
be safely resolved, supervisors should impose regulatory incentives through e.g. capital in 
order to encourage simplification of the structures that will allow cost-effective and orderly 
resolution. National authorities should seek convergence of resolution tools, exchange 
information and co-ordinate their actions in cross-border resolutions. In addition to the 
resolution guidelines Basel Committee in co-operation with the International Association of 
Deposit Insurance (IADI) has issued Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems 
                                                     
49 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Report and Recommendations of the Cross‐border Bank 
Resolution Group. March 2010, Basel 
83 
 
in June 2009 which should also contribute to better crisis management, reduced moral hazard, 
effective consumer protection, and system health. 
In addition, SIFI are strongly interconnected today. The latest crisis took down the global 
financial system not because the losses from the real estate and mortgage investments in the 
United States were so large- the same happened in the Japanese banking crisis in the 90’s 
without affecting the rest of the world- but because the institutions involved were more 
interconnected than in previous crises (Hellwig, 2010). Therefore, BCBS and the FSB are 
currently developing an integrated approach to SIFIs to address the risks arising from their 
interconnectedness. The treatment of these risks will include capital and liquidity surcharges, 
contingent capital and bail-in debt in order. This will ensure additional loss absorbing 
capacity for global SIFIs beyond the minimum levels required for other banks that will reflect 
the higher risk that their failure poses on the global financial system. The Committee is also 
working on a methodology to assess the systemic importance of financial institutions at a 
global level. Further measures include mitigating risks or externalities associated with 
systemic banks, tighter large exposure restrictions and enhanced supervision50.  
By addressing SIFIs and their safely resolution the macro-prudential regulation will reduce to 
a maximum extent the reliance on public support through central bank intervention in banking 
sector in the form of massive liquidity injections and bail- outs at the expense of the tax 
payers and the rest of the economy in times of trouble and thus limit the moral hazard 
associated with SIFIs which are perceived too-big-to-fail. 
Transparency  
The crisis of 2007-2008 was to a large extent a crisis of confidence. The inconsistent and 
insufficient information disclosure in banking sector before the crisis led to a mutual luck of 
trust among banks and the related credit crunch in interbank lending as well as to the 
investors’ withdrawal from securities trade and the subsequent market break down. Therefore, 
one of the main and most important achievements of the new regulation is the establishment 
of uniform disclosure rules in order to improve transparency, promote better market discipline 
and avoid uncertainty in decision making in the future. The enhanced disclosure requirements 
of Basel II as well as Basel III framework is an appropriate step towards providing all the 
                                                     
50 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient 
Banks and Banking Systems, p.7, December 2010, Basel 
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necessary information to market participants enabling them to assess and compare banks’ 
capital adequacy, risk exposures, valuation practices, liquidity positions, and control systems 
and thus make informed decisions about the relationships with their counterparties.  
Supervision 
The Committee has raised the standards for the supervisory review process (Pillar 2) with the 
Enhancements of Basel II and is currently reviewing the Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision in order to reflect the lessons from the crisis. In the main focus of the 
enhanced supervision are the SIFIs, OTC derivatives, CRAs and the shadow banking system. 
The strengthened supervisory framework should promote more consistent standard 
implementation and stronger collaboration and coordination among bank supervisors through 
supervisory colleges51. In October 2010 the BCBS issued Good Practice Principles on 
Supervisory Colleges. The implementation of these principles should help supervisory 
authorities operate effectively and share information properly on a cross-border basis, take 
common decisions and focus more on the macro-systemic dimension of risks rather than just 
on the micro-prudential supervision of individual institutions as it was in the current crisis. 
This will promote the financial stability at macro prudential level. 
Financial accounting52 
Financial accounting rules also created incentives for regulatory arbitrage before the crisis and 
became a reason for huge financial losses banks with large securitization exposures suffered 
during the crisis because of the fair value measurement. Therefore, BCBS in collaboration 
with the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) is currently advocating changes in 
accounting standards which promote more forward-looking dynamic provisioning based on 
expected losses approach that recognizes credit losses earlier and is less procyclical than the 
current “incurred loss” approach. The Committee has issued in August 2009 “Guiding 
principles for the revision of accounting standards for financial instruments” that should 
govern the reforms to the replacement of IAS 39 by an impairment standard based on an EL-
approach to loan loss provisioning.  
 
                                                     
51 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: The Basel Committee’s Response to the Financial Crisis: Report 
to G20, p.7, October 2010, Basel 
52 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient 
Banks and Banking Systems, p.6, December 2010, Basel 
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Compensation system 
By integrating the FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices into Basel capital 
framework BCBS aims to align the remuneration of bank’s top management and employees 
with the regulatory objectives of achieving long-term capital preservation and financial 
stability. The alienation of the compensation-base from short-term accounting profit 
generation should eliminate perverse incentives in the future for short-term oriented, 
hazardous behavior of bankers and prevent employees from excessive risk taking that 
threatens the global financial system. In addition, compensation policy disclosure 
requirements and supervisory intervention should contribute to higher transparency and 
management discipline and thus constrain behavior to the detriment of stakeholders. 
6.2. Outstanding Problems 
Basel III is a step towards improved capital base, mitigation of excess leverage and credit 
build up, control over hazardous risk taking and enhanced resilience of the global and national 
financial systems. Nevertheless, the system remains vulnerable because some of the problems 
of Basel II framework have not been appropriately addressed to this date. In addition, the new 
framework has also certain drawbacks which require further actions by the regulators. 
Capital issues 
The main criticism of Basel III addresses the fundamental problem with the risk-weighting 
approach to capital calculation which gave incentives for regulatory arbitrage under Basel I 
and II (Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, 2010, Hellwig, 2010, Georg, 2011). Hellwig (2010) 
argues that the risk calibration of capital requirements have enabled large international banks 
to reduce regulatory capital and engage in ever more levered activities bringing higher returns 
and increasing systemic interconnectedness and systemic risk through derivatives. He further 
argues that the modifications to the risk weights to produce more precise capital requirement 
might be actually the very reason for the insufficient levels of capital during the crisis, not so 
much the deficiencies of risk modeling and management. Thus, he concludes, the efforts of 
the regulators to eliminate these deficiencies without removing the underlying incentive will 
just shift the problem elsewhere. 
 Basel III has enhanced the coverage of the counterparty exposure and introduced the leverage 
ratio to reduce this negative impact of the risk-based model. Nevertheless, as long as capital is 
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based on risk weights, however improved, there will always remain gaps and errors that will 
be exploited through regulatory arbitrage, i.e. the incentives to reduce capital and increase 
leverage will be still present (Goodhart, 2005). Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) argue 
that the leverage ratio might not work well along with the risk-weighted measure because if it 
is too low banks will treat it as an upper bound of the capital requirement, i.e. bank will have 
incentives to arbitrage risk weights in order to ensure that the risk-weighted capital charge 
does not exceed the mandatory minimum capital required by the leverage ratio and this way 
will economize on capital. Moreover, a lot of critics of Basel III find the ratio of 3% highly 
insufficient. Hellwig (2010), for example, reckons that a non-risk weighted capital 
requirement should be well into the range of 20-30% in order to ensure sound bank 
protection. Therefore, Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) conclude, the combination of 
risk-weighted capital plus leverage ratio is likely to distort the initial regulatory intentions and 
push banks towards investing in assets with lower risk weights and shifting promises to the 
shadow banking system with the risk of unintended developments through regulatory 
arbitrage. This on turn can create new bubbles and cause new crises in the banking sector that 
will be even more leveraged and undercapitalized than it has been in the past. Blundell-
Wignall and Atkinson (2010) as well as Hellwig (2010), among others, reckon that the 
regulation should move away from the risk-weighted capital model and replace it with a high 
leverage ratio instead. Removing risk-weighting system will also eliminate the bulk of 
procyclicality except for the natural financial and economic cycle as well as the incentives to 
create concentrations of favored assets in the portfolio (Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, 2010) 
Another omission of Basel III is that like its predecessors it fails to take into account asset 
correlations and keeps the linear measurement of risk where single risk weights are added up 
together. As already described in Chapter 4.6.1., this produces unrealistic capital ratios, 
allows risk concentrations in portfolios and creates direct incentives for regulatory arbitrage. 
Excluding asset correlations while at the same time applying risk- weighted capital 
calculation does not encourage diversification. On the contrary, it creates incentives for banks 
to circumvent capital requirement by investing in less risky individual assets. The problem is 
that banks invest in low risky assets of a same class and, therefore highly correlated, in order 
to gain additional profits from economies of scale and specialization which effectively 
produces portfolios with high lump risk (Georg, 2011). This mechanism increases risk 
concentrations in the sector and fosters systemic risk. If portfolio variance were taken into 
account when calculating the capital requirement banks would have the incentive to reduce 
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their capital charge through diversification of assets instead. This will align the interest of 
both banks and regulators. Banks would have to hold less capital because the amount of their 
risk-weighted assets when considering the risk-offsetting effect of the diversification will be 
reduced. The system will be better protected because encouraging diversification through 
capital incentives would be more effective to deal with risk concentrations in banking sector 
rather than treat them under Pillar 2 with additional capital at supervisory discretion.  
Additionally, higher regulatory capital requirement will reduce banks’ profitability and may 
encourage banks to seek out more risky activities which raise the systemic risk exposure of 
the banking sector. The McKinsey company has estimated that with the implementation of 
Basel III the return on equity (ROE) for the average bank will decline 4 percentage points in 
Europe and about 3 percentage points in the United States from the pre-crisis level of 15 %53. 
Raising capital with Basel III will increase the cost of financing because it will reduce the tax 
shield of debt. This on turn will increase the credit spreads of loans. As a result, the 
equilibrium amount of bank lending will be reduced. Moreover, given the dynamics and price 
sensitivity of some lending markets banks may not be able to fully pass the cost increase to 
their customers. Consequently, their profit margins will decline and they may abandon certain 
lending businesses. A lot of bankers express the concern that the stronger capital base and the 
liquidity ratio requirements will affect negatively also the trade finance. The investment 
banking will be strongly affected in terms of trading and securitization business. As a 
consequence, banks may try to restore their profitability through expansion of their activities 
into the unregulated sector of the shadow banking system and thus threaten the system in a 
similar way again.  
Cyclicality 
Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) admit that the countercyclical buffer is very good as an 
idea but express doubts that it is likely to have poor performance in practice. This is so 
because of the leads and lags in modeling credit. Credit is lagging behind the cycle. 
Therefore, “bubbles” can be easily identified at a time when the economy has already started 
to turn down. Increasing provisioning to offset excess credit growth then will exacerbate the 
cycle and thus have the opposite of the intended effect. Moreover, developments in the 
                                                     
53 See McKinsey & Company: Basel III and European Banking: It’s Impact, How Banks Might Respond, and the 
Challenges of Implementation. 2010  
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shadow banking system may lead to distortions similar to those created by securitization 
which dampened balance sheet credit growth in the past and gave misleading signal that there 
were no leverage problems. Therefore, the supervisors may find it difficult to identify such 
distortions in advance and protect the banking sector in a prescribed manner through 
additional capital buffers. 
In addition, even if supervisors were able to identify the build-up of systemic risk at an early 
stage they might find it difficult to intervene and impose the buffer on banks. The FSB is 
aware of the problem and states that “when supervisors take an early intervention approach, 
there are often no tangible risk indicators (i.e. losses) to confirm that this intervention is 
needed, so this makes it difficult to convince a firm and their boards that such measures are 
necessary to deal proactively with emerging areas of risk within a SIFI”54. Therefore, it is 
questionable how effectively this countercyclical measure will counteract the systemic risk 
and will it be possible at all to detect systemic risks while they are building-up (Hellwig, 
2010, Georg, 2011). 
Liquidity  
Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) see some potential problems that may arise as a result 
of the liquidity standards. LCR standard requires banks to hold high-quality liquid assets with 
an obvious bias towards government bonds55. This may have two unintended consequences. 
First, prioritizing government bonds may lead to decline in the lending to the private sector- 
particularly to SMEs- and thus distort business financing. Second, sovereign bonds of some 
jurisdictions are highly risky and even subject to default risk not captured by CRAs. 
Therefore, applying one-size-fits-all liquidity rule may in extreme circumstances actually lead 
to solvency problems for banks.  
NSFR requires that banks maintain stable funding of their assets over one year in a prolonged 
firm-specific stress scenario. To achieve this, banks will have to match the maturities of their 
assets and liabilities which is not consistent with banks’ special function as asset- and 
maturity - transformers to the rest of the economy. This will reduce bank’s profitability 
substantially but more importantly it may hamper banks’ ability to perform their special role 
in the economy as financial intermediaries that are better able to manage and transform risks 
                                                     
54 See Financial Stability Board: Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI Supervision, p.3, November 2010 
55 See qualifying liquid assets in Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards 
and Monitoring. December 2010, Basel 
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than single firms or households due to their superior access to markets and instruments for 
hedging such as options, swaps, and futures. 
Additionally, liquidity standards require that banks hold more liquid assets which may reduce 
returns and increase excessive risk taking in other areas. Therefore, Blundell-Wignall and 
Atkinson (2010) argue that liquidity should be left to the market since the crisis was primarily 
a crisis of solvency and confidence. Regulators could more effectively deal with solvency 
problems by focusing on solvency issues, resolution regimes and most importantly capital 
adequacy. 
Systemic issues 
Unregulated shadow banking system 
A major problem of the Basel system, pointed out by Moosa (2008) and Blundell-Wignall and 
Atkinson (2010), is that it cannot treat the same financial promises in the same way regardless 
of where they are passed in the financial system. This is so because Basel framework lacks 
regulatory and supervisory integration. It regulates only banks but not the other non-bank 
financial intermediaries such as insurance companies, hedge funds, securities firms, i.e. the 
shadow banking system. Banks, securities firms and insurance companies operate in the same 
markets, for the same customers and with similar products and pose identical threat to system 
stability. Therefore, without further regulatory intervention into the other sectors of the 
financial system the framework cannot have full control over systemic risk and cannot fully 
eliminate arbitrage opportunities. While this is so banks will always find ways, e.g., by 
creating new financial instruments, to “play the system” and reduce their capital requirement 
by shifting promises outside of the banking sector to intermediaries beyond banking 
regulation. Passing promises transformed with derivatives to the less regulated and capitalized 
shadow banking system was a major reason for the explosion of the complex structured 
products and the expansion of leverage which led to the financial crisis. Basel III offers a 
partial solution to this problem by requiring higher AVC-multiplier and thus capital charge for 
inter-financial sector exposures. Nevertheless, the treatment of promises passed to, for 
example, a re-insurance company, which operates with less capital, is outside the scope of 
Basel regulation and, therefore, unequal in the same system. Thus, the loophole remains still 
open leaving space for actions which might not support the stability of the system. 
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Counterparty risk 
Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) welcome the regulatory incentives to move OTC 
derivatives to CCPs. They doubt, however, that even if attractive in terms of capital reduction 
this option will not be always possible and banks will keep holding large derivative exposures 
because derivatives in their larger part are tailor-made to the needs of financial and non-
financial firms and, therefore, are not suitable for the standardized trading on exchanges. 
Thus, the regulation may not achieve its objective to reduce systemic risk arising from 
derivative contracts and a critical mass of counterparty risk will remain in the system. 
Implementation issues 
One of the potential problems with Basel III is inherent in its implementation schedule. The 
framework will be fully phased in by January 2019. Admittedly, a certain period is necessary 
to give banks enough time to adjust gradually to the new capital and liquidity rules so that the 
increased minimums do not cause economy stagnation. Considering the dynamics of financial 
markets and the innovative power of banking industry, however, this timeline may turn out to 
be too long, meaning that another crisis can easily occur meanwhile. It is, therefore, important 
that the implementation is not postponed in time further than the set deadlines. Otherwise, 
Basel III may become “outdated” just like Basel II before it has been fully implemented. 
Further, it is important that Basel III is consistently implemented worldwide in order to 
protect the financial system at a global level and avoid regulatory arbitrage between 
jurisdictions. However, the concerns about the gaps among jurisdictions in terms of their 
capacity for implementation that were mentioned as regards Basel II in Chapter 4.6.6. are also 
valid for Basel III. Many supervisory authorities in emerging and developing countries might 
not be able to meet the standards set by Basel II and Basel III, particularly the requirements 
for more sophisticated approaches and internal control systems, because of insufficient 
financial and human capacity. Moreover, adopting the global standards might not be 
appropriate for some countries at their stage of development at all. Eventually, Basel III might 
not be consistently implemented and the system will remain vulnerable to imbalances and 
related shocks.  
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Lack of punishment rules 
Basel regulation and supervision, including Basel I, Basel II and Basel III, lacks tough 
sanction regime. This is so primarily because Basel standards are meant as a “soft law”, i.e. 
they act as recommendations that should be further transformed into national law in order to 
have juridical power. Furthermore, Basel standards pursue to achieve their objectives by 
creating the appropriate incentives that will provoke the desirable behavior by bankers rather 
than through enforcement or strong punishment rules. Admittedly, there is Pillar 2 and the 
supervisory review process which empower supervisors to require corrective actions by banks 
and to impose sanctions in case of infringement of rules. Concrete corrective actions and 
sanctions, however, are not explicitly stipulated and are a subject to a national supervisory 
discretion. This creates weak and heterogeneous bank treatment in case of rule violations 
across counties, regulatory loopholes and unfair competition among banks. With different 
sanction rules banks can easily do regulatory arbitrage through moving activities to other less 
regulated countries and achieve competitive advantage to the detriment of equally important 
players in the financial market. Hence, the discretionary power under Pillar 2 in terms of 
punishment of inappropriate bank behavior could be another reason for inconsistent 
implementation and application of Basel standards among banks in different countries and 
could undermine rather than strengthen the global financial stability.  
6.3. Assessment of the effectiveness of Basel III for prevention of future crises in 
the banking sector 
The effectiveness of Basel III cannot be evaluated separately since Basel III is not a 
completely new framework. It is not a radical change but rather an improvement and 
adaptation of the existing framework to the innovations in the financial market, i.e. it is the 
capital accord framework Basel II complemented by the lessons learned from the crisis. 
Therefore, the evaluation of Basel III will be made in the context of all other relevant and 
effective up to date Basel Committee documents, particularly those ones issued between July 
2009 and December 2010, most of which were already mentioned in Sections 5 and 6. 
To answer the question whether the new regulatory architecture can prevent future crises in 
the banking sector one should answer first of all the question whether Basel III has an 
adequate micro- and, more importantly, macro-prudential focus. 
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Basel III, the Enhancements of Basel II and a number of recommendatory documents issued 
by Basel Committee in response to the crisis correct almost all the deficiencies of the previous 
regulatory and supervisory framework discussed in Section 4 and Chapter 6.1. The new 
regulations increase substantially the quality and quantity of the core capital base, improve 
risk management and reduce bank’s incentives to take excessive risks, strengthen 
transparency and disclosure rules, and enable banks to withstand severe stresses without 
public support. The strong capital requirements will enhance the resilience of the financial 
system to adverse shocks and contagion effects. The Committee has recognized, however, that 
capital-based model alone is not sufficient to achieve the systemic risk management objective 
and eradicate future crises or remove regulatory arbitrage opportunities. Therefore, it has 
introduced a number of additional measures to strengthen the safety and stability at bank and 
system level through countercyclical dynamic provisioning, capital buffers, the leverage ratio, 
and liquidity standards.  
The system dimension has been taken into account in all components throughout the 
framework. There is still a lot of ongoing work particularly as regards SIFIs though. Whether 
the measures taken to enhance their regulation will be effective to ensure stability and safety 
of the system, one would be able to assess completely after the new rules have been finalized. 
What is more important here is that the regulators have recognized the importance of the 
systemically large banks and the role their interconnectedness plays for the transmission of 
shocks throughout the financial system and economy. They have addressed the issue about the 
orderly resolution of SIFSs which should help avoid costly bail-outs in the future and consider 
further a special treatment of these institutions, particularly the imposition of capital 
surcharges that should help reduce systemic risk. Another very important step towards better 
macro-prudential regulation is the enhanced supervisory collaboration on cross-border basis 
through supervisory colleges which should improve sharing of experience and supervisory 
practices, efficient and effective macro-level decision taking and timely intervention in 
banking sector on a global basis. 
Admittedly, the reforms address systemic risk more adequately than any other previous 
framework and promote financial stability at micro- and macro-prudential level. Thus, they 
should help lower to a large extent the likelihood of financial crises and/or at least dampen the 
severity of the consequences if crises occur. But will Basel III be able to prevent the banking 
sector from crises in the future at all? 
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The discussion of the weaknesses of Basel III in Chapter 6.2 clearly outlines a number of 
omissions and shortcomings which could hamper the successful implementation of the 
framework. The foremost criticism concerns the underlying deficiencies and arbitrage 
opportunities of the risk-sensitive capital requirement in general which can make regulatory 
efforts to strengthen capital base useless. As Moosa (2008) notes, however, there is no way to 
design any set of regulation in such a way as to eliminate all possibilities to “game the 
system”.  Moreover, removing risk calibration of capital and replacing it solely with leverage 
ratio will deprive the banking system of all the benefits and sophistication of the risk 
weighting. Leaving only leverage ratio would be a step back to Basel I and would bring with 
it the same problems which Basel II attempted to overcome, i.e. only with leverage ratio 
banks will have the incentives to invest in more risky assets while at the same time maintain 
the same capital charge. Therefore, the two measures would better complement each other and 
offset each other’s shortcomings. In addition, leverage ratio is subject to further calibration; so 
if it proved to be perversely used because it is too low, the Committee will simply adjust it to 
sufficiently high levels which will remove the incentive to reduce risk-weighted capital 
charge. 
The effectiveness of the countercyclical provisioning as well as other measures to reduce 
systemic risk such as the treatment of OTC derivatives are also questioned and accused to 
produce weak practical results. The soundness of these arguments should be, however, proved 
in the coming years.  
Liquidity ratios are assessed to be somewhat arbitrary and problematic as well. However, the 
effect of the liquidity standards will be observed by the Committee during the transitional 
period and calibrations will be made if deemed necessary. There is also a general criticism 
against regulatory intervention in liquidity at all since at the core of the crisis were solvency 
problems. Nevertheless, liquidity risk turned out to be the most expressed factor magnifying 
the depth of the crisis. If banks held enough high-quality liquid assets and did not rely 
primarily on short-term debt, the contagious effects of the liquidity shortfall would have been 
avoided or mitigated. Therefore, one cannot rely on market discipline to solve this problem.  
Inevitably, however much regulation tries to eliminate arbitrage opportunities, improve risk 
management and protect the system, it will hardly be able to entirely control perverse 
behavior and reduce risk taking first of all because risk is inherent in banking sector more 
than any other business and is the base for profit generation. Secondly, as pointed out by 
94 
 
Moosa (2008), there is a basic inconsistency and controversy in the objectives of regulators 
and the objectives of bankers. The purpose of the regulation is to protect the soundness of the 
financial system, which makes holding excess capital (above the economic private targets) 
desirable whereas the objective of the banks and their shareholders is profit maximization and 
holding excess capital not available for income generation reduces return on equity. Unlike 
bankers, regulators do not take into account the fact that risk creates value and as long as they 
ignore profitability as the main driver determining banker’s actions and do not align 
regulatory incentives with private objectives any attempts to reduce systemic risk in order to 
avoid social costs will actually make the financial system more vulnerable and susceptible to 
instability and shocks. On the other hand, however, if it were possible to completely align 
regulatory and private interests in managing risks, i.e. if the private objectives of banks were 
to protect the system rather than pursue private benefits, regulation would not be necessary at 
all. So, this controversy in objectives is the reason for the regulation at first place and will 
continue to exist only changing dynamics over time depending on the degree of regulators’ 
interference. 
The strongest argument against the strength and potential of the new regulatory architecture to 
prevent the system from future crises, in my view, arises from the fact that Basel III like its 
predecessors regulates the banking sector but excludes the shadow banking system which 
existence made this crisis possible. Banking sector has strong human and financial resource 
basis and, therefore, huge potential for innovation. Since it will be hard to change the 
competitive mindset of bankers, they will always find ways to “escape” from regulation 
pushing and accumulating risks into the less regulated shadow segments of the financial 
system. And since bankers from within know better than supervisors how to exploit the 
loopholes in the system, they will be able to earn a lot through new products whose riskiness 
cannot be easily measured or identified long before they got “caught up” by their supervisors 
or before another crisis outbreaks. Moreover, supervisory competency will cover primarily 
the banking sector whereas the other sectors will be subject to other supervisory regimes and 
authorities. Therefore, the supervisors as a whole will lack a system-wide view and complete 
information. There are two ways to resolve this problem. First, BCBS should work in constant 
and effective cooperation with the other supervisory bodies in the system- IOSCO and IAIS- 
to harmonize practices, exchange information on a regular basis and take jointly measures to 
identify and control system destabilizing factors. Or, more effectively, sharing the view of 
Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) among others, the FSB or a new international 
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organization can take on the function of a single supervisor and regulator for the whole 
system. If BCBS and FSB manage to adequately address this problem this will dramatically 
improve the powers and potential of the regulation and supervision to reduce and even avoid 
crises in the future. 
To sum up, the financial crisis history shows a lot of examples that no regulation is able to 
completely eliminate the probability of crises. Post-crisis the regulation can easily address and 
remove loopholes revealed by the crisis and better mange already known risks. But the crises 
never repeat the same scenario and every next one is usually unpredictable, catching market 
players by surprise and revealing new risks that were not anticipated. However, as already 
mentioned, risk is inherent part of every business and more so of the banking industry. 
Without risk there is no gain. Thus, as long as there is a tradeoff between risk taking and 
revenue generating there will always be time and again new exaggerations and speculative 
bubbles. 
The most important achievement of Basel III framework, in my view, is that the Basel 
Committee has realized the importance of banks being resilient in their survival strategies in 
both internal and external shocks and the necessity of constant regulators’ involvement in 
pace with the ever changing conditions in global economy and particularly in the rapid 
financial innovation. This is evident from the implementation program of Basel III which 
includes transitional observation periods and foresees corrections of the different framework 
components based on practical results. A very important prerequisite, however, for the 
success of the framework to protect the system from severe future shocks is its timely 
implementation. Otherwise, the enormous investment of effort to develop and refine the 
regulatory system will be in vain just like it happened with Basel II. Basel II took decades of 
regulatory work in order to make regulation more sophisticated. Nevertheless, it failed so 
miserably in the crisis not because it was not robust enough- indeed it would have mitigated 
the crisis to a large extent had it been effectively applied before the crisis. It was designed to 
address the risks of financial innovation. Particularly, the securitization framework eliminated 
to a large extent the incentives for regulatory arbitrage through shifting exposures off-balance 
sheet or distributing them through the securitization process. In addition, if supervisors had 
fully used their discretionary power under Pillar 2 to assess banks’ risk management and 
capital adequacy, they would have detected earlier banks’ unhealthy practices such as 
excessive leverage and poor risk estimates and intervene through imposing additional capital 
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requirements. Basel II failed because it never came properly into operation on an international 
basis before the crisis and particularly in the U.S.A. which unlike European countries have 
delayed its full implementation. 
Therefore, considering that Basel III is not the perfect regulatory framework that provides the 
ultimate solution to financial stability, it will hardly prevent crises in the banking sector. Most 
probably the next crisis will also be related to the shadow banking because of the lack of 
integrity and common regulation of the different sectors in the financial system unless 
meanwhile the Committee and the FSB include in the regulatory framework the missing parts 
of the whole picture.  Nevertheless, provided the strong capital base, liquidity standards and 
macro-prudential focus it offers, Basel III could make crises less likely to occur in the future 
and minimize the extent of damage on banking system associated with them. This is possible, 
however, provided that Basel III is timely implemented on a global level and regularly 
updated and improved at pace with the dynamic changes in the financial sector.  
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Section 7: Conclusions and Recommendations  
Basel III has addressed the systemic risks in many aspects and strengthened the global 
supervision. It also managed to bring bankers’ incentives more in line with the financial 
system stability objective. Therefore, as the analysis in the previous section shows, Basel III 
has the necessary qualities and potential to protect the system from collapses in the long run. 
In order to achieve this objective, however, there are several important prerequisites. 
First of all, it is crucial that supervisors increase their coordination and establish reliable 
information exchange channels on a global basis through the supervisory colleagues and react 
in a timely manner to changes. The supervisory reluctance of the pre-crisis period to take 
appropriate measures should not be repeated. The approximately ten-year full implementation 
period is a reasonable time to phase in the higher capital requirements and liquidity standards 
that will allow banks to gradually raise capital without reducing their competitiveness and 
constraining lending to the real economy, and thus hampering the normal economic activity. 
For ten years, however, another crisis can easily occur. Therefore, regulators should be 
already aware of the fact that no regulatory system is perfect and should not over rely on the 
soundness of Basel III since in ten years Basel III may become outdated before its full 
implementation as it happened with Basel II. Supervisors should anticipate financial 
innovation and reconsider capital charges and implementation periods if necessary to take 
account of the new financial instruments and the dynamics of the financial markets on time.  
Secondly, BCBS should continue its work on the leverage ratio, SIFIs, and liquidity 
framework in order to establish sound and clear rules which produce desirable practical 
results.  
Banks have natural preference for high leverage because debt is cheaper than equity. 
Therefore, if regulation wants to constraint leverage in the future, leverage ratio should be set 
sufficiently high if it turns out that it creates perverse incentives to reduce risk-weighted 
capital charge. 
SIFIs are at the center of the financial system because of their constant interaction among 
each other and with the related financial markets. Hence, BCBS in cooperation with the FSB 
should trigger the development of the methodology for assessment of the systemic importance 
of these institutions at a global level and the design of capital surcharge to address the 
systemic risks arising from their interconnectedness.  
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One option to address these risks is to require SIFIs to have certain proportion of contingent 
capital56 which has to a large extent the same potential as common equity to absorb losses. 
BCBS has stressed the important role the convertible capital instruments should play in the 
regulatory capital treatment in their original consultative document for regulatory reform of 
December 2009 and then in their initial proposal published in August 201057. Nevertheless, 
the final package Basel III has no provisions for the use of contingent capital at the current 
stage. Basel Committee is still studying the potential use of the CoCos and is expected to 
come with an opinion by mid-2011. Many experts, however, support CoCos because of some 
important and attractive characteristics they have. ESFRC (2011), for example, point out the 
following advantages: (1) CoCos will reduce the burden for banks to substantially increase 
their capital base to the new high level, (2) they carry tax-deductible interest and therefore are 
less costly for banks, (3) they will reduce the need for bail-outs of all creditors in case of 
distress, (4) since investors in these debt instruments bear high risk, they will have strong 
incentives to strengthen the monitoring of the bank, and when necessary, to discipline the 
bank by requiring it to raise more capital and/or increase the interest on the debt. Therefore, 
contingent capital instruments may be included as more substantial part of Tier 1 capital. 
They will help banks increase their capital ratios at a lower cost and will have significant 
impact on market discipline. 
Liquidity framework is the first attempt of the Committee to address liquidity risk and as such 
will surely need further adjustments. Some of the problems are evident even now. LCR favors 
lending to some businesses and disadvantages another. NSFR aims to reduce structural 
mismatches between bank’s assets and liabilities and to ensure stable funding in the long run. 
But this contradicts to the fundamental function of banks that assigns them а special role in 
the economy which is to act as asset- and maturity-transformers of short-term deposits into 
long-term loans. Therefore, the Committee should make the necessary calibrations of the 
ratios on time in order to avoid distorted lending incentives which may lead to discrimination 
against loans to business and to eliminate the potential of NSFR to critically reduce bank’s 
                                                     
56 Contingent capital consists of capital instruments (convertible debt or contingent convertibles known as 
CoCos) that could be converted to common shares at the discretion of the relevant authorities if the bank 
becomes non‐viable or mandatorily, when the capital level reaches a pre‐defined threshold of capital ratio.  
The objective is to decrease the probability of banks reaching the critical point of non‐viability and, if they do, 
to ensure that there are additional resources available to manage the safely resolution or restructuring of the 
bank. 
57 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: (1) Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector, 
December 2009 and (2) Proposal to Ensure the Loss Absorbency of Regulatory Capital at the Point of Non‐
viability, August 2010, at www.bis.org  
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profitability and/or to infringe the level of maturity mismatch necessary for banks to fulfill 
their role in the economy. 
Third, the international community needs a global financial regulator to establish consistent 
rules for all participants in the financial sector. Basel standards are exclusively focused on 
banking regulation and supervision and exclude the shadow banking system which, as already 
discussed in Chapter 6.2, leaves space to do regulatory arbitrage and reduces the potential of 
Basel III to have full control over systemic risk. As long as these non-bank financial 
intermediaries benefit from regulatory and accounting incentives the strongly innovative 
banking sector will always find easy ways to circumvent regulation through new financial 
instruments and to push and accumulate risks in the less regulated shadow sector putting this 
way the financial system in danger. Therefore, there should be one international financial 
organization, e.g. FSB, which acts as a single global regulator and supervisor for all sectors of 
finance. Alternatively, all international standard setting bodies in the system- BCBS, IOSCO 
and IAIS- could be subordinate to and coordinated at the global level by one international 
organization.  FSB has exercised this function so far. However, if this scheme is to be kept in 
the future, FSB should establish uniform principles for standard development and make sure 
that all supervisors apply consistent requirements to their financial intermediaries, harmonize 
their practices, exchange information on a regular basis and take jointly measures to identify 
and control system risks in order to achieve international regulatory consistency. Only by 
developing an integrated regulation and an integrated supervisory network the regulators can 
manage to have the system-wide view of the risks financial players are engaging in and the 
complete information and competency necessary to reduce or avoid global crises in the future.  
Fourth, prudential regulation was not the sole cause of the crisis and therefore it will not be 
able to solve all problems alone. Financial regulators should be proactive in seeking 
cooperation and coordination with the other policy makers and standard setting bodies in 
order to promote more harmonized rules in the financial sector. It should support the 
initiatives such as the regulation of CRAs or corporate governance rules that should 
preferably be implemented internationally. Particularly important are the joint actions of 
BCBS and IASB to improve the accounting standards. BCBS and IASB have already made 
the initial steps in this direction by addressing issues related to provisioning and fair value 
measurement. Another important revision is necessary as regards the accounting rules for the 
treatment of off-balance sheet vehicles which hid enormous risks and potential losses before 
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the crisis (FSF, 2008). This will ensure that accounting rules do not aggravate financial crises. 
Additional efforts, however, will be necessary to initiate further alignment of the accounting 
rules of IASB and the US-based standard-setter FASB in order to achieve international 
convergence of accounting practices and a level playing field on a global level.  
Finally, consistent implementation of Basel III across the globe is vital for achieving financial 
system stability. The high discretionary power of national supervisors under Pillar 2, however, 
could be a serious source of inconsistency. The supervisory discretion particularly as regards 
the remedial actions and punishment imposed on banks in case of infringement of rules and 
the lack of concrete sanction regime in Basel framework creates inconsistent bank treatment 
in case of rule violations and loopholes for regulatory arbitrage across counties which could 
undermine the level playing field and the financial stability on a global level.  
Inevitably, there will be strong peer and regulatory pressure after the crisis for international 
convergence and harmonization of sanction practices. Better results would be achieved, 
however, if BCBS reduce supervisory discretionary power and introduce strong, clear and 
equal punishment rules and effective sanction enforcement when inadequate capital and 
liquidity positions as well as weak risk management and control mechanisms of financial 
institutions are ascertained. Such uniform sanction regime with comparable set of measures 
will ensure consistency in implementation, transparency and fair competition across banks in 
different countries. It will also reduce the compliance burden related to cross-border business 
activities, avoid regulatory discrepancies between jurisdictions and facilitate the supervision 
of globally operating banks. 
Additionally, BCBS or an independent committee to BCBS should check on a regular basis 
that national supervisory authorities apply the sanction regime every time they indentify that 
risks are not adequately covered by banks or on а system level. Тhis Committee should have 
the powers to require that supervisory authorities immediately fulfill their obligations or even 
to impose sanctions to supervisors that fail to meet the necessary supervisory standards. This 
practice will ensure that banks are deterred from increased risk-taking that generates systemic 
risks and that supervisors do not breach their duties. Indeed, if such clear punishment rules 
and independent control of supervisory authorities had been established before the crisis the 
supervision would have been much more effective and the crisis would have been to a large 
extent mitigated. The only problem is that BCBS or any other international committee will be 
hardly able to punish countries or national supervisory authorities if they do not abide by the 
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standards. In such cases more effective “control” is usually exercised by peers who respond 
by constraining their activities (e.g. by limiting branching activities) to countries whose 
regulators and supervisors have failed to meet the standards and have lost their reputation 
among international colleagues. 
However, peer pressure cannot always be relied upon. Countercyclical buffer, for instance, 
aiming to provide additional capital defense in times of trouble relies entirely on discretionary 
power and neither the Committee nor the peers can ensure that national supervisors will use it. 
Additionally, supervisors may differ from one country to another in their ability to identify 
excessive credit growth which will lead to inconsistent application of this discretionary 
measure among banks as well.  
Therefore, Basel standards will be more effective in ensuring their consistent implementation 
across the globe if they do not provide high discretionary powers to national supervisors not 
only in terms of sanctions or countercyclical capital buffer but also in respect of what they can 
do in general by the way of supervision. To align all national supervisory regimes completely 
will be impractical and impossible but BCBS should seek to remove the key differences in 
national bank legislations that may have material impact on the global market, induce 
competition distortions or regulatory arbitrage. Thus, BCBS should examine the problematic 
differences in supervisory powers and propose further developments. 
In conclusion, the emphasis of the international banking regulation and supervision from now 
on has to be put primarily on the financial system stability on a global level. This requires 
consistent, full and timely implementation of an integrated regulatory framework in all 
countries as well as enhanced and improved cooperation and coordination between 
supervisory authorities on an international level. In order to ensure a proper flow of 
information and effective collaboration between supervisors on a global basis the regulatory 
efforts should be focused on strengthening the quality of national supervision and reducing 
the differences arising from national supervisory discretionary powers at first place. This will 
achieve consistency in implementation and application of the rules of financial regulation and 
supervision across countries and a level playing field for all financial market players. Only by 
removing the incentives to take advantage of the loopholes in regulation across financial 
sectors and across countries Basel III will be strong enough to achieve the objective of long 
term financial and economic stability and reduce or eliminate the threat of global financial 
crises. 
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Appendix 1   Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems 
 
 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
Committee on payment and settlement Systems (CPSS) 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
 
 
Source: Financial Stability Forum (FSF) 
Area  Standard  Issuing Body
Macroeconomic Policy and Data Transparency
Monetary and financial 
policy transparency  
Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial 
Policies  
IMF  
Fiscal policy 
transparency  
Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency  IMF  
Data dissemination  Special Data Dissemination Standard /  
General Data Dissemination System  
IMF  
Institutional and Market Infrastructure  
Insolvency  Insolvency and Creditor Rights  World Bank  
Corporate governance  Principles of Governance  OECD  
Accounting  International Accounting Standards (IAS)   IASB   
Auditing  International Standards on Auditing (ISA)  IFAC   
Payment and settlement  Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems   
Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems  
CPSS  
CPSS/IOSCO 
Market integrity  The Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force /  
9 Special Recommendations Against Terrorist Financing  
FATF  
Financial Regulation and Supervision  
Banking supervision  Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision  BCBS  
Securities regulation  Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation  IOSCO  
Insurance supervision  Insurance Core Principles  IAIS  
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Appendix 2   Risk Weights under Basel II
 
Risk Categories for On-Balance-Sheet Items under Basel II  
 
 
Category 1 (0% weight) 
Cash, Treasury securities, OECD governments, and loans to sovereigns with an S&P credit 
rating of AAA to AA- 
 
Category 2 (20% weight) 
Cash items in the process of collection; OECD interbank deposits and guaranteed claims 
Some non-OECD bank and government deposits and securities; General obligation municipal 
bonds 
Some mortgage-backed securities; Claims collateralized by Treasury and some other 
government securities 
Loans to sovereigns with an S&P credit rating of A+ to A-; Loans to banks and corporates 
with an S&P credit rating of AAA to AA-  
 
Category 3 (50% weight) 
Loans fully secured by first liens on one- to four-family residential properties; Other 
(revenue) municipal bonds; Loans to sovereigns with an S&P credit rating of BBB+ to BBB- 
or better; Loans to banks and corporates with an S&P credit rating of A+ to A- 
 
Category 4 (100% weight) 
Loans to sovereigns with an S&P credit rating of BB+ to B-; Loans to banks with a credit 
rating of BBB+ to B-; Loans to corporates with a credit rating of BBB+ to BB- and unrated 
C&I loans 
All other on-balance-sheet assets not listed above, including loans to private entities and 
individuals, some claims on non-OECD governments and banks, real assets, and investments 
in subsidiaries 
 
Category 5 (150% weight) 
Loans to sovereigns, banks, and securities firms with an S&P credit rating below B-; Loans to 
corporates with a credit rating below BB- 
 
Unrated (100% weight) 
 
 
Risk categories for Off-Balance-Sheet Items under Basel II 
 
The same risk weights applied for On-Balance-Sheet Items are also assigned to (the credit 
equivalents of) the Off-Balance-Sheet contingent or guarantee contacts (e.g., commercial 
letter of credit issued to a CCC-rated counterparty will have 150% risk weight).  
 
Interest rate and exchange rate contracts (forwards, swaps, caps, and floors) have in general a 
risk weight of 100%. 
 
Source: Saunders and Cornett (2008) and Bank for International Settlements, “The New 
Basel Capital Accord”, January 2001 at www.bis.org  
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Appendix 3   Table of Business Lines, Indicators, and Factors in BIS 
Standardized Approach for Calculating Operational Risk Capital Charge 
 
Business Line Indicator Beta factors (%) 
Corporate finance Gross income β1= 18% 
Trading and sales Gross income β2= 18% 
Retail banking Gross income β3= 12% 
Commercial banking Gross income β4= 15% 
Payment and Settlement Gross income β5= 18% 
Agencies services and custodies Gross income β6= 15% 
Asset Management Gross income β7= 12% 
Retail brokerage Gross income β8= 12% 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, “International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards”, June 2006 and “Working Paper on the Regulatory 
Treatment of Operational Risk”, September 2001, at  www.bis.org  
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Appendix 4   Operational Risk Loss Event Type Classification 
 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, “International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards”, June 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event-type category Definition 
Internal fraud Losses due to acts of a type intended to defraud, 
misappropriate property or circumvent regulations, 
the law or company policy, excluding diversity/ 
discrimination events, which involves at least one 
internal party 
External fraud Losses due to acts of a type intended to defraud, 
misappropriate property or circumvent the law, by a 
third party 
Employment practices and 
working place safety 
Losses arising from acts inconsistent with 
employment, health or safety laws or agreements, 
from payment of personal injury claims, or from 
diversity / discrimination events 
Clients, products, and business 
practices 
Losses arising from an unintentional or negligent 
failure to meet a professional obligation to specific 
clients (including fiduciary and suitability 
requirements), or from the nature or design of a 
product 
Damage to physical assets Losses arising from loss or damage to physical 
assets from natural disaster or other events 
Business disruption and system 
failures 
Losses arising from disruption of business or system 
failures 
Execution, delivery, and process 
management 
Losses from failed transaction processing or process 
management, from relations with trade 
counterparties and vendors 
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Appendix 5   Capital Categories for Prompt Corrective Action of FDIC 
Zone Total Risk-
Based Ratio 
Tier I Risk-
Based Ratio 
Mandatory  
Provisions 
Discretionary 
Provisions 
 
1.  Well 
capitalized 
 
10 % or above 
 
6 % or above 
 
No subject to a capital 
directive to meet a specific 
level for any capital 
measure 
 
 
2.  Adequately   
capitalized 
 
8 % or above 4% or above 1. No brokered deposits 
except with FDIC approval 
 
3.Undercapitalized Under 8 % Under 4 % 1.  Suspend dividends and 
management fees 
1. Order recapitalization 
   2. Require capital 
restoration plan 
2. Restrict inter affiliate 
transactions 
   3. Restrict asset growth 3. Restrict deposit interest 
rates 
   4. Approval required for 
acquisitions, branching and 
new activities 
4. Restrict certain other 
activities 
   5. No brokered deposits 5. Any other action that 
would better carry out 
prompt corrective action 
 
4.  Significantly     
undercapitalized 
Under 6 % Under 3 % 1. Same as Zone 3 1. Any Zone 3 
discretionary actions 
   2. Order recapitalization 2. Conservatorship or 
receivership if fail to 
submit or implement plan 
or recapitalize pursuant to 
order 
   3. Restrict inter affiliate 
transactions 
3. Any other Zone 5 
provisions if such action is 
necessary to carry out 
prompt corrective action 
   4. Restrict deposit interest 
rates 
 
   5. Pay of officers restricted 
 
 
5. Critically 
undercapitalized  
2 % or under 2 % or under 1. Same as Zone 4  
   2. Receiver/conservator 
within 90 days 
 
   3. Receiver of still in Zone 5 
four quarters after becoming 
critically undercapitalized 
 
   4. Suspend payment on 
subordinated debt 
 
   5. Restrict certain other 
activities 
 
 
Source: Saunders and Cornett (2008) 
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Appendix 6    Entry Criteria for Tier 1 and Tier 2 Capital under Basel III 
Criteria for classification as common shares for regulatory capital purposes  
 
1.  Represents the most subordinated claim in liquidation of the bank.  
 
 
2.  Entitled to a claim on the residual assets that is proportional with its share of issued capital, after all 
senior claims have been repaid in liquidation (ie has an unlimited and variable claim, not a fixed or 
capped claim).  
 
 
3.  Principal is perpetual and never repaid outside of liquidation (setting aside discretionary repurchases 
or other means of effectively reducing capital in a discretionary manner that is allowable under relevant 
law).  
 
 
4.  The bank does nothing to create an expectation at issuance that the instrument will be bought back, 
redeemed or cancelled nor do the statutory or contractual terms provide any feature which might give 
rise to such an expectation.  
 
 
5.  Distributions are paid out of distributable items (retained earnings included). The level of distributions is 
not in any way tied or linked to the amount paid in at issuance and is not subject to a contractual cap 
(except to the extent that a bank is unable to pay distributions that exceed the level of distributable 
items).  
 
 
6.  There are no circumstances under which the distributions are obligatory. Non payment is therefore not 
an event of default.  
 
 
7.  Distributions are paid only after all legal and contractual obligations have been met and payments on 
more senior capital instruments have been made. This means that there are no preferential 
distributions, including in respect of other elements classified as the highest quality issued capital.  
 
 
8.  It is the issued capital that takes the first and proportionately greatest share of any losses as they 
occur.  Within the highest quality capital, each instrument absorbs losses on a going concern basis 
proportionately and pari passu with all the others.  
 
 
9.  The paid in amount is recognised as equity capital (ie not recognised as a liability) for determining 
balance sheet insolvency.  
 
 
10.  The paid in amount is classified as equity under the relevant accounting standards.  
 
 
11.  It is directly issued and paid-in and the bank cannot directly or indirectly have funded the purchase of 
the instrument. 
 
 
12.  The paid in amount is neither secured nor covered by a guarantee of the issuer or related entity 
or subject to any other arrangement that legally or economically enhances the seniority of the claim. 
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Source: Basel Committee on Bank Supervision: Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework 
for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems. December 2010, Basel, at www.bis.org  
 
 
 
 
 
13.  It is only issued with the approval of the owners of the issuing bank, either given directly by the 
owners or, if permitted by applicable law, given by the Board of Directors or by other persons duly 
authorised by the owners.  
 
 
14.  It is clearly and separately disclosed on the bank’s balance sheet.  
 
Criteria for inclusion in additional Tier 1 capital 
 
1.  Issued and paid-in 
 
2.  Subordinated to depositors, general creditors and subordinated debt of the bank 
 
3.  Is neither secured nor covered by a guarantee of the issuer or related entity or other arrangement 
that legally or economically enhances the seniority of the claim vis-à-vis bank creditors. 
 
4.  Is perpetual, i.e. there is no maturity date and there are no step-ups or other incentives to redeem 
 
5.  May be callable at the initiative of the issuer only after a minimum of five years:  
     a.  To exercise a call option a bank must receive prior supervisory approval; and  
     b.  A bank must not do anything which creates an expectation that the call will be exercised; and  
     c.  Banks must not exercise a call unless:  
          i. They replace the called instrument with capital of the same or better quality and the 
replacement of this capital is done at conditions which are sustainable for the income capacity of the 
bank; or  
          ii. The bank demonstrates that its capital position is well above the minimum capital 
requirements after the call option is exercised. 
 
 
6.  Any repayment of principal (eg through repurchase or redemption) must be with prior supervisory 
approval and banks should not assume or create market expectations that supervisory approval 
will be given. 
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Source: Basel Committee on Bank Supervision: Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework 
for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems. December 2010, Basel, at www.bis.org  
 
 
7.  Dividend/coupon discretion:  
     a.  the bank must have full discretion at all times to cancel distributions/payments 
     b.  cancellation of discretionary payments must not be an event of default  
     c.  banks must have full access to cancelled payments to meet obligations as they fall due  
     d.  cancellation of distributions/payments must not impose restrictions on the bank except in 
relation to distributions to common stockholders.  
 
 
8.  Dividends/coupons must be paid out of distributable items  
 
 
9.  The instrument cannot have a credit sensitive dividend feature, that is a dividend/coupon that is 
reset periodically based in whole or in part on the banking organisation’s credit standing.  
 
 
10.  The instrument cannot contribute to liabilities exceeding assets if such a balance sheet test 
forms part of national insolvency law.  
 
11.  Instruments classified as liabilities for accounting purposes must have principal loss absorption 
through either (i) conversion to common shares at an objective pre-specified trigger point or (ii) a 
write-down mechanism which allocates losses to the instrument at a pre-specified trigger point. 
The write-down will have the following effects:  
           a.  Reduce the claim of the instrument in liquidation;  
           b.  Reduce the amount re-paid when a call is exercised; and  
           c.  Partially or fully reduce coupon/dividend payments on the instrument.  
 
12.  Neither the bank nor a related party over which the bank exercises control or significant 
influence can have purchased the instrument, nor can the bank directly or indirectly have funded 
the purchase of the instrument  
 
 
13.  The instrument cannot have any features that hinder recapitalisation, such as provisions that 
require the issuer to compensate investors if a new instrument is issued at a lower price during a 
specified time frame  
 
 
14.  If the instrument is not issued out of an operating entity or the holding company in the 
consolidated group (eg a special purpose vehicle – “SPV”), proceeds must be immediately 
available without limitation to an operating entity or the holding company in the consolidated 
group in a form which meets or exceeds all of the other criteria for inclusion in Additional Tier 1 
capital 
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7.  The instrument cannot have a credit sensitive dividend feature, that is a dividend/coupon that is 
reset periodically based in whole or in part on the banking organisation’s credit standing.  
 
 
8.  Neither the bank nor a related party over which the bank exercises control or significant influence 
can have purchased the instrument, nor can the bank directly or indirectly have funded the 
purchase of the instrument  
 
 
9.  If the instrument is not issued out of an operating entity or the holding company in the 
consolidated group (eg a special purpose vehicle – “SPV”), proceeds must be immediately 
available without limitation to an operating entity or the holding company in the consolidated 
group in a form which meets or exceeds all of the other criteria for inclusion in Tier 2 Capital  
 
 
Source: Basel Committee on Bank Supervision: Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework 
for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems. December 2010, Basel, at www.bis.org  
Criteria for inclusion in Tier 2 Capital  
 
1.  Issued and paid-in  
 
2.  Subordinated to depositors and general creditors of the bank  
 
3.  Is neither secured nor covered by a guarantee of the issuer or related entity or other arrangement 
that legally or economically enhances the seniority of the claim vis-à-vis depositors and general 
bank creditors  
 
 
4 . Maturity:  
     a.  minimum original maturity of at least five years  
     b.  recognition in regulatory capital in the remaining five years before maturity will be amortised 
on a straight line basis  
     c.  there are no step-ups or other incentives to redeem  
  
 
5.  May be callable at the initiative of the issuer only after a minimum of five years:  
     a.  To exercise a call option a bank must receive prior supervisory approval;  
     b.  A bank must not do anything that creates an expectation that the call will be exercised;19 and  
     c.  Banks must not exercise a call unless:  
           i. They replace the called instrument with capital of the same or better quality and the 
replacement of this capital is done at conditions which are sustainable for the income 
capacity of the bank; or  
           ii. The bank demonstrates that its capital position is well above the minimum capital 
requirements after the call option is exercised. 
 
 
6.  The investor must have no rights to accelerate the repayment of future scheduled payments 
(coupon or principal), except in bankruptcy and liquidation.  
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